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Abstract 
This study sets out to analyse the dynamics and complexities of Moroccan-Spanish relations 
“from above and from below” over a period of 22 years (1990 to 2012) by exploring the 
impact of the supra-state (EU) and the sub-state (Catalan) entities on the bilateral 
relationship. While the Rabat-Madrid nexus is the main focus, the thesis also surveys 
Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations, focussing on economic, migration and 
cooperation policy areas where Spain, the EU and Catalonia have shared but varying degrees 
of competence. The investigation seeks to examine whether the complexity of relations and 
actors turn out to be beneficial or detrimental to the Rabat-Madrid bilateral ties, and strives to 
produce a theoretically informed investigation by framing the dynamics of this complex 
relationship in theoretical terms. Multi-level governance, Europeanization, Complex 
Interdependence and Omnibalancing are the main theoretical frameworks discussed.  
With regard to the central relationship (Moroccan-Spanish relations), the research highlights 
its complex, multifaceted and cyclical nature. It underlines some of the structural problems 
plaguing the bilateral ties such as the dissimilar political systems, the territorial squabbles, 
economic interests and disparities, migration and security challenges, and the negative public 
opinion; and it also points to the flourishing web of interdependencies forcing the two 
neighbours to cooperate such as the intensifying economic, political, and social issues.  
As to Morocco-EU relations, it transpires that Madrid looms relatively large in most EU-
Moroccan ties, especially in economic (fisheries and agricultural) and migration issues. 
Brussels also plays an on-going structural role allowing Madrid to de-problematize some of 
its dealings with Rabat, by providing resources and a platform allowing Rabat and Madrid to 
focus on more constructive issues. Importance of Moroccan-Catalan relations is illustrated by 
the large proportion of Moroccan immigrants living in the autonomous region and the 
sustained economic and official relations between Barcelona and Rabat. Although Catalonia 
has its own priorities linked to its economic interests, identity, security, international prestige, 
and influence in Spanish politics, Barcelona’s impact on Rabat-Madrid relations has mainly 
been positive, if not complementary.  
The research also highlights the lingering and potential structural problems in the inter-state 
bilateral relationship including territorial issues, economic interests and disparities, security 
challenges, negative perceptions, etc. However, it concludes that the proliferation of actors 
and the diversification of interests has largely generated a shield of common 
interdependencies that mitigate tensions and prevent potential conflicts. The thesis argues, 
therefore, for Complex Interdependence as a fairly satisfactory theoretical base, albeit with 
limitations. The theory has the potential to frame the dynamics of this complex relationship 
where increased interdependencies seems to create a buffer of common interests withstanding 
conflict. Within this framework, the EU and Catalonia can be perceived as external actors and 
contact channels, largely facilitating relations and alleviating tensions. 
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Chapter one - Introduction, questions, and review of literature 
 General introduction 
 For centuries, the story of Morocco and Spain has been, and continues to be, frenzied, fertile 
and fascinating. It is the tale of two incongruent neighbours with a long lasting love-hate 
relationship, a history fraught with chapters of mutual domination and capitulation, tension and 
détente, as well as cooperation and grand accomplishments. Almost everything matters in the 
analysis of the unpredictable, complex and convoluted relationship of this couple: history, 
geography, religion, race, culture, politics, economy, security, strategy, etc. The point of 
encounter between them marks the meeting between Africa and Europe, Islam and Christianity, 
South and North, and East and West, with premonitions of mutual entrenchment, prejudice, 
aversion, and bellicosity; or the promise of mutual appreciation, cross-learning, abundance, 
and productive cooperation. Their common history is everything but dull, as they share a 
turbulent yet extremely lush legacy. The nine centuries of Arab and Islamic influence in the 
peninsula that started from the first Arab/Berber conquest of 711 until the final expulsion of 
the Moriscos in 1610,1 and the almost five centuries of Iberian presence in North Africa have 
left a lasting heritage of tensions, suspicion, mistrust and, ironically, ignorance on both sides 
of the Strait. Yet it also left records of abundant exchanges and miscegenation, tales of fabled 
cohabitation, splendid monuments and architecture, and the promise of more to come.  
 
The more recent past beginning with the strained period of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco 
between 1912 and 1956, however, made the schism grow even deeper. After Morocco’s 
independence, the bilateral relations were still disrupted by intermittent crises and spats, but 
they started changing course, veering towards periods of pragmatism, negotiation and 
cooperation. The last half century was, therefore, characterized by cycles of hostility and 
friendship, rapprochement and disputes, and cooperation and conflict. Tensions over Tarfaya 
in 1958, Ifni in 1969, the Green March in 1975, the major fisheries crises of 1995 and 2001, 
and the 2001 to 2002 diplomatic crises were punctuated by no less than 105 agreements 
                                                          
1 The term “Moriscos” refers to the (two to three million) descendants of the Muslim populations in Spain and 
Portugal who chose to remain in the Peninsula (sometimes forcibly converting to Christianity) after the downfall 
of the last Muslim bastion of Granada in 1492. On April 9th 1609, Philip III of Spain ordered the expulsion of 
the last half million of them. See (Lane-Poole, 1990: 279). For further details see also (Bernabé Pons, 2009) and 
(Caro Baroja, 2003).  
 
11 
 
between Madrid and Rabat over the 1956 – 2005 period (second only to France with 148 
agreements, and ahead of the USA with 76 agreements and Germany with 66 agreements) 
(Torrejon Rodríguez, 2006: 5-6).  
 
Aside from a rich and fascinating past, the contemporary relationship of these two countries, 
presents a host of intriguing elements. Even after Spain surrendered the occupied northern 
territories to the newly independent Moroccan kingdom in 1956, the bilateral relationship 
remained edgy compared to Morocco’s relations with France, the other colonial power, mainly 
since Spain was still occupying territories in the country. However, in the aftermath of Spain’s 
accession to the European Community (EC) in 1986 (the main focus of this research), the 
relationship gradually entered a new stage. While old elements of tension did not disappear 
(territorial issues, political disagreements, economic squabbles, historical legacies, 
perceptions, etc.), bilateral relations started to proliferate and consolidate, creating a buffer of 
incremental common interests that managed to counterbalance the adversarial aspects in the 
relationship. Probably, another assuaging factor was the EC accession itself, as it ushered in a 
new player in the form of the European Community. The EC (and later the EU) gradually 
converted itself into a key partner for Morocco but also an important component in Moroccan-
Spanish relations. Finally, the period also coincided with the budding of Spain’s devolved 
political system and the entry into play of some of its prominent regions such as Catalonia and 
Andalucía. Such historical Spanish regions started to act as fully-fledged autonomies, 
conducting their own external relations and driving their distinctive goals and policy priorities. 
This research aims to bring these elements together, examining contemporary Moroccan-
Spanish relations and exploring the impact of the supranational as well as the sub-state 
dimensions. 
 
 Research questions and assumptions  
Considerable research and numerous studies have looked at contemporary Spanish relations 
with countries south of the Mediterranean in general, and with Morocco in particular. But as 
the review of literature will reveal, the majority of these mainly focused on the strictly 
bilateral relationships. While some experts have explored the EU’s part in the relationship 
(Villaverde, 2000; López García and De Larramendi, 2002; Martín, 2003; Vaquer, 2004b; 
González García, 2006; Zapata-Barrero and De Witte, 2007; Bremberg, 2012), fewer studies 
have examined more complex scopes of the relationship that would include the contribution 
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of other players in shaping the bilateral ties, such as the neighbouring countries, the 
superpowers, non-state actors, or the Spanish autonomous regions. This research aspires to 
examine relations between Morocco and Spain over a period of 22 years (1990 – 2012) “from 
above and from below”, gauging the contribution and the impact of the EU as well as the 
autonomous region of Catalonia. While the Rabat-Madrid nexus is the main focus and the 
key component of this set of connections (a substantial part of this project will be dedicated 
to the wider Moroccan-Spanish bilateral aspects), the research will equally evaluate the input 
of the EU and Catalonia to see the extent to which they converge with, impact, or shape the 
Rabat-Madrid bilateral ties. For this purpose, the thesis will also examine the two other 
(Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan) bilateral relations, focussing on issues where the 
three actors (Spain, the EU and Catalonia) have shared, but varying, degrees of competence 
with regard to their relations with Morocco. The result will be the exploration the three 
dyadic relationships where the main objective is to capture some of the complexities of the 
wider Moroccan-Spanish ties. The main research questions this research is seeking to answer, 
therefore, are as follows: 
 
1- How can Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations during 
the (1990 - 2012) period be characterised, especially in the areas of migration, the 
economy and cooperation? 
2- What kind of impact did the EU and Catalonia have on Moroccan-Spanish relations 
during this period and does the complexity of relations and actors turn out to be 
beneficial or detrimental to the Rabat-Madrid relationship?  
3- Finally, how can this complex North-South relationship be adequately captured in 
theoretical terms?  
 
This investigation, therefore, examines some of the major aspects involved in Moroccan-
Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations, but will concentrate on policy areas 
(migration, economic, and cooperation issues) where Madrid, Brussels and Barcelona possess 
varying degrees of competence in order to see how each of these actors manages these issues 
and pursues their interests and what drives them to do so. The research also aims to find out 
whether motives, policies and actions of Madrid, Barcelona and Brussels towards Rabat 
converge or diverge; it also seeks to explore the impact of Catalonia’s and EU’s parallel 
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relationships with Rabat on Spain’s approach, interests and policy outcomes. By doing so, the 
research also aims to find out whether this variety of interlocutors generates a concert or a 
cacophony, i.e. whether the multiplicity of actors in the relationship creates a basis for more 
security, stability and improvement in Moroccan-Spanish relationship or makes it more 
complicated and difficult to manage. Last but not least, the thesis seeks to produce a 
theoretically informed analysis and tries to identify possible conceptual paradigms likely to 
adequately frame this complex relationship.  
 
The thesis advances a number of postulations with regard to the research questions. Its first 
assumption is that due to the continuing upward and downward shifts of influence towards the 
supranational level and the sub-state levels at the expense of the traditional monopoly of central 
governments in the European context, relationships and foreign policy agenda are no longer 
shaped and determined solely through centralized decisions. These agenda rather emerge from 
a complex process of strategies, negotiations, bargains and concessions that involve other non-
state actors. Policy-making, and therefore power, is shared across multiple levels of 
government, including the state, the sub-state and the supra-state. It would, therefore, follow 
from this that both Catalonia and Brussels bring their weight to bear in the Rabat-Madrid 
bilateral relationship, thereby forming a complex web of multiple relationships, interests, 
bargains, concessions and agenda.  
 
The second assumption is that while the objectives and actions of these players do not 
necessarily converge (due to their diverging priorities, identities and goals),2 they do share 
some common values, norms, interests and visions. This may create simultaneous processes of 
convergence and divergence, leaving the overall situation fairly mixed and in need of a 
balanced assessment. I also postulate that while Spain may find it debilitating and irritating to 
have competing and meddling actors, and while Morocco may find it both convenient and 
tedious to have a multiplicity of interlocutors, the presence of the supranational and sub-state 
channels brings a largely constructive contribution to this traditionally difficult bilateral 
relationship. These non-state actors may create a proliferation of cooperation opportunities, 
mediate or intervene during crisis periods. Equally, they may alleviate tensions by directly 
assuming responsibility to negotiate or manage some of the sticking points in the relationship. 
                                                          
2 Madrid defends its national interest, the EU defends the wider European interests and Barcelona is partly 
driven by a desire to assert its autonomy and national identity. 
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Finally, I would propose that this complex relationship may not be framed using a simple 
conceptual paradigm due to the multiplicity of issues and actors involved, the existence of 
cooperation and conflict elements and the disparate environments in which the actors revolve 
(Morocco, on one side, and Spain, the EU and Catalonia, on the other). A creative combination 
of conceptual frameworks and theories may be necessary. 
 Research relevance, rationale and limitations 
As was highlighted in the general introduction, this research aims at exploring a unique aspect 
of international relations considering the dimensions of the case under scrutiny (a North/South 
and East/West nexus) and the actors involved (two distinct countries, a supranational entity 
and a sub-state actor), which makes this “relationship complex”3 a particularly exciting and 
rich subject, potentially in terms of tensions but also with regard to the need to cooperate in 
close proximity. This relationship acquires even deeper significance considering the 
international geo-strategic importance of the Strait of Gibraltar as well as the significance of 
this locus to the wider Euro-Mediterranean relations. Indeed, the bilateral relationship is not 
only important to the two actors but is also of strategic and symbolic importance to the 
Mediterranean region, the wider Europe and other world powers such as the United States. 
Stability, cooperation and increased interdependence appear to be the main priorities for these 
regional and international actors with a view to avoiding situations or tensions likely to trigger 
serious security, economic, political or humanitarian crises. The importance of this relationship 
is probably best appreciated during times of bilateral crises, such as the 2002 Perejil/Laila 
crisis,4 that often see considerable international involvement to resolve potentially problematic 
issues.  
 
However, while bearing a number of distinctive hallmarks, this complex relationship is by no 
means a singular or an isolated example. The Spanish-Moroccan relationship does indeed 
boast some historical, strategic and geographic specificities and Spain's patent 
                                                          
3 This concept is equally interesting from a theoretical perspective (see Chapter 2), as it will help us 
conceptualize this complex set of relationships relying on such conceptual frameworks as the Multi-level 
Governance debate (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Bache and Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010, etc.) and Buzan and 
Waever’s concept of “Security Complexes” (Buzan and Waever, 2003). 
4 Perejil in Spanish, Leila in Arabic or Taura in Berber is the name of the islet the size of a football field over 
which Spain and Morocco almost came to blows in July 2002. It is situated at about 150 meters off the 
Moroccan coast and 11 kilometres west of Ceuta. The resolution of the spat over this “stupid little island” saw 
the intervention of such super powers as the EU, France and the US. Colin Powell, then US Secretary of State, 
dedicated two full days of “telephone diplomacy” to secure a return to the status quo ante (Gillespie, 2006: 120). 
15 
 
decentralisation is an extra distinctive feature. However, the case also represents an example 
of the increasingly dense North-South relations spanning the Euro-Mediterranean interface. 
This research may, therefore, also hold relevance for other significant North-South 
relationships extending into the south-western Neighbourhood (Morocco-France, Algeria-
France, Algeria-Spain, Tunisia-France, Tunisia-Italy, etc.). Therefore, quite apart from the 
relationship itself, the case can be used as a model for similar Mediterranean (or even 
international) relationship complexes and may bear equally significant theoretical 
implications (to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 and the concluding chapter).  
 
But before proceeding any further, there are a number of questions that still beg for an answer. 
First of all, what justifies the choice of the autonomous region of Catalonia when other regions 
such as Andalucía, Galicia or the Canary Islands could have been chosen instead? What is the 
rationale behind the choice of the time frame, particularly the year 1990 as a starting date? Why 
concentrate on the areas of migration, economy, and cooperation? What do these areas actually 
comprise? And will these be sufficient to substantiate and warrant valid empirical and 
theoretical conclusions?  
 
While the role of the EU in the bilateral relationship has been reasonably well examined and 
might be self-evident due to its on-going structural role, the relevance of a Spanish region might 
sound less so. Catalonia’s place in this quadrilateral equation, however, becomes particularly 
pertinent when we consider a number of facts. With almost 16% of the overall Spanish 
population, Catalonia was home to some 270,000 Moroccan immigrants by 2010 (some 35% 
of their total in Spain); it was by far the largest foreign community in the autonomous region, 
followed by the Romanian (88,000) and the Ecuadorian (80,000).5 Equally significant, more 
than one-third of Spanish companies established in Morocco are Catalan and the region’s share 
of overall Spanish investments in Morocco between 1990 and 2010 represented almost a third, 
and exceeded 50% in 2011.6 Moreover, since the early 1990s, strong Catalan-Moroccan 
bilateral relations kept evolving. Rabat is not only the first destination of Spanish Prime 
Ministers’ foreign visits but that of Catalan premiers as well. Jordi Pujol, Pascual Maragall, 
José Montilla and Artur Mas have all made Rabat their first destination outside of Europe. And 
aside from economic cooperation and migration issues, other issues such as the Sahara, civil 
                                                          
5 See statistical data available at the Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya Idescat.cat 
6 Interview with the Director General of external affairs at the Catalan Generalitat (20 June 2012). 
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society cooperation, tourism, education, culture and other social projects make the Catalan 
dimension loom even larger in the equation.  
 
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter five, the choice of the autonomous community 
of Catalonia is justified by its historic importance in the Morocco-Spain nexus as well. Indeed, 
Catalonia is also part of Spain’s relation with Morocco in that it often provides a support role 
for Madrid in its ties with Rabat. On numerous occasions, Catalan officials have played 
intermediation roles between the two countries, especially during difficult periods. At the same 
time, the central government in Madrid remains wary of Catalonia’s behaviour with regard to 
the region’s own interests and nationalistic aspirations. Catalonia does indeed loom large in all 
the policy areas chosen in this investigation (migration, economy and cooperation issues), and 
acquires additional importance when we consider the region’s strong sense of autonomy and 
national identity. Catalonia, much like the Basque country or Galicia, is one of Spain’s “historic 
regions”, not the result of some arbitrary administrative segmentation. And although it behaves 
as one of the Spanish regions, its significance equally resides in its pretensions to a deeper 
autonomy and even independence. Policies in areas such as language, education, culture, and 
immigration are strong indicators that nationalism is a major driver for Catalonia. Its external 
relations are, therefore, partly perceived as international relations rather than simple external 
dealings, and the fact that successive governments have been closely involved in promoting, 
sometimes mediating in, Spain’s relations with Morocco, or that Catalonia has been playing a 
prominent role in the Euro-Mediterranean process are strong indications of the Catalan 
singularity and importance. Finally, Barcelona-based institutions such as the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) permanent secretariat, the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local 
Assembly (ARLEM), and the European Institute for the Mediterranean (IEMed), as well as the 
presence of two important Moroccan consulates in the region (in Barcelona and Tarragona) are 
extra signs of the strategic importance of Catalonia at the bilateral, multilateral and regional 
levels. 
Regarding the second question, it is true that landmark years such as 1986 (marking Spain’s 
EEC accession), or 1995 (marking the launching of the Barcelona process) are more symbolic 
dates that this study might have opted for as starting years for this research analysis. 
However, 1990 was chosen not so much because it is a round number but rather because it 
sufficiently captures the many consequences of Spain’s EEC accession and its impact on 
Morocco, while also capturing the chain of events that led to the 1995 Barcelona process. 
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Indeed, the effects of Spain’s EU accession on Moroccan-Spanish relations started to be felt 
only in the beginning of the 1990s. It took a few years of adaptation before Europeanization 
of Spain’s external relations started to be felt. The beginning of the decade also marks the 
coming to maturity of a shift in Spain’s attitude and policies towards Morocco from a 
predominantly zero-sum to an increasingly win-win logic and from competition to 
rapprochement principles.  Also, Catalonia’s role in the bilateral relationship was hardly 
significant before the early 1990s. In fact, the region’s impact and external projection, 
especially with regard to its relations with Rabat and the southern Mediterranean, started to 
become visible only a few years into the decade. The choice of the time span (22 years) was 
also motivated by a host of reasons. The period, in the author’s view, is neither too short nor 
too long, and it encompasses a number of key events and transitions. In Spain, it covers three 
important political transitions: from the socialist party (PSOE) dominance since 1982 to the 
right wing Popular Party (PP) in 1996, back to the socialists in 2004, and back again to the PP 
in 2011. The time frame also provides a convenient framework since it captures a good 
representative sample of important events, incidents, ups and downs that can shed light on the 
complexities of the bilateral relationship as well as Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan 
relations, and warrant conclusions and interpretations.  This time period is also opportune 
from the Moroccan perspective as it includes an important decade of Hassan II’s rule, the 
launching of the liberalisation process with the first alternance government of 1998,7 and the 
coming to power of Mohamed VI in 1999; it even catches a glimpse of the aftermath of the 
so-called “Arab Spring”. As far as Morocco-EU relations are concerned, the time frame 
proves equally apt as it covers the first Moroccan-EU bilateral crisis of 1992, the negotiation 
period leading up to the 1995 Association Agreement (AA), its entry into force in 2000, and 
the granting to Morocco of the so-called “advanced status” in 2008. Finally, from the Catalan 
perspective, this period is equally interesting as it captures important government transitions: 
from Convergència i Unió (CiU) government8 to two leftist coalitions in 2003 and 2006, then 
                                                          
7 In Morocco, 1998 was marked by the election of a new government led by the long-standing opposition 
socialist party (USFP). At its helm stood the leader of the party and chosen Prime Minister Abderrahmane El 
Youssoufi. This stage in Morocco’s political transition is referred to as the “Alternance”. 
8 CiU (Convergència i Unió) (Convergence and Union) is a federation of two constituent parties, the Democratic 
Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and its smaller counterpart, the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). It is a 
moderate nationalist party in Catalonia. It ruled the autonomous region from 1980 to 2003 under Jordi Pujol and 
came back to power in 2010 under its leader Artur Mas, currently the President of the Catalan Government. 
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back to a CiU government in 2010. This period also witnessed a number of official visits by 
Catalan premiers to Morocco (in 1994, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012). 
The ‘policy-specific’ thematic choice is not arbitrary either. The literature on Spanish-
Moroccan relations encompasses a vast array of potentially pertinent subjects and issues: 
most salient and recurrent among which are historical and perceptual issues, territorial 
disputes (the Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, etc.), migration, security, economic relations, 
fisheries, agriculture, and cooperation issues. Themes like history and perceptions, territorial 
issues and security are crucial and will be discussed in the sections where they are most 
pertinent, but they do not lend themselves to the top and bottom analysis we are seeking to 
undertake here. In fact, while this research will touch upon all these issues, it will focus more 
on the shared issues among the three polity levels. Rather than trying to be unrealistically 
comprehensive and for the sake of practicality, this research is concentrating on a fairly 
adequate number of representative policy areas that are important, relevant at all levels of 
analysis, and carry sufficient elements of tension and cooperation to substantiate valid 
conclusions. Indeed, important bilateral issues will crop up and be discussed, but more focus 
will be more on migration, economic and cooperation issues that represent major policy areas 
whose relevance is clear and assessable at the three levels of analysis. Migration is an 
increasingly crucial issue for Morocco, Spain, Catalonia and the EU, and its relevance, 
magnitude and centrality have been intensifying since the mid-1990s. The number of 
Moroccan immigrants in the EU, Spain and Catalonia is significant (estimated at 2.75 
million, 870 and 280 thousand respectively). Migration became a priority issue in Morocco’s 
relations with its three European partners, and immigrants are a source of much needed 
remittances, tourism and development projects for their country of origin. Their integration, 
contribution and control of illicit immigration are increasingly burning subjects for the four 
actors.  
The second issue that will be analysed in more detail is the economic aspect. More 
specifically, the thesis will scrutinize some macro-economic aspects such as GDP, trade 
exchange volumes, trade balance and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The reason behind the 
focus on these macroeconomic economic criteria is because they are pertinent for the four 
entities, growing in importance, constitute a sizeable component in the relationships, and are 
fairly representative of the overall economic balance of power. These benchmarks also have 
the advantage that they are quantifiable, evolving and comparable across the three levels of 
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analysis. Macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, trade balance or FDI are not only 
important per se. Trade balance deficit or surplus, for example, reflects the economic balance 
of power and dominant/dependent positions. For instance, the fact that Moroccan-Spanish 
bilateral trade represents almost 20% for the Alawi Kingdom as opposed to between 1 and 
1.5% for Spain9 (with the EU, figures stand at 60 to 70% as opposed to less than 1%) is an 
important indicator when it comes to analysing sensitivities and vulnerabilities (see Chapter 2 
under Complex Interdependence theory). Trade is equally important since it reveals each 
party’s comparative advantages as well as the various conditions, restrictions and regulations 
associated with these, which are yet more indicators of power distribution as well as the 
afore-mentioned asymmetries. Finally, the broad theme of cooperation also applies to all the 
four actors. Under this heading, the thesis explores both tangible and the intangible 
components. Through this theme the research will touch on issues such as official visits and 
agreement signatures, collaboration on various issues, development aid, technical support, 
etc. as well as collaboration at the level of civil society and non-state actors. This issue is not 
only important for its symbolic, political and diplomatic implications, but it is also a crucial 
gauge for the state of the relationships that lends itself to a horizontal analysis encompassing 
the state, sub-state and supranational levels. 
Nevertheless, this enterprise is not without its limitations and potential pitfalls. Trying to 
obtain conclusions relative to the European Union’s and Catalonia’s contribution to 
Moroccan-Spanish relations based on migration, economic, and cooperation issues is 
certainly important and bears thematic and theoretical value, but determining the scope and 
impact of Brussels and Barcelona on the Rabat-Madrid ties based solely on three policy areas 
might be problematic, as the bilateral relationship is much more complex and multifarious, 
and Catalonia’s and the EU’s respective roles transcend these two aspects.  However, for the 
sake of focus and consistency this research has chosen issues that bear enough importance 
and carry sufficient elements of cooperation and tension to warrant plausible analysis and 
conclusions. Also, as previously explained, migration, economy and cooperation issues are 
outstanding and central aspects in the relationship. It would probably be best to focus on 
                                                          
9 Figures stood at less than 1% until 2001 and only reached 1.5% in 2011 as a result of the enduring economic 
crisis in Spain and the massive orientation to new markets like Latin America and Morocco (Zibaoui, 2012) (see 
economy and cooperation section in Chapter 3). In 2012, the total volume of Spanish exports to Morocco hit a 
new record, exceeding 2% (See El País article “Doble récord comercial con Marruecos” 24 March 2013.). 
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these key representative issues to portray the broader multilateral relationship dynamics 
rather than try to be comprehensive at the risk of superficiality.    
Another potential “Achilles’ heel” for this endeavour is its reliance on a single regional case 
study (Catalonia) to draw conclusions on the role of sub-state actors in this complex 
relationship, as opposed to a wider comparative enterprise. While Morocco has no such intra-
state entities, Andalucía and the Canary Islands are certainly two potentially relevant cases 
whose inclusion would have strengthened this investigation (had resources and time scale 
permitted), considering their strong ties with Morocco and their weight in overall Moroccan-
Spanish relations. Whereas it is to be hoped that studies focusing on Andalucía and the 
Canary Islands will ensue, this limitation is partly counterweighed by the substantial and 
singular role of Catalonia, its advanced autonomy status and its nationalistic aspirations, 
making it a more fully-fledged and even a “quasi-international” actor. In fact, Catalonia’s 
status could become even more important if the region’s recent pro-independence tendencies 
were to reach fruition. With regard to the policy areas under scrutiny, and as was previously 
argued, Catalonia is much more relevant considering its strong official relationship with 
Morocco, its advanced and comparatively more comprehensive migration policy, the high 
percentage of Moroccans living there and the more significant volume of trade and economic 
relations between the two, as the following table illustrates. 
Table 1.1 Catalonia’s relative importance in economy and migration issues 
 2011 
Population 
(in million) 
Number of 
Moroccan 
immigrants (2011 
figures) 
Average annual 
trade volume with 
Morocco 
 2007 – 2012* 
Estimated number 
of companies active 
in Morocco (2011) 
 
Spain 47 .2 788 000 6.1 billion 800 
Catalonia 7.6 (16%) 272 000 (35%) 1.45 billion 
(23.7%) 
300 (37.5%) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from Spanish and Catalan official statistical agencies 
(www.ene.es and www.idescat.cat), as well as data from www.icex.es and www.maec.es  
* It should be noted, however, that Morocco maintains trade deficits with both Spain and Catalonia. 
 
 
 Methodology 
Having stated the research questions and discussed the rationale behind the choice of actors, 
time frame and policy areas chosen as well as some of the research limitations, this section will 
discuss how the research activities were elaborated and developed out of the research questions. 
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In other words, how the research questions were progressed and expounded into research 
strategies and actions and how the author went about carrying out these strategies and actions. 
The questions this research has asked involve various polity layers, different thematic levels, 
empirical and theoretical discussions. Trying to provide a coherent interpretation and 
conceptualisation of this hybrid relationship within the policy areas chosen means the resort to 
a range of strategies involving empirical data collection, field work, interviews, some archival 
exploration as well as an extensive study of the material published on the subject in the form 
of books and academic articles, theses, official documents and publications, newspapers, 
magazines, specialized websites and other online material and statistical data. 
 
There is a wealth of second-hand bibliographic material on Spanish-Moroccan, EU-Moroccan 
and some publications on Catalan-Moroccan relations. The review of literature will 
subsequently cover some of the most outstanding works on these subjects. The research 
activities started with a fairly thorough study of these sources in order to identify perspectives, 
arguments, data and information, analysis, conceptual interpretations, as well as gaps and 
possible research niches. These sources proved to be extremely useful in a number of ways. 
First, after reading a variety of books and research articles in Arabic, Spanish, French, Catalan 
and English, an interesting trend of perspectives started to emerge. These written sources have 
provided valuable insight into the diversity of outlooks and approaches that prompted the 
author to subsequently organise the literature review in terms of the two most salient 
perspectives: A northern and a southern viewpoint, as will be later discussed. Second, these 
secondary sources also provided a wealth of analysis, facts and evidence on the state of the 
three pairs of relationships under investigation. Sources in Spanish have proved to be 
particularly valuable in this regard, thanks to the interest of Spanish academics and experts in 
Moroccan-Spanish relations and thanks to the existence of a range of relatively independent 
research institutes and centres keen on the subject, especially in Madrid, Andalucía and 
Barcelona. In-depth discussion and analysis of migration issues, economic relations, and other 
aspects of bilateral relations is constantly updated and debated, reflecting the significance of 
the subject in Spain and popular interest in the issue. Third, some of these sources (especially 
academic theses) have equally offered some theoretical discussions and interpretations, mainly 
of Moroccan-Spanish relations, and occasionally of the role of the EU in the bilateral 
relationship. In Arabic, on the other hand, there is a plethora of journalistic articles and non-
peer reviewed material on the subject, but fewer books and research articles. Predictably 
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enough, these sources offer a fairly different thematic focus and perspective, as will be 
discussed later. 
 
These sources have proved to be essential in deepening the author’s understanding of the issues, 
but in order to approach the research questions convincingly and with some degree of 
comprehensiveness there was also a need to fill a number of gaps. First, as the research is 
covering a contemporary period and a conflictual relationship, there was a need to seek up-to-
date and contrasted sources of information. The approach with regard to this first gap was to 
resort to newspaper and magazine coverage, especially in Arabic and Spanish. In fact, the 
research often relied on some relatively independent sources from both sides, such as El País 
and El Mundo in Spain or non-partisan Moroccan publications such as Tel Quel, Al Massae or 
l’Economiste. El País in particular proved to be a useful source of information mainly due to 
its comprehensive coverage of Spanish-Moroccan relations, although its approach tends to 
echo the predominantly negative coverage of Morocco found throughout the Spanish media 
(on which more Chapter 3). Second, there was little research available on Moroccan-Catalan 
relations. This is obviously a fringe topic and, aside from a few academic articles and 
specialized publications, there was a need to address this lacuna through field work, archival 
research and interviews. During the course of this research, three visits were made to Barcelona 
where data was collected from such institutions as CIDOB, IEMed and ACC1Ó, and where 
interviews were conducted with Catalan government representatives, former officials, business 
representations, civil society actors, investors, experts and researchers, etc. This work was also 
complemented by the collection of some articles published by some Catalonia-based 
newspapers and publications like La Vanguardia, Afkar and Avui. Third, the research also 
needed to cover the quantitative and measurable aspects since it focuses on such issues as trade 
exchanges, trade balance, the evolution of the number of immigrants, data on remittances, FDI, 
development aid, etc. This information was mainly accessible through government and EU 
reports and publications, official documents and institutional websites such as the Spanish 
Statistical Institute (INE), the Catalan Statistical Institute (Idescat), Moroccan Exchanges 
Office (Office des Changes), Spanish ministry of industry and commerce, Moroccan ministry 
of economy and industry, etc. This official information and statistical data was a crucial part 
of the analysis since the research chose policy areas requiring evidence-based arguments, 
evolutionary statistical and official data. Finally, it was equally important to seek an original 
and up-to-date manner to collect information on official relations, business relations, views and 
opinions of officials, civil society actors and experts. For this reason, an important part of the 
23 
 
research strategy was to access policy documents, directives, statements and speeches, and to 
devise and conduct a good number of semi-structured elite interviews likely to shed light on 
some of the dark corners and fill specific gaps. 
 
The semi-structured elite interviews came in the form of a set of basic questions providing a 
general framework of themes to be explored, but also a set of customized questions depending 
on the context and on the individual interviewees (See appendix 2 for the list of basic questions 
asked). Moroccan, Spanish or Catalan interviewees, for example, were given a core of identical 
questions, but these also varied depending on whether the person was an entrepreneur, a civil 
society actor, a diplomat or an expert. Interviews were conducted in Barcelona, Rabat and 
Madrid with policy makers, diplomats, journalists, experts, business people, civil society 
actors, etc. (see appendix 1 for the full list of interviewees).10 Some phone interviews were also 
carried out with some technocrats and spokespersons in Brussels, targeting directorates-general 
(DGs) such as Agriculture (DG AGRI), Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE), and 
Trade (DG TRADE), as well as services like the European External Action Service (EEAS). 
The semi-structured interviews also sought to shed light on aspects of the relationships that 
were unclear, contentious or recent. Responses to similar questions were then grouped together 
and processed to identify significant trends, convergences or divergences, etc.; while answers 
to specific questions were evaluated for their fitness to substantiate arguments or illustrate 
views and analyses. Some of the most revealing statements are quoted directly to reinforce 
arguments made or lend substance to assessments or interpretations. The trips were also an 
opportunity to undertake some archival investigations, digging out some relevant documents 
that have provided further insight into the web of relationships under scrutiny (Morocco-Spain-
Catalonia-EU), especially those relating to migration, cooperation and economic issues.  
 
In total, more than 40 interviews were conducted. The choice of interviewees was motivated 
by their thematic relevance, official position, expertise or experience. And as mentioned earlier, 
selection was also influenced by the complementary potential that these interviews were likely 
to offer. In other words, interviews were mainly meant to fill existing gaps and shed light either 
on less contemporary events and information, or the latest developments in the relationships 
under study. The higher proportion of interviewees from Catalonia, for example, reflects the 
scarcity of information available on Moroccan-Catalan relations and the need to seek first-hand 
                                                          
10 Names of interviewees are not included as per the University of Liverpool ethics requirements. 
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information and data. Overall, the range and quality of interviews was satisfactory given that a 
number of senior officials, experts and people with experience were able to share their views 
and knowledge with the author. Some interview requests, however, remained unanswered. But 
some of those that took place have had an important added-value on the research. 
 
Finally, having a dual citizenship (Moroccan and Spanish) and having lived and worked in both 
countries, the research is equally influenced by some of the author’s own experience and 
knowledge. This has certainly been an advantage as well as a drawback. On the positive side, 
this made it possible for the author to access a variety of sources in different languages and 
proved helpful in gaining access to people and information. Corresponding and talking to 
interviewees in their mother tongues proved particularly useful in establishing a degree of 
familiarity and confidence, allowing a deeper exchange in a relaxed atmosphere. That also 
created a propitious context that facilitated the expression of views with a degree of openness 
and straightforwardness. However, one important challenge was guarding against subjectivity 
since there was a risk that the author’s views and opinions might influence the research or put 
a personal slant on the questions asked, the research angle or the interpretation of information 
obtained. Aside from the thesis supervision that provided a valuable level of check, and the 
fact that the author does not hold strong opinions with regard to the issues and polities under 
investigation, the policy areas chosen and the criteria utilised to measure them are clear and 
objective enough as to allow a fairly balanced evaluation and analysis of the issues. Also, being 
able to appreciate and understand different viewpoints and perspectives thanks to the wide 
range of sources consulted in various languages and the different views collected during the 
interviews was probably the best guard against partiality and bias. 
 
 Research structure 
As to the organization of this research and the way it will attempt to provide answers to the 
various research questions raised, after providing a reasonably comprehensive review of 
literature of the works published on this subject since the 1990s later in this chapter, the second 
chapter offers some of the conceptual frameworks likely to frame the triple bilateral 
relationships under study. It offers some clues with regard to possible theoretical interpretations 
of this complex relationship, first by offering Multi-level Governance theory as a general 
analytical framework to account for the dynamics at play between Spain, the EU and Catalonia, 
and the seepage of power and influence from the national to the sub-state and supranational 
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levels. The conceptual debate equally explores a number of theories, mainly Europeanization 
and Complex Interdependence, to try to conceptualize the nature of the relationships binding 
Madrid, Barcelona and Brussels with Rabat. The theory chapter also explores “Omnibalancing” 
theory to see the extent to which it can shed light and conceptualize Rabat’s behaviour with the 
European trio.  
 
Next, the research proceeds to the examination of each case, starting with the rich and 
multifaceted aspects of the Rabat-Madrid relationship in Chapter three, examining the 
historical specificities and decision-making structures of these two actors, with a view to 
elucidating the power distribution, workings, processes and actors involved in each one of the 
two national contexts. This clarification is crucial since we are not analysing two countries with 
similar political cultures and structures: Spain is an EU member, a recognised, albeit fledgling, 
democracy and with advanced regionalism, while Morocco is largely considered an 
authoritarian country with a centralized decision-making process, at best “democratizing”, and 
with a distinctive power hierarchy (Albrecht and Wegner, 2006; Dalmasso, 2012; Storm 2007). 
This section is also crucial because it exposes the contradictions between the Moroccan and 
Spanish systems of governance and the resulting misunderstandings, suspicions and pitfalls. 
The chapter also provides an account of the wide-ranging issues in the bilateral relationship, 
highlights the priorities, sensitivities and interests of the two neighbours, as well the key 
internal and external actors involved in the relationship. It tries to reflect the wider debate on 
the relationship while dedicating special attention to official cooperation, trade relations, 
immigration and public opinion.  
 
The analysis of the wider scope of internal and external influences and actors at play in the 
Moroccan-Spanish bilateral dynamics partly serves as an introduction to the on-going structural 
role and framework of the EU and the part it plays, as well as the place and impact of 
autonomous regions such as Catalonia. Once the nature of the Moroccan and Spanish systems 
has been clarified and the range of bilateral relations defined, Chapter four goes on to examine 
Moroccan-EU relations in more detail, but with a special focus on issues relating to 
immigration cooperation and management as well as economic and trade issues, especially 
within the framework of the various agreements signed between the two. The analysis of these 
aspects helps us appreciate the extent to which Brussels influences ties between Rabat and 
Madrid as well as the ways in which Spain and Morocco use and undergo the sway of the 
supranational entity. This chapter benefits from second-hand sources referring to and analysing 
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the existing literature on Moroccan-EU relations, within reference to the wider framework of 
the Euro-Mediterranean relationship. It also falls back on primary sources in the form of EU 
documents, country reports, strategy papers, as well as telephone interviews with EU officials, 
especially at the EU delegation to Morocco, European External Action Service (EEAS), Trade, 
Agriculture and Fisheries DGs.  
 
In the same vein, Chapter five focuses on Moroccan-Catalan relationship starting with a 
historical background and a section on the rise of Catalan nationalism. These are two important 
dimension that shed more light on the rationale behind the choice of Catalonia and its 
importance in the research. The chapter, then, goes on to illuminate the range of relationships 
involved in the Rabat-Barcelona axis, with a special focus on immigration, economic relations 
and cooperation issue. It also helps establish whether, how and why a Spanish region like 
Catalonia uses its autonomy privileges and leeway to shape and influence the bilateral 
relationship between Rabat and Madrid. This chapter draws upon the limited literature 
available on Moroccan-Catalan relations and is further elaborated using a range of first-hand 
documents, speeches and semi-structured interviews that proved extremely useful both in 
getting up-to-date information and deepening understanding and analysis of Moroccan-Catalan 
relations.  
 
Once the nature and functioning of Moroccan and Spanish systems are unveiled, the scope of 
their relationship depicted, the Rabat-Brussels and Rabat-Barcelona connections in relevant 
and comparable areas illustrated, a final analysis of the extent, motivations and impact of their 
influence in the bilateral relationship becomes a more straightforward enterprise. Chapter six 
constitutes an important part of the thesis since it endeavours to find a way to map the three 
relationships, examine their convergences and divergences, analyse and interpret them. The 
final chapter also offers a theoretical discussion based on the paradigms introduced in Chapter 
two and tries to find ways to frame the triple dyadic relationship in appropriate and more 
parsimonious ways. Finally, the conclusions sum up the discussion, highlight the thesis 
contributions, explore the research agenda and make some informed speculations on the future 
of these relationships. 
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 Review of literature 
Academic coverage of Spanish-Moroccan relations has known a qualitative and a quantitative 
leap, attracting increasing interest over the last two decades.11 This recent mounting interest 
is attributed to a host of reasons, but can be boiled down to two main factors: migration and 
Spain’s economic and political achievements. Indeed, on the one hand, Morocco re-
emerged12 in the Spanish literature as a subject of interest in the early 1990s mainly due to 
the growing number of immigrants finding home in various Spanish provinces. This 
immigration was a new phenomenon in the country, visible and mediatised, multiplying 
exponentially, with an alarming illegal component, and was a source of increasing concern 
and interest in the country.13 Spain, on the other hand, became increasingly significant for 
Moroccans following its EEC accession in 1986, its subsequent consolidated democratization 
and its economic miracle, three aspects that are sources of interest and fascination in 
Morocco.14 These factors increasingly made Spain the new Eldorado for swathes of 
Moroccan youth eager to make a living, find jobs and new opportunities. Morocco’s interest 
in Spain is also due to its growing importance for the country’s economy,15 its vital role in the 
Sahara issue as well as the series of cyclical spats between the two neighbours over such 
issues as fisheries, Ceuta and Melilla and the Sahara.  
A number of books, book chapters, research articles and theses have been written on the 
subject since the 1990s in Spanish, Arabic, English and French. The following review of 
literature will mainly concentrate on publications that have tried to provide comprehensive 
analyses of the relationship. These mainly include published books and theses on the bilateral 
relationship but include as well the most influential and seminal academic and research 
articles published in various academic journals and edited volumes, or by research institutes 
                                                          
11 For a more in-depth bibliographical analysis of Spanish-Moroccan relations see (López García, and De 
Larramendi, 2007). Of particular interest see article by Vicente Moga Romero as well as those in part 3 of the 
book.  
12 Eloy Martín Corrales refers to the more significant academic and research interest in Morocco between 1850 
and 1956 compared to the last 50 years (Corrales, 2007: 217). 
13 During the 1980s, Spain quickly moved from a country of emigration to one of immigration. In the early 
2000s, immigration accounted for more than ¾ of the population growth in Spain and the country was hosting 
23% of the total number of immigrants settling in the EU of 15. See (Cohen, 2009: 4-6; Balch, 2010: 58-60). 
14 In 1970, Spanish economy was barely 4 times the size of its Moroccan counterpart, by 2002 it was a 
whopping 13 times its size (Moré, 2004: 165). 
15 In the early 2000s, Spain quickly positioned itself as Morocco’s second economic partner and second source 
of FDI after France (Durán, 2009: 1). 
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such as (López García, 2003; López Garcíaand De Larramendi, 2002; Moré, 2004; Gillespie, 
2006; Amirah-Fernandez, 2008, etc.). Since this study tries to avoid a single issue analysis 
and highlights the multifaceted nature of Moroccan-Spanish relationship by bringing into 
play the regional and supranational dimensions, it will mainly focus on works that have tried 
to offer a more rounded and wide-ranging analysis of the relationship. This review is by no 
means exhaustive but tries to analyse the main contributions to the subject over the last two 
decades. There are many ways in which this review could be organized. It could be separated 
out in terms of works offering a “perspective” value and those that have a more 
“explanatory” value, but these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It could also be 
organized along thematic lines, except that this would result in a proliferation of categories 
that are not necessarily clear-cut. Instead, a more amenable, though not ideal, grouping based 
on the “perspective” of the publications was adopted. This, by no means, implies the 
prevalence of “nationalistic” discourses around the subject but rather reflects the 
predominance of certain themes and subjects that reflect Moroccan concerns, perspectives 
and interests and others that reflect European concerns, interests and perspectives. One way, 
therefore, to collapse the, otherwise multiple, themes into a pair of manageable and reader-
friendly angles is to make a distinction between these publications based on the subjects, 
concerns and view point they convey. This distribution might also prove useful with regard to 
the research ambition, i.e. to examine Moroccan-Spanish relationship. Regrouping recurrent 
themes from a “Southern” and a “Northern” perspective is already one step towards that 
objective. The review will, therefore, dedicate one part to the books or articles published by 
Moroccans or from a predominantly southern perspective and a second part to publications 
by Spanish/European authors or from a predominantly northern perspective. This exercise is 
not only important per se, but it is also essential at this stage as it will provide us with a 
crucial insight into the genres, themes, issues and perspectives of these publications that will 
reinforce, explain and justify the research niche that the study in your hands has identified. 
 Publications with a predominantly southern perspective 
Mostly available in Arabic and French, the literature on Moroccan-Spanish relations over the 
last two decades is diverse and deals with historical, cultural, political, economic and social 
issues. A large proportion of this literature, however, deals with memory and legacies from 
the past as well as issues of image and perceptions. It remains largely hostage to the historical 
and cultural paradigms, mainly concentrating on the golden Islamic period of Al Andalus, the 
colonial period, or studies analysing the contemporary relationship with a substantial 
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reference to the historic, cultural and religious fault lines, as well as the ensuing issues of 
image and perception. Books such as Mohamed Ali Dahech’s Al maghrib fi muwajahat 
ispania: Safahat fi alkifah alwatani didda alisti’mar (1903-1927) [Morocco facing Spain: 
pages in the national resistance against colonialism (1903-1927)] (Dahech, 2011); Aturath 
alhadari almushtarak bayna ispania wal maghrib [The common civilizational heritage 
between Morocco and Spain] (Moroccan Academy Documents, 1992); Muhammed Razzuq’s 
Al andaluciouna wa hijraatuhum ilal maghrib bayn alqarnain 16 wa 17 [The Andalusians 
and their migrations from Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries] (Razzuq, 1989); or Mustapha 
Shak’ah’s Al Maghrib wal Andalus [Morocco and Al Andalus] (Shak’ah, 1987), are all 
illustrations of this tendency. The overwhelming majority of these references provide a 
wealth of historical knowledge regarding the medieval, renaissance and colonial periods. 
They will, however, not be analysed in more depth here as they provide scant added value to 
the study of modern-day political, economic and cultural relations that interest us the most in 
this study. However, their value probably resides in the light they shed on the kind of 
concerns, views and discourses that these publications perpetrate and that undoubtedly reflect 
the interests and perspectives of their readership. Such publications tend to provide long 
accounts of the Islamic Golden Age of Al Andalus, the heritage and contributions of the 
Moorish populations that were expelled from Spain in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Spanish 
colonial period in Morocco (1912 – 1956) and the struggle for independence. 
Mohammed Larbi Messari’s Al maghrib wa ispania: al alakat asaaba [Morocco and Spain: 
the difficult relations], also available in Spanish under the title Las relaciones difíciles: 
Marruecos y España (Messari, 2009), is among the notable exceptions to this tendency as it 
brings a wider strategic, political and cultural perspective to the issue, combined with the 
author’s long and rich career experience as a political activist, diplomat and journalist. His 
contribution also discusses the contemporary issues and sheds light on the intricate and 
intractable nature of the Moroccan-Spanish bilateral relationship. It engages in an elegant 
analysis of the different aspects, stages and causes of this “messy relationship”. Messari’s 
valuable work, however, is tinged with a slightly nationalistic overtone and does not escape 
the trap of “historical and cultural determinism” that seems to influence a wide range of 
publications emanating from the south. The book tends to allocate a disproportional 
importance to historical events such as the 1767 Treaty of Marrakech signed between Carlos 
III y Mohamed III, the Treaty of Algeciras, or the impact of the 15th century territorial 
disputes on the contemporary bilateral relations.  
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Noureddine Affaya and Driss Guerraoui’s study titled L’image de l’Espagne au Maroc 
(Affaya and Guerraoui, 2005) is another important contribution that brought novel elements 
to the debate. It published the welcome results of an interesting opinion poll on Moroccans’ 
perceptions of Spain. The survey brought a long-awaited, thorough and empirical answer to 
the issue of perceptions from a Moroccan angle.16  The poll, indeed, managed to bring some 
vital answers to cover this research gap. Its most prominent findings were the fact that, unlike 
their northern counterparts,17 almost 70% of Moroccans had a positive image of Spain; that 
the main sources of tension between the two countries are respectively the colonial past, the 
Sahara issue, fisheries, Ceuta and Melilla, and migration; and that the majority of Moroccans 
view with fascination the economic, political and social rise of Spain over the last 30 years 
and link it mainly to EU support and the country’s democratization process. The study 
includes many other interesting conclusions and comes with an interesting final section 
containing intimate testimonials of eminent Moroccan personalities such as Omar Azzimane, 
Larbi Messari, Aziza Bennani, Driss Benhima and Oumama Aouad Lahrech. What slightly 
marred this endeavour was the relatively limited number of survey respondents (1031 
participants), and (more seriously) the high percentage of participants with an advanced 
education level (65.2%), which makes it an elite survey unreflective of the overwhelmingly 
uneducated or moderately educated Moroccan population. 
In a different register, articles such as Abdallah Saaf’s Sebta et Melilla et les relations 
Hispano-Marocaines (Saaf 1990) or Said Saddiki’s Les clôtures de Ceuta et de Melilla: Une 
frontière européenne multidimensionnelle (Saddiki, 2012) reflect the continuing interest of 
Moroccan authors in the Moroccan-Spanish territorial conflict and the central importance and 
role of this issue from a Moroccan perspective. Such publications mainly reiterate that 
Moroccans perceive the Ceuta and Melilla situation as an anachronism with problematic 
potential, especially with regard to illegal migration, illicit one-way trade activities (i.e. to 
                                                          
16 In 1995, the Moroccan monthly Shu’un Maghribiya directed by Larbi Messari published the results of a 
similar (though less comprehensive) survey on the same subject. The survey showed that Moroccans consider 
Spain to be their third role model after Germany and Japan, followed by France in the fourth position. See (De 
Larramendi 2000: 39). 
17 See the periodic opinion polls conducted by the Real Instituto Elcano. More discussion of the issue is also 
provided in Chapter 3. 
For example, a 2010 Real Instituto Elcano survey revealed that Morocco is negatively perceived by Spaniards 
with an overall score of 3.9 out of 10, worse than Israel (4.1), China (4.5), Cuba (4.6) and Russia (4.7). The only 
country that is perceived more negatively is Iran with 3 out of 10. Similar surveys of the Spanish institute 
conducted since 2002 have been showing similar results (see Chapter three). 
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Morocco) and their negative repercussions on bilateral relations. The conflict is equally cited 
as an illustration of the Spanish and EU contradictory discourse and strategies pushing for 
political, economic and cultural integration with one hand, while perpetuating an 
unsustainable situation and erecting new border reinforcements between the north and the 
south with the other. 
More recently, however, interest in the ramifications of the current bilateral relations has 
picked up in Morocco. Two recently published books in French by Moroccan authors 
demonstrate this tendency. The two books bring interesting contributions to the debate and 
are worth mentioning for varying reasons: Omar Dahbi’s Maroc-Espagne: La guerre des 
ombres 2000-2010 (Dahbi, 2011), and Samir Bennis’ Maroc-Espagne. Les relations 
politiques, économiques et culturelles 1956-2005 (Bennis, 2008). Dahbi’s is a rather 
subjective journalistic investigation that finds its way into this review not so much thanks to 
research rigor or thorough analysis, but for two separate reasons. First because it sheds light 
on an aspect of the relationship that is rarely analysed, i.e. the part played by intelligence 
services in Moroccan-Spanish bilateral ties; second because the contribution in itself is 
revealing as it elucidates the role that some media outlets can play in the relationship, in this 
case by perpetuating mutual tensions and deepening suspicions.18 The book starts and 
finishes with a rather sombre perspective, admitting to the absence of mutual trust and 
highlighting the stereotypes and clichés such as the Spanish common expression hay Moros 
en la costa19 (Dahbi 2011: 15-16). But the essay’s main focus is the role of the Spanish 
national intelligence services20 headed by General Javier Calderón, an Aznar appointee, in the 
design of Spanish foreign policy towards Morocco, especially during the PP’s terms of office 
(1996 – 2004) and the 2001 to 2003 Perejil/Laila crisis. The essay also talks about the 
supposed collusion between Spanish politicians, media organs and journalists aiming at 
“destabilizing” Morocco. The book’s off-centre tone and un-nuanced thesis border 
conspiracy theory and offer a rather pessimistic perspective and simplistic explanation to an 
extremely complex relationship.  
                                                          
18 The author is former editor of Moroccan daily Aujourd’hui le Maroc, and ALM, the book publisher, is also 
the publisher of the daily. 
19 Literally, the expression means: “there are moors around”. It is used as a colloquial expression in Spanish to 
refer to the existence of danger or trouble. 
20 CESID (Centro Superior de Información y Defensa) renamed CNI (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia) in 2002. 
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Bennis’, on the other hand, is a published doctoral thesis looking at 50 years of the bilateral 
relationship. The book dedicates its first three chapters to the territorial issues (Ifni, the 
Sahara question, Ceuta and Melilla) that started plaguing relations at the dawn of the 
Morocco’s independence in 1956. It then goes on to examine the other bones of contention, 
namely migration and fisheries, before it tackles economic relations and cooperation. It also 
addresses the crucial issue of negative perceptions that have endured throughout the years as 
a result of history, religion and the series of confrontations and conflict that the two countries 
witnessed for centuries. The book breaks away from the traditional approach and offers a rich 
discussion of issues spanning over half a century. However, it does not bringing a conceptual 
contribution to the debate and addresses a plethora of subjects over a long period of time, 
occasionally resulting superficial examination of certain issues such as the economic aspects 
of relations or the origins of the Sahara conflict. Nonetheless, the work succeeds in 
highlighting the complexity of issues and the convoluted history binding the two neighbours 
linking both to current crises and problems afflicting the relationship. 
Publications with a predominantly northern perspective 
In Spanish, interest in the subject and the number of books on the bilateral relationship have 
increased markedly over the last two decades mainly for the reasons that were established 
earlier. The themes of these books largely reflect the contemporary preoccupations, concerns 
and debates predominating in Europe in general, and Spain in particular, such as those 
relating to security, foreign policy, migration, democratization, cooperation, etc.  Other 
cultural, historical and perceptual issues did not disappear, however, as the theme of 
“otherness” never disappeared from the scene either. The perception, therefore, remained 
largely one-dimensional with a predominating “view from the north”, with absent and, at 
times, meagre and sketchy southern perspectives and contributions. Books such as the one 
edited by Bernabé López García and Abdelkrim Belguendouz, España-Magreb siglo XXI : el 
porvenir de una vecindad (1992), the one written by Miguel Hernando De Larramendi and 
Jesús Núñez in 1996 La política exterior y de cooperación de España en el Magreb 1982-95 
(1996), and La última frontera: Marruecos el vecino inquietante (Valenzuela  and Masegosa, 
1996) written by the two journalists Javier Valenzuela and Alberto Masegosa effectively 
started this new Spanish wave of publications regarding Morocco, but also a new 
multifaceted approach that marked a clearer break with the hitherto overwhelmingly 
historical and cultural coverage of the relationships, underlining issues of migration, territory 
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and security as well as the problematic, yet essential and unavoidable, relationship between 
the two neighbours.  
López García and Belguendouz’ edited volume regroups a wide range of contributions on 
political, economic, sociological and literary issues on the Maghreb region, with a particular 
focus on Morocco, but what the volume gains in amplitude and breadth it loses in focus and 
thematic coherence as it remains more of a collection of some individually valuable 
manuscripts, but with vague common denominators and an absent conceptual framework. 
Published in 1996, De Larramendi and Núñez’ volume starts with an identification of the 
various territorial, economic, security and socio-cultural Spanish interests in the Maghreb, 
followed by a hierarchical account of the various institutional actors in Spanish foreign policy 
towards the region, and a chronological and thematic analysis of relations since the 1970s. 
The book was one of the first investigations providing an insightful and structured analysis of 
Spanish foreign policy towards the Maghreb in general, and Morocco in particular, thus 
quickly converting itself into a must-read for the emerging research community interested in 
the subject. The volume, however, achieves little besides making an inventory of Spanish 
interests in the region, policy actors, instruments and the evolution of the relationship. It had 
the opportunity to offer an in-depth analysis and engage with theoretical literature on North-
South relations but missed the chance to place the analysis into an appropriate conceptual 
debate. The rigid compartmentalization of the issues, the absence of a chapter dedicated to 
migration (an issue that had started gaining in visibility by then) and the exclusively northern 
perspective constitute further limitations of this otherwise influential contribution.  
In the same year (1996) also appeared one of the most cited journalistic investigations 
authored by two eminent Spanish journalists (Javier Valenzuela and Alberto Masegosa) with 
ample experience and knowledge of Morocco. The title of their volume (which translates as 
“The last frontier: Morocco the disquieting neighbour”) pretty much defines the perspective, 
tone and focus of the publication. Punctuated by interview excerpts and historical references, 
the book successfully highlights the growing importance of Morocco as a major concern for 
Spanish foreign policy. It mostly dips into the most controversial aspects of the Spanish-
Moroccan relationship such as the thorny territorial disputes (Ceuta, Melilla and the Sahara), 
fisheries, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and Islamic terrorism. The volume which 
exceeds 400 pages, however, is little more than a compilation of slightly elaborated 
journalistic investigations, with few references and no clear added-value. As the book’s title 
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indicates, its portrayal of the southern neighbour offers a rather one-dimensional and 
alarming picture of a country that poses a wide range of serious threats to the stability of their 
native country, with hardly any concession or reference to the more positive aspects and 
potential of the bilateral relationship.  
The early 2000s saw what may be referred to as a “second wave” of interest in Moroccan-
Spanish relations owing to the coming to power of the Popular Party, and especially due to 
the series of bilateral crises between 2001 and 2002. In 2001, the journalist and ex-diplomat 
Alfonso de la Serna produced a valuable contribution that was translated into Arabic entitled 
Al sur de Tarifa, Marruecos-España: un malentendido histórico (De la Serna, 2001), where 
he skilfully discussed some of the historical and geopolitical issues that not only make of the 
country 14 kilometres south of Tarifa the beginning of a different continent, but a different 
culture, civilization and world worth exploring and understanding. The book provides a 
pertinent, detailed and meticulous historical account of Moroccan-Spanish encounters, 
starting with the eighth century Muslim conquests of Spain and finishing with the completion 
of the Spanish conquest of northern Morocco and the surrender of Abd El-Krim Khattabi to 
French and Spanish forces in 1926. The book also offers ample insights into other cultural, 
geographical and political aspects of Morocco, and devotes two detailed chapters to the 
Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla issues. De la Serna’s work remains a crucial reference for all 
students interested in the history and evolution of this bilateral relationship and keen to gain a 
thorough understanding of their neighbour to the south, offering (in the author’s view) one of 
the most balanced, rigorous and comprehensive accounts of the origins of the mutual 
discontent and “otherness” perceived by both sides. The book is, however, not the right 
reference for those researchers and students interested in contemporary political, economic 
and social issues, or in conceptual and theoretical debates as it offers little in this regard.   
In 2003, and in the wake of the most serious bilateral crisis between Spain and Morocco (the 
Perejil/Laila crisis), Carla Fibla García-Sala a Spanish journalist with expertise in Spanish-
Moroccan affairs coordinated the publication of an interesting publication titled España-
Marruecos desde la orilla sur: la relación hispano-marroquí: opiniones e ideas (García-Sala, 
2003). The book starts by providing a background, an analysis and insights into the evolution 
of Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relations, then goes on to an ‘opinions’ section detailing the 
views of distinguished Moroccan, Spanish and international contributors, highlighting the 
weight of history and mutual misunderstandings in the bilateral relationship. It also includes 
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interviews with Mohamed Benaissa and Miguel Ángel Moratinos, former ministers of 
Moroccan and Spanish foreign affairs respectively, and a section on the main controversial 
issues between the two countries such as fisheries, agriculture, migration, perceptions, border 
delimitation and territorial issues. The book’s main strength and originality reside in the fact 
that it brought to the fore the complexity of the relationship and its diverse aspects. However, 
the book’s strength is in itself a weakness since it endeavours to put together a wide range of 
loosely related pieces, especially in the opinions chapter. Also, the fact that it was largely a 
reaction to the 2001 to 2002 diplomatic crisis limited its research scope and potential. Last 
but not least, the volume did not engage extensively with the academic and research debate, 
making scant references to existing literature and no conceptual framing of the issues.   
Also, in 2003 María José Molina García’s PhD thesis (later published in book form) España-
Marruecos 1996-2002: un modelo de política exterior para el Magreb (Molina García, 2003) 
brought a welcome contribution to the debate. As its title indicates, the main research 
question of the book was whether Spanish foreign policy could serve as a model for other 
countries in the Maghreb region. The thesis successfully underscored the complex nature of 
the bilateral relationship that includes history, geography, identity, security and cooperation 
before putting the finger on the main bones of contention between the two neighbours (or 
what the author refers to as the structural elements in the bilateral relationship), namely the 
territorial disputes, the Sahara issue, fisheries and immigration. The thesis also emphasizes 
the importance of the Spanish autonomous communities, the economic relations as well as 
other technical, financial, educational and cultural cooperation issues. The work’s main 
contributions are its treatment of an extensive set of components in the bilateral relation and a 
balanced approach, highlighting the positive aspects of the relationship as well as the sour 
issues. Its main weaknesses reside in its fluffy theoretical section that did little towards a 
proper academic conceptualization of the issues; its almost exclusive northern perspective in 
the analysis of the “relationship”; and the fact that the overall scrutiny was not adequately 
packaged and organised for it to serve as a “model” for Spanish foreign policy towards other 
southern neighbours as the thesis purported initially. In any case, modelling Spain’s foreign 
policy on an analysis of a six-year bilateral relationship was probably bound to be a far-
fetched undertaking. 
The 2004 volume directed by Bernabé López García and Mohamed Berriane Atlas 2004 de la 
inmigración marroquí en España (López García and Berriane 2004), published by the Taller 
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de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos at the Autonomous University of Madrid (UAM), 
a continuation of its 1996 edition, has established itself as a veritable reference for 
researchers and students interested in Moroccan immigration to Spain. It is also among the 
rare and important publications that are the fruit of Spanish-Moroccan research collaboration, 
as it also includes an important contribution from the Laboratoire d’Infographie de 
I’UFRDAR in Rabat headed by Mohamed Berriane. Organized in ten thematic blocks, this 
fleshy volume regroups some 140 articles with contributions from Moroccan and Spanish 
researchers. The study includes data and statistics on the origins and destinations of 
Moroccan immigrants living in Spain, as well as thematic contributions from renowned 
researchers and experts on various issues relating to the subject. This work finds its place in 
the shelf of any researcher interested in the bilateral relations as a kind of “almanac” on 
migration issues, but it is no substitute for academic books and research articles, as most of 
the pieces it provides tend to be succinct, informative and with limited references. 
 
Some Spanish economists such as Iván Martín, Gonzalo Escribano, and Iñigo Moré have also 
examined various aspects of Spain’s relations with the Maghreb, but one particular article 
published in Mediterranean Politics by the latter deserves special attention. “The Economic 
Step between Neighbours: The Case of Spain-Morocco” (Moré, 2004) looks at the economic 
differences between Morocco and Spain, with a special focus on GDP per capita disparities 
between the two neighbours. Spain’s was four times higher than Morocco’s in 1970 but since 
then the differential grew exponentially to reach thirteen in 2002 (by 2005 it almost reached 
15). The article also highlights the absence of policies aimed at reducing the increasing 
economic gap and points to the risks associated with such acute inequality, which include 
regional instability, increased illegal migration and other forms of illicit activities. But while 
offering some useful comparisons, especially with the USA-Mexico and Germany-Poland 
cases, the article falls short of suggesting an adequate solution on how to reduce the 
economic gap. 
The years 2005 and 2006 also brought their fair share of interesting books and articles 
regarding the Spanish-Moroccan question in light, and with a deeper analysis, of the near-
military confrontation between the two countries over Perejil/Laila, as well as the recent 
political changes in Morocco following the coronation of King Mohamed VI and the 
semblance of a democratization process in the country. Paloma González del Miño’s book 
Las Relaciones Entre España y Marruecos: Perspectivas para el Siglo XXI (González del 
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Miño, 2005) is, in my view, one of the best contributions to this debate as it brought a well-
researched and in-depth study to the relationship. The book starts prior to Hassan II’s death 
with the appointment of the Socialist government of Abderrahman el Youssoufi that marked, 
what is now largely agreed to be, the first concrete steps towards the country’s liberalisation 
and the hoped-for democratisation. It then goes on to explore the other key liberalisation 
endeavours undertaken by Mohamed V, before getting to grips with the complex and 
interconnected issues and actors involved in the relationship, the cyclical nature of the 
bilateral conflicts, as well as the tremendous positive potential of the relations and the shared 
interests. The volume brought a series of undisputed added values, starting with the balanced 
treatment of the relationship where Morocco is not only meticulously analysed but discussed 
as an independent actor. It also reiterates a more balanced perspective that scrutinised both 
the opportunities and the threats facing the relationship, all in a well-documented and argued 
piece. The work’s main weaknesses, however, were its failure to conceptualize the 
relationship and the absence of an adequate synthesis and concluding remarks or a 
prospective analysis to seal the wealth of the subjects discussed.   
Another prominent and well researched journalistic investigation that shed new light on the 
2001 to 2003 crisis and that aptly chronicled the bilateral relationship between 1999 and 2006 
with rigour and originality was written by Ignacio Cembrero (the El País star journalist 
specialized in the Maghreb) through his book Vecinos alejados: los secretos de la crisis entre 
España y Marruecos (Cembrero, 2006). Cembrero not only managed to reveal many fresh 
details regarding the unfolding and the resolution of the worst crisis in the two countries’ 
recent history, but he also succeeded in highlighting the divergent political cultures and 
practices, the misunderstandings, the mistrust as well as the complexity of the dividing issues 
and the role of external actors such as France, Algeria and the EU. Among the book’s most 
salient contributions are its revealing interviews,21 the diversity and stature of the 
interviewees (many of them high ranking officials or influential figures on both sides), and 
the long, meticulous and in-depth research that the work required. But that did not prevent the 
account from being portrayed from a largely Spanish perspective, with much of the bilateral 
crisis details taking on a predominantly partisan perspective. Dedicating a whole chapter of 
the book to the “pro-Moroccan” French role (brushing aside EU and NATO’s support for 
Spain), under the heading “Jacques el Alaoui” in reference to former French President 
                                                          
21 Of particular interest are original facts and details provided by José Maria Aznar in a written response to the 
author’s questions regarding the Laila/Perejil crisis and its aftermath. 
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Jacques Chirac’s closeness to the Alawi Kingdom (Morocco), is among the illustrations of 
such a tendency. The work is, therefore, a tremendous and well researched contribution to the 
debate and brings valuable substance and revelations to the issue, but it unfortunately did not 
escape the “partisan” stance that tends to characterise journalistic coverage of the issue on 
both sides of the Strait. 
Academic articles from reputed academics include Richard Gillespie’s contribution published 
in International Politics (2006) which offers one of the most authoritative and theoretically 
grounded analyses of the Perejil/Laila crisis. It puts the crisis into its historical and 
geopolitical setting before proceeding to a meticulous examination of the crisis and its 
evolution, while testing the so-called ‘web of shared interests’ between Morocco and Spain. 
The article, however, mainly brings an analysis from a Spanish perspective, examining the 
strategy informing Madrid’s policy towards Morocco. It does not offer insight on Rabat’s 
position or the priorities and policies underlying its relationship with Madrid. Another 
contribution was Amirah-Fernandez’s book chapter (2008) that is yet another fairly well cited 
article on the relationship that mainly focuses on the Spanish perspective. It discusses the 
priority that Spain accords to the Maghreb region in general and Morocco in particular, and 
how the stability of the region remains of utmost importance to Madrid. The article also 
revisits Spain’s problematic and shifting relationship with Maghreb countries, dedicating a 
special attention to democratization, human rights and the Sahara imbroglio. It equally covers 
the post-PP rapprochement between Rabat and Madrid under José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s 
Socialist government, examining the concept of ‘‘dynamic stability,’’ used by some Spanish 
policy makers to refer to the ‘‘timid willingness to support gradual democratizing changes in 
the political processes of North African countries, providing that these do not interfere with 
Spain’s strategic and economic interests” (Amirah-Fernandez, 2008: 358). Yet again, the 
article adopts an almost exclusively northern perspective, focusing on Spain’s policies 
towards Morocco. 
Two more volumes came subsequently from academic experts to further enrich the historical, 
political, social, economic and cultural panorama between Morocco and Spain. The first was 
coordinated by Bernabé López García and Miguel Hernando De Larramendi under the 
heading Historia y Memoria de las Relaciones Hispano-Marroquíes: Un Balance en el 
Cincuentenario de la Independencia de Marruecos (López García and De Larramendi, 2007). 
The book mainly revisited the Spanish protectorate period in Morocco and its legacy. It also 
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addressed the role of academics and civil society in the bilateral relationship and covered 
some issues relating to image and mutual perceptions. The volume also made an attempt at 
providing a thorough inventory of the bibliography and research made on the bilateral 
relationship during Morocco’s fifty years of independence. The book’s thematic organisation 
was sound but the contributions were markedly unbalanced. Some articles such as Martín 
Corrales’ were informative and well researched, while others such as Ben Othmane’s were 
rather impressionistic and meagrely investigated. The overall added value of the volume and 
its contribution to the debate over the bilateral relationship were also limited.  
The second volume edited by the two eminent researchers Miguel Hernando De Larramendi 
and Aurelia Mañé Estrada entitled La Política Exterior Española Hacia el Magreb: Actores e 
Intereses (De Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009), on the other hand, quickly converted 
itself into a central reference for specialists in Moroccan-Spanish relations. Aside from the 
up-to-date and rich information its contributors provide, its original contribution was the 
insight it gave into the complex decision making process of Madrid with regard to Rabat. The 
book sheds light on the intricacies and issues of the relationship, as well as the wide range of 
contributors to this process. It devotes separate chapters to each actor, starting with the role of 
the political parties, the prime minister, the ministries, civil society actors, the autonomous 
regions, the media and other Spanish lobbies and interest groups. The volume’s strength, 
however, is arguably its limitation as well since it dedicated a disproportionally big section to 
the actors but provided less analysis of the complexity of Spanish interests and issues. Also, 
in the overall analysis, the different contributors tended to analyse the various actors in a 
compartmentalized fashion as if these were largely independent from each other, and in 
isolation from their Moroccan and international counterparts. Once again, the largely 
“northern” perspective of the edited volume constituted an extra weak spot. 
Jordi Vaquer’s PhD thesis titled Spanish Policy towards Morocco (1986 – 2002); the Impact 
of EC/EU Membership (Vaquer, 2004b) is yet another example of a seriously researched and 
well-structured study that looks at the relationship from a purely “Spanish” standpoint. The 
thesis examines the evolution of Spain’s foreign policy since its accession to the EC in 1986, 
and uses its relationship with Morocco as a case study. Its strengths include its solid 
theoretical grounding that mainly relied on Europeanization theory, as well as its reliance on 
the key areas of fisheries, economic relations, immigration and the territorial disputes to 
substantiate its analysis. The thesis conclusions are equally interesting, highlighting the 
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policy areas where the EC/EU proved instrumental in shaping Madrid’s foreign policy (such 
as in fisheries and trade venues), areas that were affected by Spain’s re-definition of its 
interests (such as economic and migration issues), areas that were affected by changes in 
decision-making mechanisms (such as fisheries and migration), and areas that were affected 
by the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy (such as immigration control and 
development cooperation). The analysis of other policy areas such as agriculture and security 
would have lent additional potency to this already well-rounded piece of research. 
Another recently published PhD thesis worth including in this review is Niklas Bremberg’s 
Exploring the Dynamics of Security Community-Building in the Post-Cold War Era: Spain, 
Morocco and the European Union (Bremberg, 2012). With Moroccan-Spanish relationship in 
the background, the thesis mainly seeks to explore whether/how the European Union works 
as a security community-building institution vis-à-vis Spain and Morocco, examining three 
EU areas: trade, Common Security and Defence Policy, and civil protection as policy venues 
that have influence over Spanish-Moroccan relations. One particularly important finding of 
this research is that the EU enhances these relations by supporting “communities of 
practitioners” that transcend institutional divides and promote the development of common 
practices. The thesis is well researched with a solid theoretical component and original 
conceptual contributions. However, its conclusions, while interesting and insightful, rely on a 
limited set of policy areas to warrant the conclusions put forward. The exclusive reliance on 
the Constructivist theoretical approach to capture the dynamics of a cyclically problematic 
relationship is yet another limitation of this, otherwise valuable, contribution. 
Comments on the literature review 
Works on Moroccan-Spanish relations over the past two decades include many more studies, 
and other books could have been included here (Moha, 1994; Dezcallar, 1998; Balfour, 2002; 
Corrales, 2002; Martín Muñoz, 2003; Planet and Ramos, 2005; López García, 2007; 
Sandoval and El Fathi, 2009; etc.). But this review of literature is fairly representative of the 
themes, focus and perspectives of this body of literature that marks a clear transition from the 
historical, territorial, cultural, perceptual, and identity issues to the newly emerging subjects 
such as migration, security, cooperation and economic issues that have overlapped with the 
old. What transpires from this review is that the bulk of works published on Moroccan-
Spanish relations are mainly by historians, when not by journalists and diplomats. Outside the 
relatively few academic publications and PhD theses, the narratives tend to be historical, 
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event-oriented and even impressionistic at times, with some works more analytical than 
others. There also appears to be little interest in offering a perceptual and theoretical 
conceptualization or in applying an analysis based on interpretation of the various schools of 
International Relations. By employing conceptual tools such as Europeanization, Complex 
Interdependence and Omnibalancing, this research hopes to bring a more theoretically-
grounded analysis and put to the test some of the most recurrent conceptual frameworks to 
examine this relationship. Also, rather than adopting a specific “southern” or “northern” 
perspective, this study will strive to examine the relationship itself, bringing together the 
realities, considerations and views from Rabat, Madrid, Brussels and Barcelona with an 
empirical and theoretical scrutiny. Moreover, while some PhD theses have extended analysis 
of Moroccan-Spanish relations to the EU and regional dimensions, this work brings these two 
dimensions to the heart of the debate and tries to extend the conceptual interpretations 
“above” and “below” to include the supranational and the regional facets of the Moroccan-
Spanish bilateral relationship. Last but not least, the review also corroborates and reinforces 
the importance of migration and economic issues in the bilateral relationship, both of which 
are at the heart of this analysis. Let us now turn our attention to the theoretical aspects of this 
research to discuss possible conceptualizations of the triple bilateral relationship we are 
seeking to explore. 
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Chapter two - A theoretical framework 
Introduction 
By trying to gauge the impact of a sub-state entity (Catalonia) and a supranational body (the 
EU) on an already dense and multifaceted North-South country relationship (Spain and 
Morocco), this research sets itself a quite exciting but intricate objective from an empirical as 
well as a theoretical standpoints. From a theoretical perspective, tackling Moroccan-Spanish 
relations, partly through the lenses of the EU and Catalonia is an endeavour bound to be original 
and complex in a number of ways. The research will explore the relationship but will also be 
looking beyond the strictly bilateral bonds of the two countries to include the European 
dimension and an internal source of potential influence, that of an autonomous Spanish region. 
The undertaking becomes even more daunting and appealing at the same time when we realise 
that the bilateral ties we are about to analyse involve two neighbouring countries whose 
political, economic and social evolution, environment, and culture are significantly dissimilar, 
and whose relations carry elements of conflict and elements of cooperation (see next chapter 
for a more detailed discussion of these differences). Trying to adequately frame this fluctuating, 
multifarious and incongruous relationship from a theoretical point of view, therefore, presents 
us with significant challenges. 
 
Clearly there is no off-the-peg theoretical framework that would account for this multi-layered 
and complex relationship involving a semi-authoritarian North African regime and what has 
mostly been perceived as a democracy in southern Europe. In a number of ways, we stand 
before a typical case where power and interdependence are competing notions, mirroring the 
theoretical struggle between the Realist and Liberal traditions that tests the primacy of "power" 
over "plenty" or “balance of power” over “balance of trade” (Viner, 1948: 2). Indeed, the 
relationships under study (particularly the bilateral state relationship) may lend substance to 
either the Realist interpretation that explains how each player seeks to pursue their interests 
and drive their separate agenda primarily to assert their power and maximize their relative 
gains as Stephen Krasner would argue (Krasner 1985: 12); or to the Liberal reading that 
espouses a ‘win-win’ logic, holding that post-cold war North-South relations are characterized 
by an intensification of economic, political and social relations, and that absolute gains and 
interdependence have since replaced zero-sum views of the world (Brown 2002: 189). 
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The proliferation of theoretical contenders 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, this elaborate relationship presents us not with a problem of 
conceptual scarcity but with an abundance of possibilities. Its North-South characteristic, the 
presence of elements of tension and elements of cooperation, the diversity of issues, the 
multiplicity of actors and disparities in the nature of those actors make the relationship open to 
various theoretical interpretations.  For instance, the state-centric bilateral relations and 
decision-making, the proliferation and centrality of territorial and security-related issues (Ceuta 
and Melilla, migration, the Sahara, fisheries, terrorism etc.), the cyclical spats and crises (1995, 
2001-2002, 2009-2010), the prevalent lack of mutual trust and the drive to prevail and 
maximize individual gains are all strong characteristics that favour a more Realist 
interpretation. Indeed, in a number of ways the relationship highlights elements of power not 
cooperation, tends to emphasize prospects for conflict and seems to be governed largely by the 
quest for relative rather than absolute gains. All these are strong reasons for the adoption of a 
structural realist approach to the case (Waltz, 1959: 198). However, a strictly Realist 
interpretation would certainly struggle to account for the important cooperation and increasing 
interdependencies between the actors involved. It would also need to justify the absence of 
actual conflict, and the growing role of non-state actors such as the EU. Equally important is 
the difficulty to argue for a zero-sum relationship since the actors involved do at least take 
account of each other’s interests and appear to be more concerned with absolute rather than 
relative gains. 
 
Another interesting paradigm that may also be useful in the conceptualization of this hybrid 
relationship and that is close to the Realist tradition is Game Theory (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Schelling, 1960; etc.) or other adaptions of it that are equally suitable to 
IR analysis such as Theory of Moves (TOM) (Brams, 1994; Zeager and Bascom 1996). Based 
on notions of "strategies" and “moves and countermoves”, these theories would consider the 
four polities we are analysing as “players” faced with various possible courses of action that 
generate a set of possible outcomes depending on the combinations of strategies they choose. 
The theories would also calculate “preference functions” and “consequences of countermoves” 
for each player indicating the degree of utility/damage of each possible outcome (Bennett, 
1995: 22). Put this way, Game Theory or TOM would appear to be parsimonious and elegant 
ways to conceptualize these relationships. But while they would possibly be an interesting 
venue to explore for the main bilateral state relationship (Spain and Morocco), a number of 
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limitations would render them less useful for this analysis. The complexity of the relationships, 
the disparities in the status of “players” (two states, one sub-state and one supra-state), the 
multiplicity of issues that do not necessarily lend themselves to quantification, and the fact that 
in our case substance and form of interactions are as important as interactions themselves, all 
constitute important constraints for the use of these two theories in this analysis.  
 
Yet another contender is Immanuel Wallerstein’s World Systems theory that highlights the 
relationship of dominance between unequal countries: the strong “core” and the weaker 
“periphery” countries (Wallerstein, 2006: 12). According to this framework, Spain and the EU 
could conceivably be perceived as the “core” engulfing “periphery” countries in their vicinity 
such as Morocco to perpetuate their economic and political supremacy. However, the 
Wallersteinian approach with its deterministic and rigid relationship between “core” and 
“periphery” ill suits the case at hand, for in spite of the asymmetrical relationship between a 
“strong” Spain (and EU) and a “relatively weaker” Morocco, the relationship is still not one of 
unilateral dominance. As will be shown later, Morocco does have a degree of leverage in the 
relationship. Complex Interdependence theory may provide a more nuanced and realistic 
account of the asymmetry by highlighting mutual vulnerabilities and sensitivities (Nye, 1976: 
133-5), as will be further explained in this chapter. 
 
In all cases, aside from aspects suggesting the predominance of power relationships, 
strategizing tactics and the propensity for conflict, other important features of these bilateral 
ties are telling a different story. For despite the tendency for the relationship to go sour and 
notwithstanding the cyclicality of crises, the two neighbours have cooperated more often and 
never came to blows over issues since their mutual problems have habitually been negotiated 
and resolved peacefully, albeit with resort to occasional pressure and brinkmanship. Economic, 
social and institutional relations between the two have always trumped hostilities and kept 
increasing continuously and significantly, especially over the last two decades, to the extent 
that Spain is now Morocco’s first trade partner (even ahead of France, the country’s historic 
partner),22 and Morocco is a privileged EU partner. What is more, Rabat and Madrid have been 
bound by a friendship and cooperation treaty since 1991, consider each other to be strategic 
                                                          
22 Further discussion on the issue is provided in Chapter three under economic cooperation section. Also see El 
País article “España-Marruecos: La buena racha económica aleja los nubarrones políticos”, (2 October 2012). 
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partners, and have managed to prioritize pragmatism and preserve cordial ties for many 
decades.  
 
In fact, instead of reinventing the wheel, the research prefers to test theories that have already 
been applied when analysing Spanish-Moroccan and Spanish-EU-Moroccan relations. Three 
important conceptual frameworks have often been used to account for these: Constructivism 
(Adler and Crawford, 2006; Bicchi, 2006; Bremberg, 2012, etc.), Europeanization 
(Torreblanca, 2001; Vaquer, 2004b; Ruano, 2013 etc.), and Complex Interdepence theory 
(López García and De Larramendi, 2002; Gillespie, 2006; Fernandez, 2008, etc.). And since 
these theories have often been used to explain Spain’s (and EU’s) behaviour towards Morocco 
but rarely the other way around, this research will also seek theoretical understanding of 
Moroccan political strategy by critically examining the idea of Omnibalancing (David, 1991; 
Willis and Messari, 2005) that has been used to conceptualize Morocco’s (and other third-
world country’s) foreign policy behaviour, especially when dealing with regional powers or 
superpowers. Also, the EU and the Catalan dimensions call for supplementary analytical 
frameworks likely to allow us to integrate these two levels into the analysis. Multi-level 
Governance (MLG) theory which underlines the importance of the complex and multi-layered 
decision processes gaining ground beneath and above the state level might prove a convenient 
analytical framework (Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Le Galès and 
Lequesne, 2002; Bache and Flinders, 2004; Piattoni, 2010). This theory, while recognizing the 
central role of the state, is likely to be extremely useful in framing the dispersion of the 
decision-making process at the European level among the state, the region and the EU. The 
theory, however, has limitations in terms of explaining North/South relationships. 
 
Before proceeding any further, however, it would be worth highlighting that this research will 
not concentrate on the constructivist approach for reasons that will be explained in this 
paragraph. Indeed, the in-vogue constructivist framework, especially the “security 
communities” paradigm23 (Deutsch, et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Acharya, 2001; Adler 
                                                          
23 Bremberg (2007) used Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Waever, 2003) to frame 
Moroccan-Spanish relationship. It argues that the Mediterranean forms a link between two distinct regional 
security complexes (RSCs). While this interpretation brings a more realistic touch to the analysis, it still 
endeavours to conceptualize the relationship from a “regions” percepective and gives precedance to security 
issues. 
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and Crawford, 2006; Bremberg, 2012),24 has often been used in framing Euro-Mediterranean 
relations and holds that the EU, as a security community, is engaged in a process of region-
building. It is shaping its Mediterranean vicinity by promoting normative guidelines and 
constructing common institutions, cultures, identities and practices that are strong and 
dependable enough to engender peace, collaboration and security (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 
7-13; Acharya, 2001: 16; Bremberg, 2012: 18-30). Adapted to North-South relations in the 
region, the theory talks about the likely emergence of a Euro-Mediterranean region “built on 
Western Enlightenment principles and values” and based on shared norms and institutions 
(Adler and Crawford, 2006: 4). It also holds that the Barcelona Process “is a laboratory where 
one of the most outstanding experiments in international relations may have started… 
[demonstrating] the social engineering of a regional identity that rests, neither on blood nor on 
religion, but on civil society voluntary networks and civic beliefs” (Adler and Crawford, 2006: 
19). While they certainly provide powerful explanatory grounds for the EU member and 
candidate states, the constructivist “security communities” and normative ideas are in a number 
of ways incompatible with the relationship dynamics taking place between northern and 
southern countries of the Mediterranean. Morocco’s relations with the EU (and Spain for that 
matter) might not be mature yet to warrant the use of these analytical tools. While the 
relationship might be a case of a “nascent” security community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 48), 
talking about societal networks, the creation of common institutions, cultures, identities and 
practices is premature. As our analysis will illustrate, EU-Moroccan and Spanish-Moroccan 
relations involve strong economic, political and security components, probably even 
dependencies (Lister, 1997: 74), but still have not produced the paradigm shift suggested by 
the constructivists. The theory would also suggest that the supranational role supplants the state 
bilateral relationship, something that our analysis does not substantiate either. Also, as our 
analysis will reveal, the rift at the societal level and the lingering negative perceptions make it 
hard to justify talk about the emergence of “civil society voluntary networks and civic beliefs”. 
Moreover, processes like the EMP that have partly spurred the constructivist enthusiasm 
towards the Mediterranean region have proved their limits,25 and, finally, the useful essence of 
this theory, i.e. the importance of the normative and institutional power of the EU may be 
                                                          
24 For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of security-community building among Morocco, Spain and the EU, 
see Niklas Bremberg’s thesis: Exploring the Dynamics of Security Community-Building in the post-Cold War 
Era: Spain, Morocco and the European Union (Stockholm University) 2012. 
25 The absence of almost all southern leaders from the 2005 Barcelona summit was a strong symbolic statement 
indicating their dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Barcelona Process (Cardwell, 2011: 228; Gillespie, 2012: 
1) 
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captured more adequately by our extended definition of Europeanization, as will be 
subsequently explained.  
The theoretical framework 
Spain and Morocco are often portrayed as two neighbours engaged in a relationship consisting 
of a web of interdependencies or “a cushion of shared interests” that boosts relations, increases 
cooperation, and withstands serious crises (López García and De Larramendi, 2002: 171; 
Gillespie, 2006: 120; Fernandez, 2008: 352). Moroccan-EU relations seem to follow the same 
trend as well. These relationship traits would clearly be better conceptualized through a 
theoretical lens that is likely to account for the resilience of the bilateral relationship in the face 
of adverse conditions. Complex Interdependence Theory (CIT) might provide us with such a 
framework. Its underlying assumptions tell us that states are no longer coherent units since 
transnational actors are increasingly important, that economic and institutional (rather than 
military) means are more relevant, and that welfare issues are gaining importance over security 
issues. It also holds that an increase in economic, political, institutional, social and cultural 
linkages and cooperation between countries gradually set the stage for more stable relations 
and mutual dependencies, thus making conflict between them too costly to be pursued 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989: 10).  Even if this theory has mainly been used to account for the 
stability that has characterised relationships among western countries, especially since WWII, 
it can still prove to be useful in our case. CIT can clearly be useful to analyse and study relations 
between Morocco and Spain as it talks about the importance of economic, political, institutional 
and social cooperation as a means to avoid potential clashes and other types of conflict. It 
should also be noted that it can be applied to the supranational level and, to a certain extent, to 
the sub-state levels as well. As will be further analysed in Chapters four and five, the EU’s 
Mediterranean policy, like Spain’s, is influenced by CIT and Catalonia’s approach also seems 
to be informed by a similar philosophy, although the potential conflicts that are averted are of 
a different nature to the country-to-country clashes.  
 
Europeanization is yet another important theoretical framework that has the potential to 
strongly account for the role of the supranational entity in the bilateral relationship. The term 
“Europeanization” has been widely used and includes various notions most outstanding among 
which are the top-down (reception) aspect whereby the EU influences policy areas in EU 
countries such as Spain and the bottom-up (projection) feature whereby policy competencies 
are transferred from the member-state to the supranational level (Ladrech, 1994; Börzel, 2002: 
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6; Schneider and Häge, 2008: 16-17; Torreblanca, 2001: 12-13; Vaquer, 2004b: 41-42). Yet, 
for the purpose of this research, another equally important aspect of Europeanization will be 
considered. It is what is now commonly referred to as “Neighbourhood Europeanization”, in 
reference to the tangible and non-tangible benefits, support and norm-based socialization that 
come as a result of cooperation between the EU and countries in its neighbourhood in such 
areas as democracy promotion, economic cooperation, security collaboration, etc. (Gawrich et 
al, 2010; Franke, et al, 2010). In fact, Neighbourhood Europeanization as a concept is 
particularly practical not only for the sake of parsimony (allowing us to collapse three 
importance processes under one referent “Europeanization”), but also because it better captures 
and moderates the degree of the normative, institutional and economic potential of the EU. Let 
us now look more closely at the four paradigms that this thesis will be testing, starting with the 
Multi-level Governance analytical framework. 
Multi-level Governance theory 
Making sense of what is referred to as “the hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994) in the 
case of European States like Spain, and the diffusion of authority to the regional (Catalan) and 
supranational (EU) levels compels us to look into existing conceptual paradigms on devolution 
likely to elucidate the power sharing and influence competition at work. The literature on 
federalism (Elazar, 1987; Aja, 1999; Agranoff, 2005; Burgess, 2006), broadly defined as an 
ideological or normative concept that reflects a power-sharing system between the central and 
the regional governments and a way of living which combines a degree of ‘self’ and ‘shared’ 
rule (Elazar, 1987: 5), is probably the first conceptual framework that comes to mind when 
thinking about conceptualizing relations between the EU, its member states and their respective 
autonomous regions. Federalism, however, lacks the conceptual potential to adequately 
account for the three-level European relations (autonomous region – state - supranational 
entity), unless we view the EU as a federal entity, which would be quite a stretch. And even if 
Brussels is regarded as the main pivot of a federalist interpretation in our case, that would still 
not fit the bill, as the central role of Madrid would defy the analysis, and the regional dimension 
would be harder to account for. 
 
But despite the limitations of the Federalist approach as a theoretical framework to account for 
the dynamics at work at the European level, we probably should not completely abandon the 
trail of devolution and power transfers and their implications. In fact, other theories in the same 
vein on regional and supranational governance might provide adequate grounds to analyse the 
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European triangular relationship at hand. Spain has been a member of the European Union 
since 1986 and is also considered to be the prototype of a stable political system with 
asymmetrical decentralization. This system is made up of some historic regions that have 
deeply rooted identities (Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia), and less historic regions 
that have equally benefited from the devolved powers in what is known as café para todos or 
“coffee for everyone” (Agranoff, 1999: 108), although these concessions remain differentiated 
in areas such as policing and taxation. Spain’s history as far back as the eighth century accounts 
for the existence of different kingdoms (Asturias, León, Navarre, Castile) and countries 
(Urgell, Barcelona, Aragón) (Cuadrado-Roua, 2009: 5). The historic regions are the living 
remnants of this past and still keep their unique cultural identities, distinctive social 
configurations, special economic profiles, exceptional institutional conditions, etc. (Bukowski 
et al, 2003). 
 
Over the last 35 years, Spain has gradually been shifting from the centralized Franco 
dictatorship to a democracy with an intermediate level of government (Autonomous 
Communities) that has been concentrating and expanding considerable powers and 
responsibilities from the state as stipulated in the 1978 Spanish constitution. These prerogatives 
have been evolving and expending in a constant process of dialogue, renegotiation, redefinition 
and political bargains (see next chapter for a more detailed discussion). The EC/EU has also 
played an important role in the relevance of the regions, mainly in providing a vital lifeline to 
their growth and visibility within the Union. In essence, in the EU areas of structural funds, 
regional and cohesion policies, regions were called upon to contribute to the policy-making 
process without the supervision of their national governments, through such mechanisms as 
the Committee of Regions and the regional delegations in Brussels. “Their formal or informal 
involvement in European regional policy gave them an additional argument in their struggle 
with their central governments for larger devolutionary powers and fanned regionalist 
aspirations for autonomy” (Sharpe, 1993 quoted in Piattoni, 2009: 6). 
 
Probably the most widely accepted theoretical formulation accounting for the role of the EU 
and the emergence of national sub-groupings within state systems is Multi-level Governance 
(MLG) theory (Hooghe, 1995, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Marks and Blank, 1996; 
Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Jeffery, 2000; Le Galès and Lequesne, 2002; Bache and Flinders, 
2004; Piattoni, 2009). The debate on MLG has been in vogue for the last two decades, 
especially since the publication of the influential article by Gary Marks “Structural Policy in 
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the European Community” in 1992, which was initially meant to present a useful concept for 
understanding some of the decision-making dynamics of the EC. Marks was, in fact, a pioneer 
in identifying and underlining the importance of the complex and multifaceted decision-making 
processes that were gaining ground beneath and above the European state level. He had rightly 
observed that the “European Community seems to be part of a new political (dis)order that is 
multi-layered, constitutionally open-ended, and programmatically diverse” (Marks, 1992: 
221). 
 
MLG is now a widely used and accepted term in European integration and international 
relations forums, defined as the ‘dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple 
territorial levels’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: xi). This approach acknowledges the central 
position of national governments in the European context, but challenges their traditional 
monopoly and highlights their changing nature. Contemporary European states’ competencies 
have, thus, gradually been shifting “both up to the supranational level and down to the sub-
national level” (Marks et al, 1996: 167) in such a way that “authority and policy-making are 
shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational” 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 2). 
 
MLG also points to fundamental changes in contemporary European governance as reflected 
by the structural transformations affecting contemporary European states under the impact of 
the process of European integration as it “invites normative reflection on the conditions under 
which binding decisions gain widespread acceptance and bestow legitimacy on the institutions 
that produce them” (Piattoni, 2010: 1). MLG, in fact, managed to put on the map new levels of 
relevance to the EU equation, adding a new level to the more traditional notion of the national 
and the supranational levels (long echoed by the famous two-level theory of Putnam (Putnam, 
1988)). 
“The point of departure for this multi-level governance is the existence of 
overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the 
interaction of political actors across those levels… Instead of the two level game 
assumptions adopted by state centrists, MLG theorists posit a set of overarching, 
multi-level policy networks… The presumption of multi-level governance is 
that these actors participate in diverse policy networks and this may involve 
subnational actors -interest groups and subnational governments- dealing 
directly with supranational actors” (Marks and Blank, 1996: 167). 
 
Although there is an increasing trend of intergovernmentalism, the EU is not home to 
centralized and unitary states (Loughlin, 2001; Strange, 1996; Schneider and Häge, 2008: 17-
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20). This is not only a result of the growing diffusion of state authority to markets and 
international institutions (Strange, 1996: 4), but is also a consequence of the delegation of 
decision-making powers to supranational entities and to peripheral government levels, 
especially the regions. Although this trend has taken a slower rhythm since the 1990s and taken 
a further hit during the on-going 2008 financial crisis,26 and “[r]egardless of whether this 
pressure is created by sub-state nationalisms... or rather by the willingness of the central state 
to offload some of the burdensome tasks taken up during the heyday of the welfare state 
(regionalization)” (Piattoni, 2010: 9), the devolution trend in Europe is both a fact and a 
continuing process. MLG denotes, thus, “a diverse set of arrangements, a panoply of systems 
of coordination and negotiation among formally independent but functionally interdependent 
entities that stand in complex relations to one another and that, through coordination and 
negotiation, keep redefining these relations” (Piattoni, 2010: 26). MLG, therefore, does indeed 
seem to offer at least an analytical framework, if not a conceptual basis, for the triangular 
dynamics at work at the European level. 
Europeanization 
Europeanization is a buzz-term that has been widely used mainly to refer to the impact of the 
EU and the European integration on the politics and policies of member states. The term has 
also been applied to the reverse process (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003), denoting the sway 
that national governments may have over the EU. The term has also been used to refer to the 
degree of this latter’s influence on its vicinity, and the world as a whole. But the concept was 
also overused and applied to various policy areas triggering a proliferation of definitions 
(Ladrech, 2002: 391), to the extent that Claudio Radaelli warned of a “conceptual stretching” 
(Radaelli, 2000). For the purpose of this research, however, we will mainly be concentrating 
on the application of the concept in the foreign policy area, highlighting three of its aspects: 
Top-down Europeanization, bottom-up Europeanization, and Neighbourhood Europeanization. 
 
The initial and dominant application of the term refers to the process whereby the EU 
dimension penetrates national spheres resulting in a reorientation of member countries’ policies 
to adapt to EU dynamics (Ladrech, 1994: 69). More precisely, Europeanization mainly refers 
                                                          
26 One has to recognize that recently there are also some countervailing and recentralising tendencies, especially 
in Spain, and in the EU as a whole, in response to the 2008 financial crisis (such as the protagonism of heads of 
states in the management of the crisis and the ways in which financial assistance is associated with central 
monitoring and control). 
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to how the EU “influences ‘policy, polity and politics’ in each of its constituent states, i.e. the 
nature and content of public policy (policy), the constitutional and institutional architecture of 
the system (polity) and the issues and actors in the political process (politics)” (Dardanelli, 
2009: 49). This salient definition, therefore, mainly highlights the top-down process of the term 
where member states are at the receiving end as the ones being “Europeanized”. Radaelli 
provided a more comprehensive illustration of this describing Europeanization as a processes 
of “(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated 
in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli, 
2000: 4). Top-down Europeanization of foreign policy, one of our main concerns here, seems 
to have indeed taken effect since member countries have seen their foreign relations 
significantly changed, “if not transformed, by participation over time in foreign policy making 
at the European level” (White, 2001: 6). 
 
Equally important for our analysis is the bottom-up feature of Europeanization, i.e. how 
European member states affect EU policies by exporting or “up-loading” their agendas, 
priorities and issues to the supranational level (Torreblanca, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 
2003; Vaquer, 2004b; Kelley, 2006). This is a highly pertinent and important process in the 
Rabat-Madrid bilateral relationship. While it is generally agreed that Spanish-Moroccan 
relations were characterized by state-centrism prior to Spain’s EU accession in 1986, these 
started to be Europeanized from then onwards (López García and De Larramendi, 2002: 170), 
when Spain started “exporting” parts of its foreign policy priorities to the EU (Torreblanca, 
2001: 12). Europeanization can, therefore, also be achieved when a country starts using the EU 
as a conduit to deal with other countries. But this process should not always be viewed as a 
voluntary or premeditated strategy. As more and more policy areas come under EU jurisdiction, 
this process is largely inevitable and becoming more and more frequent. In a number of its 
critical dealings with Rabat, Madrid is increasingly finding itself in this situation. Issues such 
as democratization, human rights, fisheries, agriculture or immigration are continuously 
Europeanized as they come under the various EU policy areas. This may produce adverse as 
well as positive effects for the member states (See Chapter 3 for further discussion). On the 
one hand, bottom-up Europeanization clearly impinges on state sovereignty and deprives 
individual countries of the powers to defend some of their national interests or simply convey 
their distinctive outlook. On the other hand, the process can be advantageous as it may be a 
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way to delegate management of potentially delicate issues to the supranational level, and a 
means to increase leverage. Indeed, by externalizing some of their thorny issues to the 
European level, countries manage to de-problematize their foreign policies to certain extents, 
and find themselves in more comfortable positions to concentrate on the more positive and 
fruitful aspects of their external relationships. Third countries like Morocco are well aware of 
member states’ influence over EU policy and try, therefore, to lobby them as well as Brussels. 
Agriculture and fisheries policies, for example, are to some extent shaped by countries like 
France, Spain and Italy.  Moreover, when the sticky issues are handled by the EU, they 
generally acquire increased status and imminence, and are no longer perceived as purely 
bilateral issues, but rather collective matters where all EU members have a stake, and 
potentially a say. Spain has experienced both the positive and negative effects of bottom-up 
Europeanization in its foreign policy issues with Morocco (Barbé, 1995; Torreblanca, 2001). 
On balance, however, this form of policy externalization has been beneficial in a number of 
ways, as our subsequent analysis will show. 
 
As stated earlier, our conceptualization of Europeanization will not only concentrate on EU-
member state mutual policy “transfers” or “exportations” (Torreblanca, 2001: 12), i.e. intra-
EU processes of “reception” and “projection” (Vaquer, 2004a: 41-42). The concept here will 
be further extended to incorporate what is referred to as “Neighbourhood Europeanization” 
(Gawrich et al, 2010; Franke, et al, 2010). This recent extension of the notion to account for 
EU effects and normative influence beyond its borders (Manners, 2002; Emerson et al, 2005) 
is equally important for this research as it attempts to gauge the EU’s transformative potential 
outside of its borders and the normative connotation of its foreign policy (Bicchi, 2006: 287). 
This influence has mainly been examined through such tools as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in areas such as democracy 
promotion, economic cooperation and institutional collaboration (Gawrich et al, 2010: 1212-
1214). Neighbourhood Europeanization, therefore, is not a two-way process since it only has a 
“reception” component. It might also be seen as a “light” or “decaf” Europeanization of the 
EU’s neighbourhood, since its impact is bound to be less significant for these countries 
compared to member or candidate states. For the purpose of this study, however, the concept 
fills an important gap and provides a useful conceptual dosage. While recognizing a degree of 
of the supranational actor’s influence over its neighbourhood through such instruments as the 
EMP or ENP, it falls rightly short of trumpeting the emergence of a “we-feeling” resulting 
from the establishment of “common institutions, cultures, identities and practices”, as the 
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disciples of constructivist “security communities” would claim; and adequately captures the 
embryonic normative and institutional weight of the EU in its vicinity. It is hard to argue against 
the persuasive potential of European institutions, values and norms as the recent Arab 
revolutions seem to confirm; but this influence has not resulted (yet) nor showed signs of any 
significant modification of cultures, institutionalization of practices, or transformation of 
perceptions and identities. 
Complex Interdependence theory 
As argued earlier, relations between Spain and Morocco have often been explained in terms of 
Complex Interdependence theory as two neighbouring countries engaged in a relationship that 
becomes a cushion of shared interests that boosts relations, increases cooperation, avoids inter-
issue contagion and stands in the face of serious crises (López García and De Larramendi, 
2002: 171; Gillespie, 2006: 120-1; Fernandez, 2008: 352). In fact, Liberals of all stripes share 
the basic assumptions of this theory that contends that interdependence among states pacifies 
political relations and prevents, or at least decreases incentives for conflict as it becomes too 
costly compared to the shared network of mutual benefits that develop. 
 
The Complex Interdependence paradigm was initially developed by Keohane and Nye in order 
to gauge interactions among industrialized pluralist societies tied up by economic and 
intergovernmental relations but also by a complex web of treaties, multinational cooperation 
and civil society interaction (Gillespie, 2006: 120). Its basic assumption is that as relationships 
among countries develop and interdependence grows, confrontation becomes a relatively 
costly way to pursue their interests (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 10). More precisely, the defining 
characteristics of complex interdependence are: the multiplicity of actors (including the non-
state actors), the multiplicity of channels through which these actors interact in the system, the 
shifting (or absence of) hierarchy among issues, and the non-resort to force in mutual 
interactions (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24–5). In other words, the environment in which 
countries’ decisions are made is considerably broadened, the stakes (economic, institutional, 
social and otherwise) are increased, the issues and the channels of contact between states and 
societies multiply, and force becomes increasingly irrelevant for most policy objectives. This, 
in turn, expands the scope for agreements “by multiplying points of interaction among 
governments and therefore increasing incentives to comply with commitments in a situation 
characterized by practices of ‘tit for tat’ reciprocity” (Keohane, 1984: 104). The theory also 
underlines the importance and function of asymmetries, sensitivity and vulnerability as sources 
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of power. Relations in a complex interdependence context are not necessarily balanced and 
symmetrical: in fact, ‘most significant instances of manifest interdependence are asymmetrical 
and unbalanced’ (Jones and Willetts, 1984: 14). Keohane and Nye, therefore, insist that “it is 
asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in 
their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependent 
relationship as a source of power.” (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 10-11, italics original). 
 
Complex interdependence, as said earlier, was initially developed to account for relations 
between pluralistic western democracies and was not seen as an adequate model to typify the 
politics of more turbulent regions such as the Middle East (Keohane, 1984: 197). But neither 
these inadequacies nor the conflict-prone relationship dynamics between Morocco and Spain 
should deter us from testing this concept as a potential framework for analysing contemporary 
relations between the two countries, especially since the European ‘neighbourhood’ has 
become a reality since Keohane and Nye excluded the Middle East from consideration. Indeed, 
complex interdependence seems interesting precisely because it accounts for such ups and 
downs between states. After all, and as explained earlier, Keohane and Nye’s assumption is 
that as relations increase, common institutions are reinforced and interdependence grows; 
confrontation becomes a relatively costly way for states to pursue their interests (Keohane and 
Nye, 1989: 10-24; Keohane, 1998: 83-87). 
 
Contrary to the Realist claim that world politics is based on relationships among states focusing 
on force, security and self-help, complex interdependence essentially states that power does 
not only lie in the hands of the state and is not always gauged by the power to coerce, but that 
it also involves growing transnational, intergovernmental, and trans-governmental 
relationships (Keohane and Nye, 1974: 42-49). In fact, even influential realists such as Robert 
Gilpin do not deny the paramount importance of interdependence in international politics, 
except that they over-emphasize its economic aspect, and especially its detrimental potential. 
Interdependence of national economies, writes Gilpin, “creates economic power, defined as the 
capacity of one state to damage another through the interruption of commercial and financial 
relations. The attempts to create and to escape from such dependency relationships constitute 
an important aspect of international relations in the modern era” (Gilpin, 1975: 38). In the same 
vein, Albert Hirshman had explained that national power and influence, in the sense of the 
capability of one nation to coerce another, can also be applied through “peaceful” means. One 
way for a country to achieve such influence is through ‘negative sanctions’, whereby the 
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country in the dominant position tips the balance in its favour which creates a situation of 
asymmetrical interdependence through trade or other relations (Hirschman, 1945: 16).  David 
Baldwin also drew attention to the fact that influence can also be achieved through ‘positive 
sanctions’ that increase a partner’s expectations, arguing that statecraft works best when 
combined with both the threat of negative sanctions and the promise of positive ones. Positive 
sanctions are, therefore, more relevant to international politics in an interdependent context 
than the negative ones (Baldwin, 1985: 213). In all cases, however, it remains important to 
recall that the effectiveness of any such influence will also depend on the interactions of 
external variables and the configuration of state-society relations that often “mediate, refract, 
and filter the policy impact of transnational activities” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 293), which 
further exhibits the essential role of social, political, institutional and economic networks. 
 
In addition, complex interdependence provides other fertile concepts and tools that may prove 
useful in the analysis of Spanish-Moroccan, EU-Moroccan and Catalan-Moroccan relations 
such as the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is defined as “the degree of 
responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in one country bring 
costly changes in another”. Vulnerability, on the other hand, is defined as “the relative 
availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face” (Keohane and Nye, 
1989:12–13). Sensitivity, in other words, is the proneness to costly consequences caused by 
another country prior to any policies being undertaken to try to alter a given situation, while 
vulnerability means a sustained proneness to these consequences even after initiatives have 
been taken to reverse the situation. “Vulnerability is determined by whether we have reasonable 
alternatives. [It] is a matter of degree and varies with the costs and time involved in developing 
alternatives. In the economic sphere, for example, this implies hard policy choices about 
acceptable degrees of dependence and how willing we are to sacrifice the economic benefits of 
cheaper foreign supplies (Nye, 2004: 155). 
 
However, it seems that many relationships in a complex interdependence context involve 
“relatively trivial sensitivity dependence in one direction, but a critical dependence, of high 
vulnerability, in the other” (Jones 1995: 8). While this seems to characterize to a large extent 
the bilateral relationships under scrutiny in this research as the Moroccan-Spanish partnership 
appears to be largely asymmetrical and tilted in favour of the northern neighbour in a number 
of aspects (Moré, 2004: 178; Gillespie, 2006: 121; Galduf, 2004: 185), a more meticulous 
analysis is in order to define the means of pressure and gauge the consequences on each side. 
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For advocates of complex interdependence, asymmetry and imbalances are important concepts 
that are “prevalent within the contemporary international system’ (Jones, 1995: 8) and the 
international system would not function in complete symmetry where each group would give 
and receive equally: 
 
“Asymmetries in interdependence are important both economically and 
politically. Economically, they make one country or group of countries sensitive 
to economic policies and economic cycles in other countries that are not so 
dependent themselves. Politically, asymmetries create power relations between 
countries and vulnerabilities open to political exploitation. They give countries 
that are less dependent leverage over countries that are more dependent.” 
(Levine, 1996: 39). 
 
Here, therefore, is a useful tool provided by complex interdependence to analyse the wide range 
of Spanish-Moroccan and Catalan-Moroccan relationships. Asymmetrical ties would, 
therefore, not only allow us to look at the purely economic exchanges and test the likelihood 
of influences resulting from macroeconomic indicators, trade agreements, commercial and 
investment asymmetries, but also at the political, institutional and social leverage that one side 
may have over the other. While involving a number of inherent caveats and far from providing 
a comprehensive framework, complex interdependence may turn out to be a valuable tool in 
the analysis of Spanish-Moroccan relations in particular and the quadrilateral complex in 
general. 
 
Complex Interdependence, therefore, seems to be a suitable model against which Spanish-
Moroccan (and even EU-Moroccan and Catalan-Moroccan) relations could be analysed. Our 
case study certainly exhibits a number of limitations, not least the fact that the two countries 
are not the type of countries the theory was meant to frame and  were at loggerheads over issues 
such as the fisheries episodes of 1995 and 2001 (Fernandez, 2008: 353) and the Perejil/Laila 
dispute of July 2002 (Gillespie, 2006: 120). But it could well be argued that such ‘spats’ mainly 
took place at early stages when interdependence was at its embryonic phase. Moroccan-Spanish 
relations rather seem to be a case of deepening economic interdependence punctuated by 
political tensions that are usually successfully dodged, giving way to more significant 
economic, institutional and social considerations. Notwithstanding the repeated frictions, the 
two countries have never engaged in an open conflict during recent decades as the shared and 
deepening interests between the two have proved to be more resilient in the face of the recurring 
chapters of hostility. This general state of economic, social and institutional reinforcement, 
punctuated by political tensions has been characterizing this bilateral relationship up until 
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today. After all, Nye reminds us that complex interdependence does not mean the end of the 
struggle for dominance as “power remains important even in domains characterized by 
complex interdependence” (Nye, 2004: 198). 
 
Seen from this perspective, Moroccan-Spanish relationship at least starts to make more sense. 
The “cushion of shared interests” linking the two countries does seem to act as a buffer against 
potential open hostilities and assuages the recurrent “tit for tat” reciprocities. The Perejil/Laila 
incident, the worst chapter in the two countries’ recent relations, can be interpreted as the 
exception that confirms the rule and that indicates that the underlying “cushion of shared 
interests” can survive. Cooperation can be affected but only temporarily. The two countries, 
indeed, seem to be successfully engaged in a relationship “of multiple interactions in which 
recourse to force is excluded” (Keohane, 2002: 17). Their complex interdependence creates a 
whole network of contacts and interests where overall state interactions are actively sustained 
by “a complex network or web of transnational and bilateral bargains” (Strange, 1985: 234). 
 
The particular framework of sensitivity and vulnerability concepts, applied to our case, is also 
likely to provide us with valuable insights and tools to gauge the Morocco-EU and Morocco-
Catalonia relationship dynamics, especially when examining such issues as bilateral trade, 
foreign direct investment and migration. Indeed, these concepts may also be useful to 
investigate other issues outside the scope of this research such as the territorial issues, the 
Sahara issue, drug trafficking and other instances of policy issues and stances that if altered by 
one side would provoke costly consequences to the other. These concepts would also provide 
us with insights into the power relationships between these players, as the less sensitive and 
less vulnerable actor would have more influence and control over the other. In economic terms, 
for example, Morocco appears to be more vulnerable at least from a volume point of view. 
While trade with Spain constitutes a sizable chunk of the country’s operations, Madrid’s trade 
with the country constitutes a fraction of its foreign economic exchanges. Morocco, therefore, 
would need to be vigilant not to further its dependence and vulnerability as it “cannot allow 
itself to increase the specific weight of its relations with Spain… a greater economic 
relationship would mean a greater deficit” (Moré, 2004: 180). 
 
But complex interdependence may also have positive effects on the more dependent side in the 
equation. Morocco’s increasing political, economic, institutional and social relations with 
Spain, the EU and Catalonia (the preferential official visits, the Friendship, Good 
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Neighbourliness and Cooperation treaty signed with Spain in 1991, the advanced EU status 
signed in 2008 pushed for jointly with France, etc.) do bestow upon it additional prestige and 
regional leverage. All these special relationships can be seen as important factors in bolstering 
its international image and its regional reputation and, thus, influence, especially given that 
Morocco’s deepening relations with Spain and the EU have not greatly constrained or 
restrained its capacity to pursue an independent regional and foreign policy. 
 
The case of Spain and Morocco would also provide us with unexpected cases of sensitivity and 
vulnerability since it is not necessarily the “less influential” partner that always suffers the 
negative effects. Spain, at certain points, has been in situations of sensitivity and vulnerability 
towards Morocco as reflected by the spring 2001 crisis, after the collapse of fisheries 
negotiations between the EU and Morocco. José María Aznar the conservative Prime Minister, 
“feeling that Morocco did not honor its promises, thus damaging Spanish interests, declared 
that ‘there would be consequences for relations between Morocco and Spain’” (Fernandez, 
2008: 353). Such declarations demonstrate the degree of sensitivity that Morocco caused Spain 
following the suspension of the agreement, momentarily causing it to look for other costly 
alternatives. Other such instances may be less perceptible and more subtle, affecting intangible 
points of sensitivity, such as prestige. It could be argued that the mobilization of the Arab 
media, especially Al Jazeera, which Morocco undertook during the 2002 Perejil/Laila crisis 
may have been perceived as a threat by Spain and may have affected the country’s image and 
status in the Arab world. 
Omnibalancing 
Since this research has set itself the objective of examining Catalonia and the EU’s impact on 
Moroccan-Spanish relations (not Spanish policy towards Morocco or vice-versa), it needs to 
frame the whole relationship. Multilevel Governance, Europeanization, and Complex 
Interdependence provide us with valuable clues to do that, but we feel that there is an important 
aspect of this relationship that would not be sufficiently accounted for relying solely on these 
three paradigms. The main reason is that they would fall short of a thorough conceptualization 
of Morocco’s behaviour in this quadrilateral interaction. The Neighbourhood side of 
Europeanization and Complex Interdependence undoubtedly have some significant 
explanatory potential. However, there is still a need to bring to light and conceptualize the 
specificities of the Moroccan state, the nature of Moroccan power and government structures, 
as well as Morocco’s foreign policy priorities and behaviour in general, and with Europe, Spain 
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and Catalonia in particular. In fact, understanding Moroccan power structures is part and parcel 
of understanding the manner in which it seeks its objectives (See next chapter for an in-depth 
discussion of this). 
 
Foreign policy in the Arab world has often been depicted from a predominantly Realist 
perspective, with an emphasis on external-systemic determinants, state centrism and the 
preponderance of anarchy as the main variables in understanding the behaviour of countries of 
the region. Domestic sources of foreign policy are largely pushed to one side as marginally 
significant, while psychological and idiosyncratic considerations are privileged, insisting on 
the leaders’ role and ‘psychological environment’. But while such explanations encapsulate 
significant factors accounting for these countries’ foreign policy behaviour, the impact of 
internal as well as external economic, political and social factors should not be quickly 
dismissed as they can also prove to be decisive (Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 22-26). 
 
Morocco, in fact, comes well within this depiction, albeit with a number of distinctive 
characteristics. Despite the presence of a plural political party system, a burgeoning and vibrant 
civil society, as well as some improvements in human rights, women’s rights and freedom of 
expression, Morocco remains largely controlled by the Makhzen system: the “shadowy power 
structure around the King, which includes senior security officials, the royal cabinet, royal 
advisers, and a fluid palace entourage of prominent families and dignitaries -in addition to the 
central government- all accountable only to the King” (Howe, 2005: 355). The country’s 
foreign policy decision making operates within this rigid and hierarchical Makhzen structure 
(El Houdaïgui, 2003: 27; Molina, 2007: 35) where the government, the parliament, the political 
parties, and the non-state actors wield little influence, while the palace and its surrounding 
circles of influence remain the ultimate sources of power (Layachi, 1998: 98; Munson, 1999: 
259 - 274; Waltz, 1999: 283 - 296).  
 
In its foreign policy approach, the regime has always adopted pragmatism and practicality and 
sought to avoid confrontation, build partnerships and maintain equilibrium between its eastern 
and western relations, while preserving its strategic interests in Africa in what is referred to as 
its “profondeur Africaine” (African depth). It has remained largely pro-western and heavily 
tied up to (even dependent on) Europe, while preserving its alliance and solidarity with Arab 
and Muslim countries, thereby sustaining a balancing act whereby the country preserves 
relations and reaps benefits on both fronts. Rabat’s overriding priorities in its relations overseas 
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have been (a) the defence and preservation of its territorial integrity, especially with regard to 
sovereignty over the Sahara, (b) the boosting and expansion of economic and partnership 
opportunities, and (c) the improvement of its international image and enhancement of its 
regional privileges and prestige. 
 
The “three concentric circles” of Mohammed VI’s foreign policy— 
neighborliness, solidarity, and partnership— are functional, not geographic, but 
they all have specific geographical referents as well as indications of a style and 
approach in foreign relations. As foreign policy values, they are pragmatic, 
related to specific policies and relations, and aimed at protecting the territorial 
integrity of the country and enhancing its economic welfare. Any state’s foreign 
policy is first of all designed to protect the state’s independence and integrity, 
but this has special importance in Morocco’s case because of the Saharan 
question. Not only is the Western Sahara seen as an integral part of the nation 
but the issue itself is recognized as an existential question for the state, a matter 
of political stability, and a popular cause as well as the basis of the monarchical 
system (Rosenblum and Zartman, 2008: 330). 
 
Indeed, in order to appreciate Moroccan foreign policy one has to understand the specificities 
of the Moroccan regime, its priorities, its historical evolution, the different power struggle 
stages that culminated in the monarchy’s control of most political and economic walks of life, 
as well as the ruling elite’s composition, concerns and approaches (see next chapter for detailed 
analysis). In parallel, it is also crucial to gauge the influence of the international and the 
domestic conditions on the elite’s political and economic power and preferences. Another way 
of portraying this is by stating that an understanding of foreign policy choices in Morocco 
requires us, aside from the historical knowledge, to map the dynamics and interests of the ruling 
elite interacting with the societal actors and the international political and economic system, 
striving to strike a balance with the ultimate objective of thriving and maintaining power and 
control. The policy preferences of the decision makers and their potential sources of alliance 
or conﬂict are largely linked to the endogenous and exogenous forces surrounding the state. A 
good vantage point from where one can appreciate Moroccan foreign policy choices, therefore, 
is at the crossroads where survival and quest for power and ambitions meet the international 
context and the domestic and societal considerations. State foreign policy is often located at 
this junction and reflects the state’s relationship with the external and internal dimensions. Joel 
Migdal expressed it mildly by saying that the state is found “in society” as well as “in the 
international system” (Migdal, 1994: 17). 
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The engineering of Moroccan foreign policy is the result of multi-layered, complex and 
dynamic processes. These not only involve pressures and opportunities dictated by the regional 
and remote international powers, internal alliances, power struggles and non-state actors: they 
also include, as our case will clearly indicate, a considerable degree of top leadership political 
will and initiative reflecting perceived opportunities and threats to the regime. But beyond all 
these complex levels of interpretation, the overriding priority of the state is the survival of the 
regime, economic welfare and the preservation of the privileges of the elites that benefit from 
it. Foreign policy in countries such as Morocco, in Gerd Nonneman’s words, is often defined 
through the lens of the ruling elite’s perceptions about “the security of their regime, about the 
opportunities and challenges presented by both their domestic and their external environments; 
and, to varying extents, about their own identities” (Nonneman,  2005: 10). 
 
In his book, Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World, Steven David 
initially developed ‘Omnibalancing’ theory to explain the reasons why third-world countries 
change alliances between the Eastern and Western blocks, especially in the cold war context. 
David argued that third-world countries tended to shift alliance depending on which super-
power offers durable guarantees and preserves their interests. The theory, however, found 
renewed application and usage in the post-cold war era due to the enduring validity of its 
premises even after the breaking up of the Soviet Union. The theory’s main argument that 
alliance decisions in third world countries do not necessarily follow a 'balance of power' logic 
but rather the overall balance of internal as well as external political factors remained valid. 
The theory also argues that these alliances are constantly shifting and changing, depending on 
the rational calculations around the security needs of ruling regimes, and depending on “which 
outside power is most likely to do what is necessary to keep them in power” (David, 1991: 6).27 
Threats and opportunities from the external environment have to be counterweighed against 
domestic variables and pressures too, as countries must juggle between internal and external 
pressures in the process of designing their foreign policy (Willis and Messari, 2005: 153). 
Foreign policy outcomes will, therefore, often be shaped with regard to the relative weight as 
well as the source of such threats and opportunities.  
 
                                                          
27 An interesting application of the concept in the analysis of Moroccan foreign policy was used by Willis and 
Messari (see Willis and Messari, 2005). 
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North-South relations such as Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-French or Moroccan-US relations 
appear to validate this theory. Morocco, for example, does not hesitate to swing from one ally 
to another or offer them attractive deals or concessions, depending on which power is most 
likely to defend and preserve its strategic interests. It is not surprising, therefore, to see 
Morocco seeking support for its strategic interests (such as on the Sahara issue) and pursuing 
better partnership deals with the regional and international powers, offering better terms to the 
power(s) presenting the strongest guarantees. This alliance shift is sometimes designed to 
respond to pressures emanating from within the country as well, when domestic pressures grow 
strong. John Ikenberry refers to this as “state adjustment strategies” and describes it as the 
constant negotiation and bargaining processes between states and their respective societies that 
brings about policies and strategies befitting international changes and pressures.  The ensuing 
choices will often depend on opportunity-cost considerations (Ikenberry, 1986: 54-60). In fact, 
a good illustration of this was provided during the so-called “Arab Spring” when the Moroccan 
regime had to juggle between internal pressures, mainly from February 20th Movement, the 
regional and international context, and its own underlying interests of survival, stability and 
power maximization (see Hoffmann and König, 2013). 
 
In more concrete terms and to transpose Ikenberry’s “adjustment strategies” and David’s 
Omnibalancing models onto our case, post-independence Moroccan foreign policy did indeed 
strive to strike a balance and take into account these several dimensions and actors. Varying 
degrees of leadership idiosyncrasies, domestic interests and considerations, regional and 
international contexts have always constituted the various backdrops for Moroccan foreign 
policy endeavours. These have all factored in the ultimate goals of regime preponderance, 
preservation of the ruling elite and the boosting of its kudos and privileges. 
 
A quick look at Morocco’s foreign policy counterparts and the issues involved reveals that the 
Sahara issue by far trumps all other Moroccan foreign policy priorities; it is a national sacred 
subject and most of Morocco’s international endeavours directly or indirectly serve to rally 
maximum backing for the corroboration of its claims on the region. Be it with Algeria, France, 
Spain or the USA, it is difficult to overstate the importance of this issue in Rabat’s diplomatic 
relations. The main reason, as stated earlier, is that the Sahara is intimately linked to Morocco’s 
sacrosanct pillar of territorial integrity, which itself is tightly related to the regime and the 
monarchy’s legitimacy, image and stability (Rosenblum and Zartman, 2008: 330). Also, and 
as mentioned earlier as well, Morocco’s positions have mostly been pro-Western but pragmatic 
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at the same time. In this sense, and despite its deep and inevitable political and economic 
anchorage to Europe, the country has also kept its options open and engaged with the USA, 
Turkey, Africa, the Middle East and now increasingly with Asia. Indeed, partnership 
diversification continues to be a key Moroccan foreign policy strategy. Hassan II was 
particularly skilful in performing a balancing act between staunch support for the Arab and 
Muslim causes and ingratiating himself with the United States and France (White 2001: 42). 
From a theoretical perspective, this weakens the dependency-based analyses of Moroccan 
foreign policy since Morocco does not solely operate within the framework of a European or 
French (let alone Spanish) circle of influence, but it also cultivates other political and economic 
relations. Its 2008 Advanced Status and 2000 Association Agreement with the EU, its 2006 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the USA, its 2004 FTA with Turkey, the 2004 Morocco-
Tunisia-Egypt-Jordan Free Trade Area that followed the Agadir Declaration, its privileged 
status among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries,28 etc. should all be seen in this 
light. 
 
This is indeed where such concepts as Omnibabalncing become useful. As a country that wields 
little international influence and has no major resources to bring to bear, Morocco resorts to 
triangulation or multilateral strategies, whereby it either exploits good relations with one party 
to try to strike better deals with another, involves a third party to try to advance its position 
with other counterparts, or simply pursues the same objective with multiple counterparts.29 
Morocco-EU-US, Morocco-Spain-US, Morocco-Spain-France, Morocco-Spain-Arab World, 
Morocco-Israel-Arab World, Morocco-US-Arab World, etc. are all examples of such strategies 
that Morocco would resort to in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives (Willis and 
Messari, 2005: 165-8). Also, Rabat’s alternation between pro-Western and non-aligned 
stances, its love-hate relationship with Spain, it’s cosying up with France and the United States, 
its support for the Arab cause and pro-Palestinian policies yet continuing dialogue with Israel, 
its proactive role in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as well as its spats with Iran 
that ended in suspension of diplomatic relations in 2012, can all partly be understood in light 
                                                          
28 During the GCC Consultative Summit of May 2011, member States invited Jordan and Morocco to apply for 
membership to the GCC (Al-Ebadi, 2012). 
29 Morocco often resorts to such strategies in its foreign policy. For example, During the Laila/Perejil crisis, 
Rabat relied on Paris for support to counterbalance Madrid’s efforts to rally EU support. Also, in April 2013 
Morocco managed to block a US draft resolution that sought to expand MINURSO's mandate to include human 
rights monitoring, claiming it threatened its sovereignty over the Sahara. To achieve this goal, Morocco resorted 
to risky counterbalancing strategies involving Washington, Paris, Madrid and even Moscow (see Amnesty 
International article “UN 'miss opportunity' to allow Western Sahara human rights monitoring” 25 April 2013. 
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of this international balancing act aiming at regime preservation, interest maximization and 
image enhancement. In the face of crises and opportunities alike, the country launches parallel 
(at times similar) processes with different powerful counterparts in order to maximize its 
options, multiply its opportunities, exert pressure, or boost its international standing and 
prestige in multiple ways. But this triangulation strategy serves other purposes as well, since it 
also helps guarantee a sort of omnipresence of the country in the different international 
platforms and broadens the scope of its alternatives, allowing it to put its eggs in more than one 
basket. 
 
Omnibalancing, therefore, seems to be the missing link in this multifarious complex of 
relationships we are about to scrutinize. This research will test its validity as a conceptual 
framework to account not only for Morocco’s bilateral relations with Spain, but within our 
quadrilateral framework as well. In other words, it will be worthwhile finding out the extent to 
which Rabat, in its relations with Madrid, resorts to triangulation30 or multilateral strategies to 
try to defend its interests and secure better deals for itself. We will also try to investigate 
whether the same dynamics might account for Morocco’s behaviour with the European trio 
(Madrid, Brussels and Barcelona). The main objective in this case will be to find out the extent 
to which Rabat uses or instrumentalises its Spanish, Catalan and EU links to maximize benefits, 
resolve problems or gain prominence. 
The theoretical complex 
This research, therefore, offers a theoretical complex made up of four key approaches to try to 
capture our convoluted quadrilateral relationship. As our theoretical map indicates (see figure 
2.1), no single theory seems to adequately manage and comprehensively capture the reciprocal 
role of the four players in our analysis (Rabat, Madrid, Barcelona and Brussels). 
Omnibalancing and Complex Interdependence theory do span the full panorama but they 
should be seen as one-directional only. They are almost mirror images of each other; the first 
providing a possible interpretation of Rabat’s behaviour towards its three northern partners, 
and the second doing the reverse. In this complex skeleton that regroups all the aforementioned 
frameworks (that we will refer to as a ‘theoretical complex’) MLG would be very helpful in 
making sense of the dynamics taking place among the northern players from a state point of 
                                                          
30 It should also be noted that Spain sometimes uses triangulation as well, especially in relations involving the 
EU and third countries where it has some influence, like (Spain-EU-Latin America) or (Spain-EU-
Mediterranean). 
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view. It is likely to better capture the relative power diffusion at the Spanish level and the roles 
of Catalonia and the EU in Rabat-Madrid bilateral relations. Europeanization, on the other 
hand, brings the supranational perspective even more saliently. It is an equally crucial concept 
that complements MLG and boasts the potential to account for the important EU ‘ins’ and 
‘outs’ of influence. The uploading and downloading of policies between the state and the 
supranational entity, as well as the moderate normative and institutional influence of this latter 
on its vicinity (Neighbourhood Europeanization) are key concepts depicting the role and span 
of the EU. Complex Interdependence theory, as said earlier, carries the potential to account for 
the dynamics informing behaviour of our four actors, but it may mean over-stretching the 
concept. However, it may prove especially potent in capturing the key Rabat-Madrid axis and 
framing the increasing mutual interdependencies that seem to withstand dangerous escalations 
of tension. The increasing interdependence appears to inform and constrain options on both 
sides (and probably all sides). In the theoretical map (Figure 2.1), we have extended it to the 
EU and Catalonia as well. Finally the state-centric Omnibalancing approach with its insistence 
on state survival, quest for diversification and multiple options, and defence of national interest 
(Korany and Dessouki, 2008: 22-3) is likely to be conceptually helpful when accounting for 
Morocco’s behaviour within the quadrilateral relationship. If European behaviour is likely to 
be informed by the creation of a multitude of interdependencies with the southern neighbour, 
Morocco’s behaviour is probably motivated by the availability and proliferation of choices and 
options. Omnibalancing is, therefore, crucial in explaining how Rabat may juggle between 
Madrid, Barcelona and Brussels, our key concerns here, and could even be accommodating 
when it comes to explaining how Rabat strives to balance out its relations with Madrid by 
activating connections with such capitals as Paris or Washington. 
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Figure 2.1 The theoretical complex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key:  ERPZ (Europeanization theory) 
                          MLG (Multi-level Governance theory) 
               OMNB (Omnibalancing theory) 
                           CIT (Complex Interdependence theory) 
 
 
Although the demarcation lines of these theories appear to be firm and strictly inclusive or 
exclusive, these are in fact more elastic and open to interpretation. The conceptual limits 
reflected in our theoretical map translate the most salient (but not exclusive) tendencies. 
Europeanization, for example, can be limited to the Brussels-Madrid axis as it can be extended 
to Barcelona, but in this case we have made the concept stretch along the Brussels-Madrid-
Rabat alignment as this better mirrors our definition of the term, having included 
Neighbourhood Europeanization in the conceptualization. Complex Interdependence is an 
equally supple concept as it can also shrink to the strictly bilateral state relationship or can 
include the supranational player only, especially with regard to the strong institutional aspect 
of interdependence. The choice to opt for a comprehensive Rabat-Madrid-Barcelona-Brussels 
framework, in this case, echoes the predominance of the economic, political, institutional and 
ERPZ 
OMNB 
MLG 
CIT  
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social aspects of complex interdependence, as our subsequent analysis will elucidate. Finally, 
Omnibalancing is an equally malleable concept as it can be restricted to the bilateral level to 
portray Rabat’s foreign policy behaviour, where Madrid is one among other “capitals” such as 
Paris or Washington that are involved in this balancing act. Or it could have been extended 
only to Brussels since Barcelona could be viewed as a less prominent player in the eyes of 
Rabat. We have chosen, however, to stretch it to all the European parties since there is sufficient 
ground to suggest that Rabat deals with the three European players, albeit in varying degrees, 
to reach its objectives and maximize its benefits.  
Limitations 
As explained from the outset, this thesis aims at exploring a fairly complex area in International 
Relations. It tackles a North-South bilateral relationship while bringing the sub-national and 
supranational levels into play. This is bound to be an endeavour fraught with conceptual, 
empirical and analytical pitfalls. To try to adequately theorize this hybrid set of relations, this 
research has opted for an equally complex battery of conceptual frameworks, each bearing the 
promise to account for particular aspects and actors in the relationship. But this ambitious 
endeavour might prove to be the research’s main limitation. First, combining one analytical 
framework and three theories (MLG + CIT, Europeanization and Omnibalancing) to account 
for the relationship is certainly not a graceful or parsimonious way to frame these relationships 
when other interpretations adopted more elegant and simple theoretical mantles (such as the 
constructivist approach). However, beyond the inadequacy of constructivism argued for earlier, 
the complexity of this endeavour will certainly require a combination of approaches. It is also 
important to remember that the objective here is to account for the whole relationship, by 
providing a range of possible frameworks that will be tested in this thesis to be confirmed or 
contested after the analysis. Second, the frameworks brought forward are not perfectly 
complementary. In fact, they overlap in a number of aspects and may even create theoretical 
tensions. Omnibalancing and Neighbourhood Europeanization, for example, do not sit 
comfortably together since the first highlights interest-driven behaviour and the second 
highlights norm-driven behaviour from the southern partner. Third, Europeanization and MLG 
appear to have some redundant aspects such as the overlap between uploading and 
downloading depicted by Europeanization, and the upward and downward power seepage 
described by MLG.   But in fact, all these conceptual frameworks are crucial in their own rights. 
MLG accounts for the hollowing out of the state and mainly describes the erosion of state 
central powers in both directions: up towards the EU, and down towards the region (Catalonia 
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in our case). Europeanization, on the other hand, places the spotlight on the European 
dimension and its political, economic, institutional and normative role. Its potential to embrace 
EU ties with the vicinity (through Neighbourhood Europeanization) is valuable for our analysis 
as well.  
 
Another potential drawback lies in the way we customized Europeanization as a term, 
especially after pointing out the risk of conceptual overstretch identified by Radaelli and others 
(Radaelli, 2000; Gawrich, 2010). Fortunately, Neighbourhood Europeanization is not a novel 
addition and in our case. In fact, it proves particularly convenient having discarded the 
constructivist interpretation. Also, relying on Omnibalancing alone to explain Morocco’s 
behaviour in this complex relationship might also prove insufficient, or even inadequate. This 
state-centric approach may not adequately and comprehensively grasp Rabat’s strategies and 
orientations. Also, while it might account for Morocco’s tactics, it might not fully make sense 
of its motives, objectives and policy content. But hopefully, this is where Complex 
Interdependence may prove useful as it has ample conceptual firepower to fill such gaps. 
Finally, Complex Interdependence and Europeanization might seem self-standing and 
sufficient paradigms, but that can only be established or rejected in the conclusion. Indeed, 
only after these paradigms are tested and tried can we decide whether to discard, include, adjust 
or creatively combine them. Our subsequent analysis will help us recalibrate this conceptual 
battery. 
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Chapter three - Moroccan-Spanish relations: a complex partnership 
Introduction 
Following on from the research questions and the methodology section, the purpose of this 
chapter is to set the stage for the analysis by offering an in-depth examination of the key 
bilateral Moroccan-Spanish relationship. Being the most comprehensive and crucial 
relationship, the purpose here is to start by unpicking its various components and layers 
before getting to grips with the two other bilateral relations and the analysis of the 
contributions of the supranational (EU) and the sub-state (Catalan) entities in the two next 
chapters. It is crucial, therefore, to start by revealing the wider dimensions of the Rabat-
Madrid bilateral ties by means of examining the various aspects, issues and players involved. 
Key to appreciating the complexity and intricacies of the Moroccan-Spanish relationship, 
beyond the depiction of issues, conflict and cooperation patterns and actors involved, is an 
understanding of the nature of these two countries’ regimes, the way these have evolved 
during the last few decades, their distinctive power structures and distribution, and how these 
dissimilar characteristics condition and affect their relationship. Failure to place each polity 
in its proper context, appreciate their recent history, comprehend their distinct command 
mechanisms, power distribution and their diverse decision-making “cultures”, would most 
likely result in a flawed or truncated understanding of the bilateral relationship. A good grasp 
of the place and role of the elected governments, the political parties, the monarchies, the 
non-state actors, etc. is indispensable for any sound appreciation of the workings of the 
bilateral relationship. Equally important to this understanding is an appreciation of the weight 
and evolution of each of the main issues and concerns that affect the bilateral ties, the 
sticking points and the sensitivities. Fundamental and recurrent questions such as the 
territorial issues, the status of the Sahara, fisheries and agriculture negotiations, economic 
relations and public perceptions, along with issues that have gained increasing importance in 
the 1990s and early 2000s such as immigration, security and terrorism, all need to be 
analysed and placed in their appropriate context.  An awareness of the wider context within 
which the two neighbours interact, i.e. an understanding of the role and impact of the external 
actors in this partnership also needs to be established in order to put the thematic (economy, 
cooperation and migration) and agency (the EU and Catalonia) focus of this research in their 
relevant context. 
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A tale of two systems 
Shedding light on the Moroccan and Spanish government systems and the way they evolved 
is key to understanding relationship dynamics and complications. It is important, therefore, to 
start by discussing the democratization process in Spain and its development over the last 
three decades, as well as the nature of the Moroccan regime, its authoritarian features and the 
enduring central role of the Monarchy since the country’s independence in 1956. It is also 
crucial to analyse aspects of foreign policy decision-making processes and discuss the centres 
of power in each of the two polities. In so doing, this section seeks to illuminate some of the 
characteristics and challenges resulting from the interaction between the two different 
systems (a democracy vs. a semi-authoritarian regime, a European vs. a North African 
country, a high income vs. a medium-low income country, etc.), and to contextualize the 
misunderstandings and discords resulting from such regime disparities.  
 Spain: the success story? 
Following a short-lived experiment in democracy (the Second Republic) that ended as a 
result of the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 1939), Spain came under Franco’s dictatorship for 
almost 40 years. After Franco’s death in 1975, the country started erecting the foundations for 
a stable system that soon transformed the country from an authoritarian regime to a 
democracy with a largely decentralized state system. It is not the purpose of this study to 
contribute to the wider debate on what the most appropriate indicators of Spanish democracy 
are, evaluate its ‘good governance’, or determine the different stages of its democratization 
(nor is it our purpose to engage in such an analysis in the Moroccan case either). But using 
minimalist definitions of democracy and a number of procedural yardsticks, such as the 
existence of free and open elections where opposition stands chances of winning office, 
relatively low barriers to participation, genuine political competition, and wide protection of 
civil liberties (Dahl 1971: 2-3), or Juan Linz’s categorization that insists on the freedom of 
citizens to make political choices, based on their rights to association, information and 
communication, and on free, fair, peaceful, all-inclusive and regular competition among 
political rivals (Linz, 1975: 182-3), one can comfortably reach the conclusion that Spain is 
indeed a democracy, in spite of some post-2008 indications that it might still be fledgling.  
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Whether the democratization of Spain was triggered by an internal crisis following the death  
of Franco (Alonso and Muro, 2011: 2), the result of the “deepening of the internal 
contradictions of the regime” prior to the dictator’s death (Preston, 1986: 2), the result of a 
peaceful and negotiated transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996), or the product of a “profound 
transformation of Spain’s political elites from disunity into consensual unity” (Gunther, 1992: 
40), the fact remains that the country’s transition to democracy was a success story, relatively 
peaceful,31 and a source of international inspiration. Hungarian, Polish, Romanian, Czech and 
other Eastern European leaders looked at the Spanish transition example for lessons after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, as did some Latin American countries such as Argentina and 
Chile (Alonso and Muro, 2011: 1-2).  
 
But the transition itself was not completely smooth. Some seven years after the passing of 
Franco, the country went through various stages of power struggle, internal conflicts, 
negotiations, bargains and attempted coups, culminating in the October 1982 elections that 
also took place under threats of unrest. The results were a humiliating defeat for the centre-
right party UCD (with 6.17% of the total votes cast), a clear rejection of Manuel Fraga’s right 
wing party Alianza Popular AP (with 25.89%), and a landslide victory for the socialist PSOE 
(with 47.26%). The overwhelming popular commitment to Spain’s democratic transition 
“definitively put an end to the claim that the army could interpret the national will better than 
could elected politicians” (Preston, 1986: 167-8). During the 1980s, the socialists played a 
crucial role in reinforcing the welfare state, oversaw the country’s accession to the EEC in 
1986, and worked towards the adoption of free market policies and privatization in the 1990s 
(Alva and Navarro, 2008: 196). They also started implementing the regional devolution 
system of the 17 autonomous communities commonly referred to as the Estado de las 
Autonomías, whereby “historical” regions32 such as Catalonia were initially granted extensive 
powers, although these were later largely watered down by being extended to the rest of the 
autonomous communities by the end of the 1990s. 
 
                                                          
31 It is important to remember, however, that the transition to democracy in Spain was not an entirely peaceful 
process as hundreds of people died as a result of political violence between 1976 and 1979 (Hooper, 2006: 80-
89). 
32 Spanish regions with a stronger sense of identity such as Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia are often 
referred to as the “historical” regions, as opposed to other regions with less pronounced identities or whose 
creation was merely the results of administrative partitioning. For a comprehensive analysis of Spanish 
decentralization process see (Aja, 2003). 
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Nowadays, Spain is often cited as a model of transition from dictatorship to democratic 
legitimacy and consolidation, which means that the country has managed to successfully 
adapt democratic structures and norms that have been institutionalized and legitimized by 
most citizens (Burton et al, 1992: 20-3).33 But the Spanish “miracle” did not take place at the 
political front alone. In economic terms, after 1995 Spain’s annual growth “comfortably 
outstripped the average for the EU-15 [and] in 2006 Spain’s GDP per capita was well above 
the EU-27 average” (Chari and Heywood, 2009: 26). Compared to its southern neighbour, 
Spain’s per capita GDP was barely four times that of Morocco in 1970 and by the mid-2000s 
the disparity had already shot up nearly fourfold (Moré, 2011: 114-5). It is often argued that 
this gaping economic disparity constitutes part of the “pull” factor that started attracting 
immigrants from Morocco and other African countries. Last but not least, this combined 
political and economic clout that Spain achieved in a record period of time and the 
trumpeting of its transition model as an example to emulate were also a source of 
considerable prestige that gave Spain a voice, weight and influence on the international 
scene. The 2008 financial crisis, however, has affected these gains but without damaging 
them irreversibly so far. 
Morocco: the weight of history and tradition 
In spite of its geographic proximity with Spain and the shared historical ties, Morocco has 
largely developed in a quiet different “ecosystem”, and has not broken away from the 
influence and the weight of its imposing past, traditions and established identity associated to 
a large extent to its Islamic, Arab components.34 Unlike many of its Middle East and North 
African peers, Morocco has constructed an collective identity based on its stronger historical 
pedigree (Rosenblum and Zartman 2008: 332-3). Its monarchy prides itself in dating back to 
the end of the 8th century with the Idrisids dynasty that ruled Morocco with Fes as its capital. 
From the early 11th to early 17th century, a string of powerful dynasties succeeded, albeit 
intermittently, in ruling the country (Al Moravids, Al Mohads, the Merinides, the Watasids 
and the Saadis). Sometimes their influence stretched as far east as Tripoli, other times as far 
south as the Niger River or as far north as Spain’s borders with France. Moroccan (and 
                                                          
33 It is worth mentioning, however, that recently executive power grew at the expense of parliament amid the 
current financial crisis.  For example, in 2012 Rajoy’s government has issued 29 “Royal Decrees” compared to 
less than 12 decrees issued per year the previous decade. Also, introducing fiscal measures by decree has 
become commonplace. See Financial Times article: “Spain rules by decree to drive reform” (7 March 2013).  
34 In fact, other identity components (mainly the Berber one) were suppressed for the sake of unitarism and state 
homogenization. 
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Islam’s) influence on the history and culture of Spain lasted from the first Muslim conquest 
of the peninsula in 711 until the ousting of the last Moriscos from Al-Andalus in 1614, and 
Spain came under direct rule of Al Moravid and Al Mohad dynasties from late 11th to early 
13th century.35 In the mid-17th century the Alawis (Morocco’s current ruling dynasty) came to 
power and soon gained a firm grip on the whole country through King Mouley Ismail’s 
succession in 1672 (Pennell, 2003: 30-99). The dynasty’s influence waxed then waned, until 
the country was finally colonized by the French and the Spanish in 1912. But the 
preponderant role of the monarchy proved resilient. The monarchical establishment itself was 
savvily boosted by King Mohammed V (and by the nationalist resistance movements as well) 
during Morocco’s struggle for independence to such a point that, following his death in 1961, 
the royal institution had become “a revived and transformed office” (Geertz, 1968: 75). To 
further uphold its supremacy, the Moroccan monarchy relied on its historical, political and 
religious legitimacy (Waltz, 1995: 44–45; Rosenblum and Zartman, 2008: 320), as well as the 
allegiance of the army and its monopoly of the constitutional codification processes 
(Berramdane, 1987: 411). 
 
During the first decades of independence, Morocco’s politics started bearing the hallmark of 
an enduring power struggle between the hitherto allies against the French and Spanish 
colonial power. A prolonged, at times bloody, tug-of-war between King Hassan and the two 
main opposition parties - Istiqlal (Independence) and the USFP (the Socialists) parties - 
continued up until the 1980s (Maghraoui 2002: 28). During that period, the Palace also 
promoted a multi-party system (and the creation of political organizations sympathetic to the 
monarchy) in a bid to undermine the two dominant opponents and to prevent them from 
gaining mass support (Waltz 1995: 109-121; Zartman 1990: 223–230; Cammet 2007: 82-3). 
But the rivalry persisted and the regime sought new strategies, including repression, state 
largess, appropriation of ideas and co-option. The appropriation of rivals’ initiatives as the 
monarchy’s own has been common practice and continues to be a shrewd regime strategy 
practiced to this date.  Probably the first post-independence instance of this was the 
monarchy’s inspiration from the hitherto Istiqlal party discourse of “Greater Morocco” 
                                                          
35 With regard to the distent past, it is important to notice that despite the long shared history between Spain and 
Morocco, the discourses and the memory remain different and selective. If Moroccans celebrate such feats as 
the Islamization of Spain, the “golden era” of Al Andalus or Annual victory, their Spanish counterparts mark the 
beginning of their “golden age” in 1492, a date that marks the “reconquest” and the fall of Granada as well as 
the launching of the sea voyages of Christopher Columbus to the New World. The history of that Golden age is 
written by such iconic figures as the Catholic Kings, Charles I and Philip II. 
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(Waltz 1995: 115) which motivated the monarch to step up territorial demands. And one of 
the latest manifestations of it was seen on March 9th 2011 when Mohamed VI, in reaction to 
mounting social protests and the toppling of the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes, gave a 
speech promising reforms that rivalled and almost eclipsed the demands made by the 
February 20th Movement,36 thereby outbidding their own demands and outfoxing their tactics 
(Benchemsi, 2012). Examples of co-option are rife as well; they consist of attracting 
previously vocal public figures with alternative discourses to the decision-making arena 
without affecting state power (Sater, 2007: 150–151; Linn, 2011: 5). 
 
In the early 1970s, a more serious threat to the monarchy came from the military. The 1971 
and 1972 coup d’états exposed the fragility of the regime and provided it with extra 
arguments to tighten its grip on state policies and structures. Faced with these challenges, 
Hassan II also sought to strengthen the position of the monarchy by assuming the leadership 
of the Army and later on by successfully launching the campaign to “complete Morocco’s 
territorial integrity” through the annexation of the Sahara. Being so tightly linked to regime 
legitimacy, the “Moroccanness” of the Sahara, therefore, became a symbol of national unity 
and a core priority for Moroccan foreign policy. This practically made the issue of “territorial 
integrity” Morocco’s top foreign policy concern (Damis 1987: 198; Willis and Messari 2005: 
156; Rosenblum and Zartman 2008: 321; Rivlin 2009: 188-9).  
 
As far as democratization is concerned, Morocco is usually classified somewhere between the 
democratic and the undemocratic regimes. At times it is labelled as a straight “autocracy” 
(Albrecht and Wegner, 2006), other times a “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg 2002), an 
“enlightened authoritarian regime” (Boukhars 2011), a “sustainable authoritarian regime” 
(Dalmasso, 2012), or at best a “democratizing” country (Storm 2007: 164-5). Regardless of 
the hue or flavour associated with it, there is a large academic consensus on the fact that post-
independence Morocco continues to be a centralized constitutional monarchy characterized 
by authoritarianism. And despite the existence of an elected government, a multitude of 
political parties, a parliament, and other legislative and judicial bodies, these wield a limited 
influence compared to the Palace and its entourage, which remain the definitive hub of power 
                                                          
36 The “February 20th Movement” is the name that was given to the 2011 protest movement in Morocco as part 
of the wave of protests in the Arab world. The name emanates from the first massive demonstration (on 
February 20th 2011) where tens of thousands of protestors took to the streets of over 50 Moroccan cities. See 
(Hoffmann and König, 2013: 5-6). 
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in the country (Munson, 1999: 259; Waltz, 1999: 296; Cammett, 2007: 84; Rosenblum and 
Zartman 2008: 332). The monarchy usually maintains power through a web of alliances and 
relatively diffuse networks of patronage, eventually leading back to the Palace. As is the case 
to this day, political opposition is chronically weakened and its leaders often end up seeking 
support from the monarchy rather than challenging its authority (Waterbury, 1970: 318; 
Holden, 2005: 463). Even the most recent constitution which emerged following mass 
protests of 2011 still maintains the King as the army’s commander-in-chief, who promulgates 
laws, appoints and dismisses the prime minister and other high-level government officials. 
Successive governments since the country’s independence have had no effective power to 
govern, since they were constantly, albeit in varying degrees, subordinated to non-elected 
elites and the King in the first place (Storm 2007: 160). Governments, therefore, “merely 
executed rather than deliberated over policies devised by the King and his close advisors” 
(Cammett, 2007: 84).  
 
Unlike its northern neighbour, therefore, Morocco is far from being a fully-fledged 
democracy. Its political system is essentially shaped by a longstanding historical legacy and 
by the post-independence struggle for power that largely ended in favour of a dominant 
Monarchy. Recently, however, the country has undertaken some important reform measures 
that make it stand out in comparison to other Middle Eastern countries such as the 
establishment of an Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) to deal with past human 
rights abuses. The country also adopted a more liberal personal status law (moudawanna), a 
much trumpeted National Human Development Initiative (INDH), basic civil liberties, 
freedom of speech and the press, and extended prerogatives to the government (Layachi 
1998, 98; Storm 2007: 164-5; Kausch 2008: 2). Also, the country has engaged in a process of 
liberalization and enjoys a degree of political openness. The existence of political and social 
structure such as a multi-party system, regular elections, an increasingly vocal parliament and 
a growing civil society makes the country among the most open and reforming MENA 
countries. 
 Spain and Morocco: two strangers with vested interests? 
The “country profiles” that have been established in the previous section is an important 
exercise for the rest of the research. Not only do the disparities between Spanish and 
Moroccan political systems explain some of the existing tensions and misunderstandings but 
they will also help in gaining a better appreciation of the reciprocal and lingering stereotypes. 
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In fact, the Spanish-Moroccan relationship should not be disassociated either from the remote 
and recent pasts or from the nature of the two countries systems of governance and their 
respective evolution. Such origins and the disparities resulting from them do indeed explain 
part of the reasons why bilateral relations have remained unpredictable, complex and 
precarious. Akin to the encounter of two strangers with vested (not necessarily common) 
interests in each other, the relationship exhibits a number of awkward features and 
incongruous aspects. Each of the two countries considers the other a close and strategic 
partner: they signed the first Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation in 
the region back in1991, relationships between the two monarchs are cordial, and government 
relations are given priority with high level summits and priority foreign visits (Amirah-
Fernandez 2008: 354). All Spanish prime ministers have chosen Morocco as their first 
foreign visit destination (occasionally their first outside of the EU): Felipe González in 1983, 
Aznar in 1996 and 2000, Zapatero in 2004 and 2008, and Rajoy in 2012. Economic relations 
have increased as well, with accumulated Spanish investments in Morocco at 3 billion Euros 
between 1993 and 2008, trade relations growing seven-fold between 1995 and 2008, and 
official aid tripling between 1997 and 2008 to reach 81.3 million Euros (De Larramendi and 
Azaola, 2010: 514). Also, Rabat enjoys a preferential status in Spain’s external relations and 
is arguably its top priority in the Mediterranean region (Amirah-Fernandez, 2008: 348; López 
García and De Larramendi, 2002: 170, Gillespie, 2001: 3-4), and at around 760,000 officially 
registered immigrants, Moroccans had become the largest group of non-Europeans residing in 
Spain by 2010 (Barreñada 2010, p.7). Yet, the bilateral relationship keeps producing 
awkward spasms that produce such crises as the fisheries episode of 2001 (Amirah-Fernandez 
2008, p. 353), the Perejil/Laila dispute of July 2002  (Gillespie 2006) or the more recent 
Haidar and Laayoun  spats37 which  further damage the countries’ mutual relationships and 
perception of each other. 
                                                          
37 Aminatu Haidar is a human rights activist who went on a hunger strike at the Spanish airport of Lanzarote in 
November 2009 after Moroccan authorities denied her entry at Laayoun airport having declared herself a citizen 
of Western Sahara. Her hunger strike was widely covered by Spanish media and resulted in a diplomatic crisis 
between Spain and Morocco after the Spanish Parliament called upon Zapatero to pressure Morocco to accept 
her unconditional return and to support the extension of the mandate of the UN mission in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) to include human rights monitoring. Morocco viewed this as a provocation and intervention in its 
sovereignty. One year later, Morocco proceeded to the dismantling of the Agdim Izik camp (12 kilometres from 
Laayoun) that attracted some 20 000 demonstrators by October 2010. The intervention resulted in bloody 
confrontations and casualties, mainly among Moroccan security forces. The incident also sparked tensions 
between the two countries, especially after the Spanish parliament adopted a motion calling upon the 
government to condemn the violence of the Moroccan intervention in dismantling the camp. See (Soler and 
Vaquer, 2010: 76-77) as well as El País articles “El Congreso fuerza al Gobierno a subir la presión a Rabat por 
Haidar” (16 December 2009), and “Marruecos amenaza con desatar una crisis con España por el Sáhara” (03 
December 2010). 
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What is more, the complexity of Moroccan-Spanish relations is such that it has created a 
“proliferation of foreign policy actors” (De Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009: 20). But 
although almost all significant actors on both sides are involved in varying degrees in shaping 
or affecting bilateral relations, the nature of the two regimes makes it that the major foreign 
policy powers sit with a restricted, yet distinct, circle of actors and institutions in each 
country. The fact that both monarchs are actively engaged in their respective country’s 
foreign policy, as well as the heads of governments, key ministries, parliaments, armed 
forces, political parties, the press, Spanish Autonomous Communities, NGOs, civil societies 
actors, interest groups and lobbies, etc. (De Larramendi and Mañé Estrada, 2009), does not 
mean that these actors play equivalent roles on both sides of the Strait. The existence of 
analogous institutions and comparable state structures in both countries can be misleading 
and does, sometimes, generate misunderstandings, false expectations, or even clashes.  
 
Ignacio Cembrero in his 2006 book starts off his interesting investigation by admitting the 
gaping mutual ignorance and misunderstanding resulting from that, even at elite levels. He 
mentions, for example, the conviction that Moroccan authorities hold that the Spanish 
government can exert influence on the press to moderate its critical approach towards 
Morocco (Cembrero, 2006: 10), or on pro-Saharawi civil society movements. In 2001 
Morocco deemed hostile a largely mediatised mock referendum on the Sahara’s self-
determination organized by pro-Saharawi civil society groups in Andalucía (Arieff, 2011: 
20), and blamed Madrid for its lack of neutrality on the Sahara. As a result it recalled its 
ambassador, thereby partly kicking off the worst crisis (2001 to 2002) in the two countries’ 
bilateral relationship since 1975. The Spaniards also fail to fully appreciate decision-making 
processes in Morocco or tend to fall into the same ignorance trap. Some may place 
disproportional expectation on a Moroccan ministerial or parliamentary visit, or not 
appreciate the real weight of certain royal advisors; others may not fully realize that they are 
dealing with a country whose GDP is less than 6% that of their own country (Cembrero, 
2006: 10). What is more, hostility that Moroccans sometimes perceive from their Spanish 
counterparts following fisheries or agricultural negotiations tend to generate feelings of 
disappointment, frustration and unfairness at the popular as well as official levels. Seeing the 
wealthy northern neighbour set to maximize its gains and keen not to make concessions 
despite the already considerable prosperity divide between the two countries tends to 
engender such sentiments. At the heart of misunderstandings, therefore, lies not only mutual 
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ignorance but also perceived “self-interest” or “fairness”, confusion between apparently 
similar systems, as well as the partial media coverage of the “other” at both ends. 
 
Start with Morocco. In the Alawi Kingdom, the key foreign policy decisions are taken in the 
royal palace. In fact, along with the other ministères de souveraineté (where ministers were 
directly appointed by the King) that included Justice, the Interior and Religious Affairs, 
Foreign Affairs used to be a domaine réservé of the Monarch38 who occupies centre stage 
among foreign policy actors (El Houdaïgui 2003b: 27). While decisions have sometimes been 
influenced by popular demands and inclinations or by international pressures, the royal 
institution has been holding a firm grip on major foreign policy decisions since the country’s 
independence, and even more so since its fierce power struggle with the Istiqlal and the USFP 
parties abated, without ceasing completely, in the 1970s. Following the 1975 Moroccan 
Green March that resulted in the annexation of the Sahara, the prestige of the Palace soared, 
and a number of “sacred lines” were firmly drawn. These were relative to the country’s 
territorial integrity (i.e. unanimity on the “Moroccanness” of the Sahara), state religion 
(Islam) and state regime (the monarchy) (Loudiy and Smith, 2005: 1070f, cited in Hoffmann 
and König, 2013: 9). This triptych soon became synonymous with national unity and the 
King became tightly associated with the concept of state pérennité (i.e. continuity and 
permanence of the state). Notwithstanding the “constitutional monarchy” label often used to 
describe the country, Morocco, therefore, remained far from being a liberal democratic 
country and the decision-making process in its foreign policy, as well as in major state 
policies, has since been closely dominated by the King. As a result of this state of affairs, 
foreign policy decisions in Morocco are more a result of “bandwaggoning” rather than 
“balancing” (Willis and Messari 2005: 155), which implies frequent alignment of the various 
political forces behind the major foreign policy decisions that are, in one way or another, 
influenced by the King. Aside from external pressures, popular demands and protests which 
sometimes manage to shift policies, the remaining national actors (political parties, civil 
society actors, the parliament, lobby and pressure groups, the press, etc.) wield little influence 
while the Palace and its surrounding circles of influence remain the ultimate sources of power 
(Layachi 1998: 98; Munson 1999: 259 - 274; Waltz 1999: 283 - 296). 
 
                                                          
38 It should be noted that, with the 2011 constitution, two of the four ministerial positions mentioned (Justice 
and Foreign Affairs) are no longer royal appointments but come from majority government parties.  
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According to Rachid El Houdaïgui, Moroccan foreign policy decision-making operates 
within a rigid structure in which the various actors intervene according to “a hierarchic and 
rational configuration”. At the top of the pyramid lies “the central decision unit” (the King, 
the royal cabinet –i.e. the King’s advisors- and the army). Supporting this key unit is the 
“subordinate decision unit” made up of the government and the parliament. The political 
parties, civil society actors, business organizations, etc. constitute the least significant 
“marginalized decision unit” (El Houdaïgui 2003b: 27). But the royal institution does not 
only exert foreign policy powers. Even after the adoption of the new constitution in July 2011 
following mass protests in the midst of the so-called “Arab Spring”, the King hardly lost any 
of his key privileges as he remains commander of the faithful, in command of the army, 
appoints and dismisses ministers and other high-level government officials, rules by decree 
and retains the power to dissolve parliament (Theofilopoulou, 2012). 
 
In Spain, on the other hand, although a wide range of actors are involved in shaping, 
influencing and conducting foreign policy, including the political parties, the prime minister, 
the ministry of foreign affairs, the autonomous regions and public opinion (De Larramendi 
and Mañé Estrada, 2009), power mainly resides with the executive headed by the prime 
minister. The ministries of foreign affairs, defence, economy and others not only compete 
against each other for influence but have seen the emergence of new rivals in the form of the 
autonomous regional governments that also engage in “external activities” by virtue of the 
Spanish constitution (Gillespie, 2000: 34-5). And although the Cortes (Spanish parliament) 
can at times nudge the prime minister towards certain directions, its role remains limited. Its 
prestige had started to dwindle after the 1979 elections, and its role was even further eclipsed 
following the PSOE’s 1982 absolute majority which provided Felipe Gonzalez with a free 
hand not only in domestic policies but in external affairs as well (Heywood, 1991: 110). 
Indeed, the Spanish executive enjoys a high degree of power. The prime minister stands at 
the heart of the country’s political system, supported by a body of advisers and specialised 
departments. In foreign policy matters he enjoys large prerogatives to the extent of 
“personalization of foreign policy” (Gillespie, 2000: 35). A quick consideration of Spanish 
foreign policy towards Morocco over the last two decades would undoubtedly confirm that. 
Gonzalez’s, Aznar’s and Zapatero’s tenures were not only characterized by difference in 
style, but one can probably decipher the weight of their personal world-views and convictions 
in the outcomes of their foreign policies. 
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But that does not mean that in democratic Spain the prime minister holds absolute power 
when it comes to foreign policy matters. Aside from the role of other ministries, specialised 
departments, and the autonomous communities, the foreign policy agenda is sometimes 
affected by public opinion, the press and the input of other political parties in opposition or 
within informal coalitions that sometimes form with victorious parties when these fail to 
achieve an absolute majority. This was the case for the Socialists in 1993 when they had to 
negotiate with the Catalan and/or Basque nationalist parties, for Aznar’s Partido Popular’s 
first term in office (1996 – 2000), and (to some extent) for Zapatero’s 2004 term. Also, even 
though Spanish citizens have traditionally shown little interest in foreign affairs (Heywood, 
1991: 112), massive protests have often influenced key foreign policy decisions, as was the 
case with regard to the popular manifestations against the Iraq war that contributed to the 
decision to withdraw Spanish troops in 2004, or the youth protests led by the indignados (the 
indignant) in cities such as Madrid and Barcelona that followed the 2008 financial crisis and 
the Arab revolutions in 2011.39 Finally, unlike his Moroccan counterpart, the Spanish 
monarch King Juan Carlos wields inconsequential foreign policy authority as he plays a 
largely ceremonial role, and at best may be charged with specific missions akin to those of a 
senior diplomat. When it comes to relations with Morocco, however, his role acquires more 
significance since the Moroccan monarchy likes to deal with its Spanish counterpart for 
symbolic reasons and to proffer prestige to the office itself. 
  
Having similar state structures (with few exceptions such as regional governments in Spain), 
therefore, does not mean that power distribution is comparable. Indeed, the similarities 
sometimes convert into sources of confusion and may even trigger discord. When former 
Prime Minister Aznar made his infamous statement threatening that there would be 
consequences for Moroccan-Spanish and Moroccan-EU relations following the breakdown of 
the April 2001 fisheries negotiations, Morocco interpreted it as a threat. The King’s 
entourage’s biggest fear was a blockading of Spanish ports by local fishermen, hampering the 
transit of the hundreds of thousands of Moroccan immigrants that return to Morocco every 
summer via Spain (Cembrero, 2006: 18-21). Such blown up assumptions and reactions at 
such a high level further illustrate not only the degree of suspicion and mistrust that can 
                                                          
39 The Indignados movement (the indignants or the outraged) refers to the series of youth-led protests and 
demonstrations in Spain that originated from cyber activism and social networks. The movement is also known 
as the “15M movement” (in reference to its start day of May 15, 2011). The movement erupted right after the 
“Arab Spring” protests in Tunisia and Egypt, although its surge is also attributed to the 2008 financial crisis in 
Spain. For a brief discussion of the subject, see (Badia and Sarsanedas, 2012). 
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sometimes surface but the degree of mutual ignorance on the part of Madrid that was not able 
to predict Morocco’s reactions to such declarations, and on the part of Rabat whose extreme 
suspicions denoted its oversized misapprehensions towards Spain. It is probably no 
coincidence, then, that some of the honeymoon periods in the relationship took place when 
clued-up, skilled and culturally insightful diplomats were in charge. Ambassadors like 
Alfonso de la Sena, Jorge Dezcallar, Omar Azzimane, or foreign ministers like Miguel Angel 
Moratinos (an Arabist and a connoisseur of Morocco and the Middle East) and Mohammed 
Benaissa have certainly had a positive influence on the bilateral relationship. 
 PSOE and PP policies towards Morocco: playing musical chairs? 
Unlike its Iberian neighbour, Morocco’s heavily centralised Makhzen system may make the 
decision-making process shadowy and unpredictable, but it remains largely monophonic as 
there are no significant internal opposition forces that can make their weight felt in the 
various government decisions. There is also an implicit consensus that the Palace has the 
final say regarding major foreign policy decisions; it is the King who draws the main policy 
guidelines, and major crises between the two neighbours are mainly resolved through his 
direct intervention (Barreñada 2010: 8). 
 
In Spain too, and despite the highly polarised political scene between the two main political 
parties, up until the early 2000s many crucial foreign policy issues such as the country’s 
Mediterranean, Latin American and Transatlantic policies used to constitute issues of 
considerable political consensus, often referred to as ‘Poltíca de Estado’ (State policy), 
between the right wing People’s Party and the Socialist Party (Gillespie 2007: 29). However, 
over certain issues relating to Morocco, the two parties seem to act out exchangeable roles 
depending on whether they are in government or in opposition. Rivalries between incumbent 
and opposition parties sometimes reflect their struggle for power and quest for votes more 
than the pursuit of significantly diverging agenda based on ideological or partisan principles. 
This change of roles was see, for example, when the two parties started modifying their 
positions with regard to the Sahara issue as early as the 1970s. The socialist PSOE party was, 
then, a fervent defender of the Polisario Front’s40 cause, a bitter critic of Morocco and a huge 
supporter of the Saharawi self-determination. Once in power following its massive victory in 
                                                          
40 The Polisario Front is a Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement seeking to end Morocco’s control over 
Western Sahara. Their name is derived from initials of the Spanish name of the Front: Frente Popular de 
Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río 
de Oro). 
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1982, however, the party adopted a more pragmatic approach, implementing policies of 
friendship towards Rabat and maintaining the Madrid Tripartite Agreement,41 contrary to 
their previous calls for its invalidation (Morán, 1990: 78-83; De Larramendi, 1997: 405-408; 
De Larramendi and Azaola 2010: 512). The hostile attitudes towards Morocco soon gave way 
to stronger links and a diversification and intensification of relations between the two 
countries, starting with the institutionalisation of top-level summits in 1990s (Gillespie, 1995: 
167), to the extent that the dominant perception nowadays is that the PSOE is much more 
Rabat-friendly than the PP. After the Socialist party victory of 1982, however, the centre-
right PP (the successor of the Alianza Popular an offspring of the Franco regime that had 
signed the 1975 Tripartite Treaty) started calling for a firmer policy towards Morocco 
regarding the Sahara question. This game of musical chairs seemed to continue prior to the 
PP election such as when Aznar made a reassuring visit to Morocco in 1994, promising 
continuity in the relations. In the same vein, Zapatero’s 2001 visit to Rabat as opposition 
leader (at the height of Morocco’s crisis with the PP) was attributed by some to his keenness 
to pursue a relationship that his party (and Felipe Gonzalez in particular) had previously 
invested and believed in; but another explanation was that Zapatero saw in the crisis an 
opportunity to project himself as a statesman who could play a constructive role in his 
country’s international relations. 
 
Although the fisheries issue corresponds to a more cyclical EU-Morocco calendar, it is 
nevertheless another area that demonstrates this quasi-role play. During the 1995 fisheries 
negotiations between Morocco and the EU, the PP had severely criticized the PSOE for its 
laxity in the negotiations, opposed Morocco’s demands and accused Felipe González, Spain’s 
prime minister at the time, of being more concerned about his pro-European image than 
Spain’s national interests (Jones 2000: 152). However, after winning the 1996 elections, the 
PP had to accept and adopt the very fishing agreements it had previously vilified, proving yet 
again that its previous stance was motivated by a vote-seeking political agenda in tune with 
the overwhelming public opinion at the time, rather than on the basis of purely partisan 
convictions and principles (Jones, 2000: 152-3). Predictably enough, five years later, it was 
the PSOE’s turn to try to undermine the PP’s credibility, blaming the failure of the 2001 
fishing negotiations and the steady degradation of relations between the two countries on the 
                                                          
41 The Tripartite agreement refers to the November 1975 treaty between Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania 
whereby Madrid ended its presence in Western Sahara, opening the door to Morocco’s Green March to reclaim 
the Sahara.  
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government’s failure to maintain previous relations (López García and Larramendi, 2002: 
188).  
 
Other instances of the instrumentalization of Morocco-related issues in Spanish politics keep 
reoccurring. For instance, in 2007 King Juan Carlos, with a Socialist government blessing 
apparently motivated by the imminent 2008 elections, made an official visit to Ceuta (the first 
made by a Spanish head of state in 74 years). Coming just one day prior to the Moroccan 
Green March anniversary celebrations, the visit deeply infuriated the Moroccan government 
and revived the long dormant tensions between the two countries. However, other visits to 
Melilla made in 2010 by José Maria Aznar and Mariano Rajoy, PP former prime minister and 
the party leader respectively, were harshly criticized by the PSOE government as acts of 
provocation.42 The events in Laayoun later that same year further demonstrated the 
exploitation of such issues by the two main rivals when Rajoy openly criticized Zapatero’s 
leniency towards Morocco and accused him of “abdicating” his government responsibilities 
by abandoning the consensual state policy towards the Sahara issue.43 Rajoy’s declarations 
backfired as they ignited massive demonstrations in Casablanca in 2010 which rallied 
hundreds of thousands in protest against the PP.44 Soon after his general election victory in 
November 2011, however, Rajoy chose Morocco for his first official visit, in spite of the 
critical economic conditions of his country and the deepening Euro crisis that might have led 
him to prioritize a visit to Germany or France instead.  Symbolically at least, once in office, 
the PP did not veer from the tradition of giving precedence to Rabat. The last act of the 
musical chairs game towards Morocco was still to be written. 
 
Although one might easily argue that relations between Rabat and Madrid have generally 
been better under the Socialists compared to the PP or UCD before them, successive 
governments have largely followed similar policy patterns towards Morocco, in spite of their 
pre-electoral declarations. While economic, immigration and territorial policies remained 
unchanged, what tends to slightly differ are positions over the Sahara, over the approach (i.e. 
the balance between incentives and sanctions, or “positive conditionality” vs. “negative 
conditionality”) (Pinyol Jiménez, 2009), or over the management of other immaterial issues 
                                                          
42 See El País article: “La coincidencia de la visita del Rey a Ceuta con la Marcha Verde enfureció a 
Marruecos”,  (13 October 2012). 
43 See El País article: “Rajoy asegura que Zapatero ha "abdicado" en el conflicto sobre el Sáhara” (13 November 
2010). 
44 See El País articles “Todos los líderes políticos marroquíes arremeten contra el Partido Popular” (26 
November 2010) and “Jiménez intenta blindar la relación con Marruecos” (27 October 2011). 
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relating to the realm of perceptions, history or symbols (Del Pino 2005: 80-81). The shifts in 
the PSOE’s and PP’s declarations and stances towards Morocco, therefore, can mainly be 
interpreted in two ways: realpolitik and opportunism (vote-seeking). More precisely, when in 
power, political parties follow a more pragmatic approach towards Morocco with regard to 
the multiple opportunities and risks involved with alienating the neighbour. When in 
opposition or in the run up to elections, however, potentially problematic issues can 
constitute opportunities for the competing parties to reap political dividends and gain more 
votes, knowing that the public is not indifferent towards Morocco, and might sometimes 
welcome goodwill gestures and other times firm stances towards a country that they do not 
particularly trust or hold much esteem for, as opinion polls tend to reveal.45  
Major bilateral issues: land, money, people and the neighbours 
The relationship between Morocco and Spain involves a host of problematic issues such as 
legal and illegal migration, drug smuggling, fishing access rights, trade with the EU, 
maritime delimitation disputes, the Sahara issue and that of Ceuta and Melilla (Del Sarto, 
2006:197). But they also involve other positive issues such as growing economic exchanges, 
increasing security cooperation, multiplication of aid programs, as well as political, social 
and cultural collaboration. The most important aspects of this relationship, however, could be 
summed up under three major headings: territorial issues (comprising the Sahara, Ceuta, 
Melilla and the islets and rocks under Spanish control), migration and security (including 
drug smuggling, criminal networks and terrorism), and economic and cooperation issues 
(including fisheries, agriculture, trade, aid, investments, etc.). 
Territorial issues 
Historically and according to Fernando Morán, Morocco and Spain’s bilateral relationship 
prior to Spain’s EU accession was mainly characterised by territorial disputes and by 
recurrent incidents over fishing rights and territorial demarcation, punctuated by diplomatic 
tensions and escalations. Spain often resorted to the instrumentalisation of regional rivalries 
(mainly between Algeria and Morocco), and made “Morocco, not the Cold War, the Spanish 
army’s principal conflict scenario” (Morán, 1980 cited in Torreblanca, 2001:14). Indeed, 
geographic proximity and history ensure that Spain and Morocco not only share maritime 
borders but land borders as well. Ceuta and Melilla on the North African coast with 
                                                          
45 See section on the role of public opinion and civil society later in this chapter. 
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populations of 75,000 and 65,000 inhabitants respectively have been controlled by Spain for 
centuries (since 1668 and 1497 respectively). Morocco has continuously been claiming them 
along with other islets and rocks just off the Moroccan coast (Islas Chafarinas, Peñón de 
Alhucemas and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera) since its independence in 1956 on the grounds 
of completing its territorial reunification. But Spain always maintained that the territories 
were Spanish long before the establishment of the modern state of Morocco (Zapata-Barrero 
and De Witte, 2007:86, Gillespie, 2010: 88). 
 
The main aspect of bilateral discord between Spain and Morocco, however, is arguably the 
Sahara, a former Spanish colony that was regained by Morocco in 1975. The territory 
constitutes for Morocco a central issue for the stability of its political system and can even be 
said to have been made into an “existential” and sacred issue for the state over which internal 
dissent is not tolerated. While Rabat insists that the 1975 Green March commemorates yet 
another milestone towards the completion of the country’s territorial integrity, the majority of 
the Spanish population and political parties generally support the right of the Saharawi 
population to self-determination. The Spanish government stance, however, has largely 
shifted from support for the right to self-determination of its ex-colony to the call for “a 
mutually-accepted solution” i.e. a compromise position between the Moroccan and Polisario 
Front objectives, including a significant degree of autonomy to the region based on the 
devolution proposal presented by Morocco to the UN Security Council in April 2007.46 The 
“soft” position adopted by Madrid towards this crucial issue for Rabat is often interpreted as 
evidence of Spain’s “belief that putting too much pressure on the Moroccan regime … would 
ultimately produce its downfall... [which] could initiate a period of instability and perhaps 
even chaos in the country, resulting in grave consequences for Spain” (Amirah-Fernández, 
2008: 355). This “soft” position, however, is sometimes hardened depending on the state of 
bilateral relations or on pressures emanating from the parliament, political parties or civil 
society. 
 
The worst territorial crisis between the two countries in recent decades, however, did not take 
place over Ceuta and Melilla of the Sahara but over a miniscule islet. The crisis was seen 
from the outside, and rightly so, as one of the most ludicrous conflicts of the 21st century, but 
that does not make it any less serious. It ignited in the summer of 2002 over Laila/Perejil, an 
                                                          
46 Although questions remain as to how substantial the Moroccan notion of devolution would be since Rabat did 
not offer plans or a clear model for the autonomy or for the advanced country-wide regionalization project. 
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islet the size of a football pitch 150 meters off Morocco’s cost, which was “occupied” 
successively by Moroccan then by Spanish forces before the former US Secretary of State 
Colin Powel spent considerable time and effort to restore the status quo ante (Gillespie 2006). 
But the bilateral relationship had started to go sour many months before with Spain’s 
ambivalence over the endorsement of the Baker I plan which advocated a large amount of 
autonomy for the Sahara, a position that Morocco favours over vote for self-determination. 
The relationship was further exacerbated by a series of events including the repeated failures 
of EU-Morocco fisheries negotiations, rows over the increasing waves of illegal immigrants 
reaching Spain via Morocco, disputes over treatment of Moroccan immigrants living in 
Spain, and the recall of the Moroccan ambassador following the mock referendum over the 
Sahara. 
 
Albeit brief and ultimately contained, the Laila/Perejil spat is a symbolic chapter that looked 
like a textbook case of a “precipitating factor” that may lead to larger scale confrontation. It 
exposed the precariousness of the bilateral relationship, the lingering bilateral suspicions and 
the incapacity of the EU, compared to the US, to find a solution to the dispute. But the short-
lived nature and ultimate resolution of this potentially dangerous conflict reveals other facts. 
In spite of the accumulating dark clouds that were likely to provoke an ominous storm, a 
solution was found in the eleventh hour. In many ways, that also illustrates some of the 
virtues of the so-called colchón de intereses comunes (cushion of shared interests): the 
Spanish doctrine that promotes an increase of exchanges between the two countries to boost 
trust and avoid confrontation. Despite the brinkmanship, it appears that open conflict was not 
an option for both countries as it would have brought about more serious political, economic 
and social consequences that neither country wanted to face. Conflict was clearly too costly 
compared to the shared benefits that they both reap from the peaceful relationship. Even in 
the middle of the crisis, constant efforts were made to avoid a stalemate, and when a deadlock 
actually occurred, efforts were immediately made to secure the intervention of the US 
Secretary of State Collin Powel (Cembrero: 44). The Laila/Perejil episode, in many ways, 
gives credence to a case of growing interdependence between the two neighbours that has 
been increasing since then. With the advent of the Socialist government in 2004, and with 
Miguel Ángel Moratinos spearheading Spain’s foreign policy, the Moroccan-Spanish 
relationship indeed managed to regain some of its glimmer (Vaquer, 2007: 5). Although the 
honeymoon was short-lived as the partnership fell victim to new problems and spats such as 
the Laayoune and Haidar events, demonstrating, yet again, the cyclicality of conflicts and the 
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enduring love-hate feelings underlying the relationship. In parallel with that, however, 
relationships keep growing and intensifying barring the road to actual confrontation. 
Migration, social and security issues 
Immigration is a fairly recent phenomenon in modern-day Spain. In fact, prior to its EC 
accession, the country was a net migrant exporter, but starting in 1997 a huge new wave of 
immigrants started bringing a much needed workforce mainly from Latin America, Africa 
and Eastern and Central Europe. A combination of Spain’s spectacular economic growth and 
population aging and shrinkage47 boosted the phenomenon even further. Between 2000 and 
2009 Spain absorbed about five million immigrants (13.8% of the population).48 With this 
remarkable surge in immigration, illegal north-bound migration across the Mediterranean 
also gained prominence. It became one of the most covered subjects in the Spanish media and 
started constituting one of the top concerns of Spanish people, making Morocco look like a 
source of the problem. In the years 2000-2010, the issue often figured among the three major 
worries of Spaniards after unemployment and terrorism (Balch, 2010: 69).  
 
Moroccan immigration to Spain is a relatively recent phenomenon compared to other 
countries like France where the Moroccan community has been settling for generations. Its 
increase over the last two decades has been phenomenal. As Figure 3.1 shows, the total 
number of immigrants went from around 50 000 in 1991 to about 200 000 in 2000 and 
reached almost 870 000 in 2012. The increase in numbers had particularly been significant 
between 2000 and 2008. Spain’s “economic miracle” and Morocco’s poverty and stagnant 
growth during that period have constituted considerable “pull” and “push” factors for this 
migratory trend. With a per capita GDP 15 times that of Morocco in 2005 (Moré, 2011: 114), 
Spain inevitably converted itself into a new “Eldorado” for Moroccans as well as other 
immigrants. However, with the collapse of the economy (particularly the construction sector) 
and the soaring unemployment, migration has slowed down and the trend may well start to 
reverse in the next few years. 
 
 
                                                          
47 A UN report in 2000 warned that by 2050 Spain would lose more than 9 million inhabitants. And the National 
Institute of Statistics (INE) reported in 1999 that the birth rate in Spain was 1.07, much below the population 
replacement rate of 2.1 (Balch 2010: 54-5). 
48 See the Economist article “Buttonwood: A Great Migration” 1 June 2013. 
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Figure 3.1 Evolution of Moroccan immigration in Spain (1991 - 2012) 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on statistical data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
 
Beyond the numbers, it is also important to realise that the majority of Moroccans who 
migrated to Spain during the last two decades are characterised by their low education level 
and relatively low skills. Most of them found jobs in such sectors as construction, agriculture 
and domestic work,49 which explains their alarming unemployment rates since the 2008 
economic crisis. According to the Consejo de la Comunidad Marroquí en el Extranjero 
(Council of Moroccan Community Abroad, and NGO), in 2012 more than half of Moroccan 
immigrants living in Spain were jobless.50 Immigration is also significant in terms of 
immigrants’ contribution to their home country economy. In 2006, Spain became the second-
largest remittance-sending country to Morocco after France. Between 2007 and 2010, 
remittances from Moroccan immigrants living in Spain accounted for about 13.5% of the 
total received (second to France that accounted for 50.6%) (Ministère de l'Economie et des 
Finances, 2013: 16), despite a 33% decrease due to the economic crisis.51 Overall official 
remittances to Morocco from abroad reached some 5.6 billion US dollars in 2006, about six 
times the value of direct foreign investment and development aid combined (De Haas 2007). 
Up until 2011, remittances proved resilient to the crisis, consistently exceeding the $6 billion 
                                                          
49 See Le Monde Diplomatique article “¿Fin de la inmigración marroquí en España?” (June 2009). 
50 See El Mundo article “'Muchos marroquíes retornan para mantener a sus familias en España'” (19 July 2012). 
51 In 2010, unemployment among Moroccan workers living in Spain stood at over 50% (twice the national 
level). See The Christian Science Monitor article “Spain loses title as Moroccans' land of opportunity” (23 
October 2012).  
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mark. But transfers from Spain started declining compared to previous years representing just 
10.7% of total remittances in 2011,52 and are likely to dip even further in the future. From an 
economic perspective, the importance of emigration and migrants for Morocco is, therefore, 
inestimable. In simple terms, the country manages to export unskilled and unemployed labour 
that quickly converts itself into remittance-sending workforce. This has huge political and 
social implications for the country as this emigration constitutes an important escape valve, 
easing up the internal tensions and offering a much needed social and economic support. 
 
However, the phenomenon does not only have positive sides. In the host country (Spain), 
Moroccan immigration is generally disliked, and is at times even considered a threat to 
Spanish cultural identity (De Lucas, 2002: 23-48; Martín Muñoz, 1996: 9-16). The issue also 
contributes to the already negative image of the country among Spaniards on top of the other 
cultural, historical, political and economic reasons. An opinion poll conducted by the Real 
Instituto Elcano in 2010 showed Morocco was the least appreciated country in Spanish public 
opinion, with an overall grade of 3.9 out of 10 (only Iran scored worse).53 In a separate 
survey conducted by the Sociological Research Centre (CIS) in 2003, the results also showed 
that Moroccans were the least respected immigrant group with an overall grade of 5.3 out of 
10. The same poll revealed that while 59.6% of the Spanish population preferred Ecuadorian 
immigrants and 18% favoured European immigrants, barely 4.4% of them had a preference 
for Moroccan immigrants (Marrero, 2005: 422). In the early 1990s, similar negative 
perceptions towards Arabs, and Moroccans in particular, were also reported by the Centro de 
Investigaciones sobre la Realidad Social (CIRES) and the CIS. Moroccans were not only the 
least appreciated immigrant group but were also often associated with unwanted immigration 
and unsuccessful integration (Izquierdo, 1996: 171-5). As will be further discussion in the 
section on public opinion, far from being exceptional results, such surveys reflect a steady 
pattern detected throughout the different opinion polls conducted in Spain over the last two 
decades.54 Language, culture and religion appear to be other sources of the negative 
perception. For example, Spain’s admission policies tend to privilege people coming from 
countries with a Christian tradition such as Eastern Europe, Latin America and the 
Philippines. A powerful expression of this selective migrant admission is found in the 
                                                          
52 For more comprehensive data see Moroccan Office des Changes website at www.oc.gov.ma. 
53 See El País article “La imagen de Marruecos empeora en España” (17 December 2010). 
54 See El Publico article “La imagen de Marruecos en España cae en picado” (17 December 2010). 
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Spanish naturalisation process. The state may grant Spanish citizenship to Philippinos and 
Ecuadorians after only two years of residence in Spain, while those coming from Morocco 
need to have spent ten years on Spanish soil before becoming eligible for naturalisation 
(Joppke, 2003 cited in Vicente et.al, 2010: 62).  
 
On occasion, popular discontent and rejection of immigrants transcends the realm of 
sentiments and translates into riots and racial violence, as was the case in El Ejido in 
February 2000 when the murder of a Spanish woman by an apparently deranged Moroccan 
immigrant sparked a series of mob attacks against Moroccan immigrants and their businesses, 
in what became the worst chapter of racial violence in recent Spanish history. The event also 
shed light on immigrants’ precarious living conditions and contributed to the development of 
a new immigration policy framework (Balch, 2010: 75). There are worries among Moroccan 
immigrants that similar waves of racial violence might reoccur, especially in the wake of the 
recent financial crisis, the alarmingly high unemployment rates and the new acts of 
xenophobic in the country.55 
 
Immigration in general and Moroccan immigration in particular, therefore, converted 
themselves into a high government priority and the subject of considerable partisan 
squabbling. Even though illegal immigration from Morocco barely constitutes some 10 per 
cent of the annual overall volume of illicit immigrants coming to Spain, Morocco and 
Moroccans are enduring symbols of this phenomenon. In fact, according to Zapata-Barrero 
and De Witte, most of the illicit immigrants are Latin Americans abusing their tourist visas 
and coming by air, rather than the rickety fishing boats that used to symbolize the 
immigration outpour into Spain. The second biggest source of illegal migration to the Iberian 
Peninsula comes through terrestrial channels such as the Pyrenees (Zapata-Barrero and De 
Witte, 2007:87-9).  
 
Yet the fact remains that some illegal immigrants come by sea, via Moroccan shores,56 and in 
the 1990s and 2000s, the Spanish media have contributed to the construction of a frightening 
image of an ‘avalanche’ of immigrants coming from Africa, via Morocco, and ‘invading’ 
                                                          
55 This worry was reflected in a number of interviews conducted by the author in 2012 with Moroccan 
immigrants living in Spain and some civil society actors as well. The emergence of anti-immigrant political 
groups such as Plataforma per Catalunya (PXC) and España 2000 (E2000) is another indicator that may 
substantiate such worries. 
56 Most, however, do not arrive by sea but rather through airports, with valid tourist visas. Also, a number of 
legal Moroccan immigrants become illegal once resident in Spain after their residence permits expire (Crespo, 
2006: 21-26). 
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Spain and Europe. Morocco’s northern and western shores are indeed among the major 
sources of sub-Saharan African illicit immigrants, recently making it more a country of 
transit than an exporter of local migrants as was the case during the 1990s and 2000s. Illegal 
immigration and the other social and security issues directly or indirectly related to it, such as 
border control, immigrant integration, drug trafficking, and terrorist and criminal activities 
are the cause of considerable apprehension in Spain and the EU (Amirah-Fernandez, 2008: 
355). But although issues such as anti-terrorism and drugs cooperation have sometimes been 
said to be affected by mistrust between the two countries (Reinares, 2006: 3), these remain 
the subject of continuing cooperation between the two neighbouring countries, especially 
since the Madrid terrorist attacks of March 2004. Migration is also a major cooperation area; 
close collaboration and joint policing measures resulted in the number of illegal migrants 
from Morocco to Spain substantially decreasing from 2007 (Vaquer, 2007: 15; Wolff, 2008: 
253; Aragall, 2010: 278). It is thought, however, that Morocco sometimes uses its degree of 
cooperation over these issues, along with claims over Ceuta and Melilla, as a bargaining chip 
and pressure tool to advance its own agenda or express discontent (Shelley, 2005: 74). This is 
yet another example of how a seemingly “weak” country in the relationship can be the source 
of concern and discomfort to its “stronger” counterpart. 
 
Assuming, however, that government regulation and control greatly affect licit and illicit 
migration flows is to ignore the consensus over the fact that the phenomenon is largely the 
result of pull-push factors which are very difficult to manage (Portes and Böröcz, 1989). As 
much as governments like to depict themselves as major actors in migration regulation and 
even when their will is strong, the issue remains beyond their capacity. This is even more the 
case for destination countries such as Spain than it is for countries of origin such as Morocco. 
Despite the deployment of Frontex (the EU agency that promotes, coordinates and develops 
European border management), Spain’s extension of its external security net SIVE (Sistema 
Integral de Vigilancia Exterior), and Morocco’s cooperation in policing the borders 
incentivised by Spanish and EU generous funds (Balch, 2010: 86), it has only pushed 
desperate migrants and human trafficking networks to change routes. 
 Economy and cooperation: 
After its EC accession in 1986 and the start of its economic surge, Spain gradually started to 
change its position over Morocco from a logic of competition to one of collaboration. The 
early 1990s were marked by a political and economic rapprochement between the two 
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countries, reinforced by the signature of the 1991 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty and its 
entry into force in 1993. Bilateral high level summits (Reunion de Alto Nivel – RAN-) 
between the two countries were institutionalised and measures to increase cooperation in a 
number of sectors were established. A total of ten high level summits were held between 
1993 and 2012. These occasions regroup large delegations from both countries addressing the 
major issues of bilateral interest and are usually a good indication of the state of bilateral 
relationship. They are usually held during symbiotic periods and postponed during the 
difficult ones.  
 
Spain also played a crucial role in the different EU Mediterranean policy initiatives in favour 
of its southern neighbour during its first and second presidency (1989 and 1995), culminating 
in the organization of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean conference and the ensuing Barcelona 
Process. And in February 1996, the Spanish government adopted a new economic and 
financial cooperation agreement with Morocco for the 1996–2000 period (De Larramendi, 
1997: 429). This was followed by other such agreements structuring the bilateral economic 
and financial relationship, coinciding with the two countries high level summits. With the 
entry into force of Morocco’s EU Association Agreement in 2000, bilateral trade more than 
doubled compared to 1995, reaching €2.33 billion. The trend kept gradually intensifying to 
the extent that Spain’s trade with Morocco became greater than its exchanges with historic 
Latin American partners during the 2000s. By 2004 trade volume exceeded €4 billion 
annually and Rabat confirmed its place as Madrid’s largest trade partner in Africa, and the 
third outside the EU (behind the United States and Turkey).57 With 12% of Moroccan exports 
to the EU destined for Spain and 17% of its EU imports coming from Spain by 2011, Madrid 
started to compete closely with France as Morocco’s first trading partner (Zibaoui, 2012).  
Some even argued that if the illicit trade exchanged between Ceuta and Melilla and northern 
Morocco were included,58 Spain would easily outstrip France of its leadership position. 
Without including this informal trade, however, Spain did indeed become Morocco’s first 
trade partner in 2012, outperforming Rabat’s traditional partner.59 In that year, total economic 
                                                          
57 In fact, 2012 figures show that Morocco has even surpassed Turkey to become Spain’s second economic 
partner (outside the EU) after the US. See El País article “Doble récord comercial con Marruecos” (24 March 
2013). 
58 This illegal land border trade is a one-way trade only that considerably increases Morocco’s negative trade 
balance with Spain. It is estimated at €1.4 to €1.5 billion per year. See El País article “Doble récord comercial 
con Marruecos” (24 March 2013). 
59 With exports to Morocco almost reaching 5.3 billion Euros in 2012 (a 28% increase compared with 2011), 
Spain did indeed convert itself into the first economic partner of Morocco. Morocco became Spain’s 9 th export 
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exchanges exceeded the €8 billion mark. Between 1995 and 2012 bilateral economic 
exchanges had multiplied eight-fold from €1.02 billion to €8.25 (See Figure 3.2).   
 
 
Figure 3.2 Spanish-Moroccan Trade (1995 - 2012) 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on statistical data from Dirección General de Comercio e 
Inversiones. Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio. 
 
However, the impressive cumulative figures often cited by Spain are not interpreted in the 
same way by their Moroccan counterparts. Exchanges only account for a modest 1.5% of 
Spain’s total foreign trade (0.9% in 2001) (Barreñada 2010: 7) and the balance of trade is 
largely in favour of Spain. Indeed, Rabat often shows concern towards its growing negative 
trade balance with Spain that increased from €154 million in 1995 to €2.34 billion in 2012 
(See Figure 3.2).60 Moreover, aside from the fact that Spain tends to relegate its relationship 
with Rabat to a secondary position, especially during crisis periods like the period between 
2001 and 2002 (Gillespie, 1997: 11– 12), Madrid, along with other like-minded EU members 
such as Italy and France, often blocks talks on further concessions to Moroccan agricultural 
                                                          
market after the United States and other countries in the EU, with 33.7% of total Spanish exports to the African 
continent and almost half of the country’s exports to North Africa (See La Vanguardia (04 October 2012) and 
article at the Red de Oficinas Económicas y Comerciales de España en el Exterior website “España, primer 
socio comercial de Marruecos” (11 March 2013). 
60 Two interviews conducted by the author at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed a large degree 
of discontent with the trend of economic exchanges with Spain, insisting that the negative trade balance that 
Morocco incurs is not so much a problem of competitiveness but of market access. The quota and calendar 
restrictions imposed on Moroccan agricultural products are thought to widen the gap and prevent the country 
from developing a more competitive agricultural and fisheries sector. 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Exports Imports Balance
95 
 
exports (De Larramendi, 1997: 416– 17). Indeed, since the onset of the economic crisis in 
Spain, trade balance between Rabat and Madrid soared from €1 billion between 2003 and 
2007 to a whopping €5.8 billion between 2008 and 2012, making Morocco an important 
export outlet and, ultimately, part of Madrid’s solution to weather the crisis to the detriment 
of Rabat’s own economic balance. Trade and economic relations between the two neighbours 
have never developed at the spectacular and mutually beneficial levels that the discourse 
around the relationship would suggest.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Official Development Aid (ODA) do not meet Rabat’s 
expectations either. France by far still represents the main investor in the country by an 
average of almost 44% of total foreign investments between 2000 and 2011. Spain’s share in 
FDI attracted by Morocco remains modest with an average of 10% of the total over the same 
period (See Figure 3.3). It also represents a rather meagre 0.5% of total Spanish FDI between 
1993 and 2008 (De Larramendi and Azaola, 2010: 514). Although more than 1500 Spanish 
firms in various sectors such as electricity, telecommunications, real estate, tourism, 
agriculture, fisheries, distribution, transportation, textiles, banking, energy, engineering, 
consulting, automotive industry and aeronautics are doing business in Morocco, countries 
like the United Arab Emirates have far exceeded Spain’s FDI in the country as of 2007. The 
modest levels of direct investment, for Morocco, translates Madrid’s lack of long-term 
commitment. Many Moroccans complain that Spanish companies tend to perceive their 
country as a market not as a partner. The 2008 economic crisis has pushed many Spanish 
entrepreneurs to explore the southern neighbour, but so far their interest remains largely 
aimed at putting their products on the market,61 and did not give rise to the long-awaited 
wave of peer-to-peer partnerships, investments or joint-ventures with Moroccan partners. 
Spanish counterparts, on the other hand, talk about the administrative, cultural and linguistic 
difficulties that they have encountered as well as their lack of experience in a new 
environment. They believe that more opportunities are in the process of maturing and that 
Spanish entrepreneurs need to gain more experience and confidence before venturing any 
further into the market. Also, despite the efforts of the Moroccan government with regard to 
                                                          
61 The field work conducted in Spain and Morocco corroborates this. The impression came up repeatedly during 
the interviews. Spanish business persons as well as staff working in government agencies promoting business 
opportunities outside of Spain such as the Catalan ACC1Ó tend to talk about being interested in Morocco to 
“sell products” and “open distribution branches” rather than invest or establish joint-ventures. Moroccan 
businessmen also tend to complain about their Spanish partners not perceiving them as partners but more like 
“business agents”. 
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streamlining and simplification of administrative procedures and formalities, the Moroccan 
administrative machinery and corruption still hamper some investment opportunities.62  
 
Figure 3.3 FDI in Morocco from France, the UAE and Spain (2000 – 2010) 
 
Source author’s elaboration relying on data from l’Office des Changes (www.oc.gov.ma). 
 
 
ODA is yet another aspect of the bilateral relationship deemed unbecoming of the level of 
relationships by Morocco. Having lingered in the vicinity of €40 million a year between 2000 
and 2005, the amount of Spanish official development aid dedicated to Morocco gradually 
reached its record level of €158 in 2009 but dropped considerably since then. The figures are 
also considered distorted with regard to the refundable Development Aid Funds that are also 
included, and the fact that part of the aid package funds expenses of the Spanish cultural 
missions and centres in the country.  
 
More serious still is the yawning economic disparities between Morocco and Spain. The gap 
in GDP and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) between the neighbours remains among the most 
abysmal in the world. In 1970, the Spanish GDP per capita was four times that of Morocco, 
in 2004 it became 14.5 times higher (15 times in 2005), and almost 6 times higher in PPP 
                                                          
62 These issues were expressed by the director of the Euro-Mediterranean Business Association, headquartered 
in Barcelona. Similar concerns were also voiced by two Spanish entrepreneurs. Language and cultural issues 
were particularly highlighted as the main obstacles to embarking on joint-ventures or big investments in 
Morocco, and one interviewee also mentioned the negative experience of a group of Spanish entrepreneurs in 
Morocco «Association des Affectés par l’Extorsion au Maroc» (Association of victims of extortion in Morocco) 
as an illustration of the still rampant red tape and corruption in the country. 
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terms (Amirah-Fernandez 2008: 361; Moré, 2011: 114). This represents the most acute chasm 
across external EU and OECD borders. To attenuate the gap, Spanish economist Iñigo Moré 
called for more engagement from Spain, emulating the US-Mexican model where the gap is 
much smaller and where the USA tolerates a negative trade balance with its neighbour in 
order to preserve stability and avoid dangerous disparities (Moré, 2004: 165-7). Allowing 
more favourable trade terms, increasing Morocco’s exports quotas of agricultural products 
where the country is most competitive (such as tomatoes), assisting the country to develop its 
fishing industry and facilitating fishing exports towards Spain and Europe, and encouraging 
more Spanish foreign direct investment in the country are some of the strategies that Spanish 
governments could work towards in order to diminish the increasing economic chasm that 
ends up affecting both neighbours. But the Spanish have been loath to alienate their fisheries 
and agricultural workforce and remained largely protective of their farming sector and their 
privileged access to the EU market, maintaining strong resistance against more significant 
concessions for competing Moroccan products,63 while invoking pretexts such as the Sahara 
issue, labour cost differentials or EU safety, environmental and working conditions 
standards.64 
 
The worldwide average economic difference between neighbours is 3.5 (Moré, 2004: 165) 
and the fact that Spain is 15 times richer than its southern neighbour remains an open 
invitation to illegal immigration that generates other more serious and costly drawbacks for 
the two. These include the rising pace of illegal migration with all its ensuing consequences 
and the cyclical economic, political and diplomatic crises between the two countries. The 
economic step between Morocco and Spain also favours illegal activities such as contraband, 
drug trafficking, and other criminal actions. The income gap might also explain part of the 
negative perceptions whereby the rich northerners may look down upon their poorer 
                                                          
63 The latest EU-Morocco agricultural agreement of December 2009 stipulates that Morocco would allow the 
EU immediate duty-free access for 45% of its agriculture and food exports, rising to 70% over ten years, in 
return for immediate duty-free access for 55% of Moroccan agriculture and food exports to the EU. However, 
excluded from the agreement were products such as tomatoes that remained subject to strict quota, enter price 
and calendar restrictions (Kausch, 2010: 4). In February 2012, the ratification of this reciprocal agriculture Free 
Trade Agreement by the European Parliament between the EU and Morocco led to a tough political battle 
between the region of Andalusia and the Spanish central government. The autonomous region accused the 
government of Mariano Rajoy of not wanting to block the adoption of the new agricultural agreement that 
allows entry into Europe of greater amounts of Moroccan fruits and vegetables. See El País article “Andalucía 
acusa al Gobierno de no frenar el acuerdo agrícola con Marruecos” (16 February 2012). 
64 See Capreform.eu article “EU-Moroccan agricultural trade deal running into trouble in European Parliament” 
(25 July 2011). 
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southerners. Some (pre-2008 financial crisis) sources estimated the number of North African 
emigration candidates at 20 million, all cherishing hopes of crossing over to Europe where 
salaries were eight to ten times higher than in the South (Calleya, 2005:128).  
External sources of influence 
The western Euro-Mediterranean region is subject to a chain of interdependencies and the 
importance of relationships with other neighbouring countries and with the US cannot be 
understated. Both Spain and Morocco remain sensitive to external sources of influence, and 
at times may even depend on the very external forces they are swayed by. The issues of 
contention between them being so rife and the two countries being situated at strategic, 
cultural, economic and political fault-lines makes their relationship the business of both close 
and distant powers. This multiplicity of strong and influential actors reduces the two 
countries’ scope for manoeuvre and freedom of action, thus increasing their respective 
frustration and powerlessness at times. But at other times, the presence of external players 
can be a blessing in disguise, as they can also intervene in crisis situations. The countries that 
have the strongest impact on the bilateral relationship are France, Algeria and the USA. The 
on-going structural role of the EU that is an equally considerable source of “external” 
influence will be examined separately in the next chapter. 
 
The “French factor is a constant that needs to be taken into account at all times when 
analysing Hispano-Moroccan relations” (Amirah-Fernandez, 2008: 353). France is 
considered to be Morocco’s main partner and ally. Rabat has remained largely dependent on 
it for economic, security and political support (Calleya, 2005:16). This is also evidenced by 
the frequent and continuing French support of its position with regard to the Sahara issue and 
other territorial disputes such as its success in vetoing EU support for Spain during the 
Laila/Parejil crisis (Gillespie, 2006: 119). Up until 2012 when Spain superseded it, France 
has always been the Kingdom’s principal trade partner and still remains, by far, the largest 
investor in the country (see Figure 3.3), which makes its economic partnership much more 
valued and appreciated by its Moroccan counterparts. Paris has equally kept posing a serious 
challenge to Madrid’s attempts to become the EU Mediterranean champion and may be said 
to have effectively established itself as the leader with the launching of the Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) project in 2008 to replace the agonising Barcelona Process. Madrid had 
felt threatened by this move, seeing in it a new French foreign policy ambition to renew its 
influence in a region that it had dominated during colonial times and throughout the early 
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years of EEC through the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), and steal the spotlight and 
prestige from Spain in its Mediterranean engagement. While welcoming France’s renewed 
commitment to the Mediterranean, Madrid had lobbied hard with Italy and Germany to keep 
the Barcelona seal on the UfM (Barbé et al, 2007: 46; Gillespie, 2008: 279; Cusi 2009; 
Martín, 2010: 2). And despite its official launch in July 2008, some still consider Spain a 
major player in the EU Mediterranean agenda since it “scored a diplomatic coup by securing 
Barcelona as the headquarters for the UfM Secretariat” (Martín, 2010: 3). Others, on the 
other hand, speak of a possible Spanish de-prioritisation due to French competition, a lack of 
original and new ideas and financial means, and the fact that governments of the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean “have deliberately squandered the immense incentives and 
opportunities offered by Europe” (Torreblanca, 2010: 13). It appears, however, that the 
growing Mediterranean role played by countries like France combined with Spain’s reduced 
state budget, dwindling official assistance aid fire power, the limited role it played in the 
Arab revolutions and its increased reliance on the EU for reform support might be making it 
less relevant and with much less kudos in Europe and in the eyes of its southern neighbour. 
 
Algeria is yet another important player in the Moroccan-Spanish bilateral relationship. Its 
military, diplomatic and financial backing of the Polisario Front, its position as a major 
energy supplier for Spain and its cold and competing relationship with Morocco make it a 
crucial actor in the Rabat-Madrid axis. Morocco sees Algeria as the main stumbling block to 
the resolution of the Sahara conflict, its priority concern. The two countries’ distant 
relationship is also the main cause for the stalled Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) project and 
the lack of regional integration. At 1.3%, economic exchange between the Maghreb states 
represents the lowest regional trade in the world (Zoubir, 2010: 72). The two southern 
Mediterranean neighbours are also in constant competition for regional supremacy and 
privileged status with the EU through such instruments as Morocco’s ‘advanced status’ or 
Algeria’s ‘strategic partnership’ (Gillespie 2008, p. 285). Still, Algerian gas is exported to 
Spain through a pipeline that crosses Morocco, travel between the two countries is still visa-
free (although land borders have been closed since 1994), and the two countries still 
cooperate in counter-terrorism and security issues and have not engaged in conflict since the 
1963 “sands war”. All these are indications that a good deal of pragmatism and a degree of 
friendliness still characterises their relationship.  
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Spain’s relations with Algeria, on the other hand, were first within the framework of the 
strategy of ‘equilibrium’ that Spain adopted towards its southern neighbours during the 1970s 
which sought to foster good relations with both Rabat and Algiers at times and play on their 
regional rivalries other times. But with the PSOE in power from early 1980s, the relationship 
shifted to a more global approach towards the region when Spain sought to prioritise stability 
and promote more interdependence (Gillespie, 2000: 30-33). In real terms, however, relations 
between Madrid and Algiers compared to those with Rabat or Tunis remain limited and 
involve little aside from trade (especially in energy) and counter-terrorism cooperation (see 
Ghilès, 2013). They are also less marred by controversial issues such as the territorial, 
historical or migration factors. More recently, however, Madrid has been revitalising its 
bilateral diplomatic and cultural relations with Algiers, and, at times, it also resorts to old 
‘equilibrium’ strategies as a pressure tool against Rabat during crisis periods such as (2001 – 
2002). 
 
Finally, the USA also plays occasional but crucial roles in the bilateral relationship. For 
Morocco, the superpower, along with France, often protected its interests and supported its 
claims over the Sahara; equally it backed Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan (Gillespie, 2010: 
88; Zoubir, 2010: 74). The USA’s decisive intervention to resolve the Laila/Perejil crisis, the 
most critical spat in the two countries’ recent history, not only exposed the EU’s inadequate 
Common Foreign and Security Policy but had also proved Washington’s crucial conflict 
resolution role, and the USA’s position as the sole security superpower in the region 
(Gillespie 2010, p. 91). The resolution of the Haidar case in late 2009 seems to have relied on 
US intervention as well (Soler and Vaquer, 2010: 76 -77). America’s political, economic and 
security interest in the region did increase in the region, especially after 9/11 (Zoubir, 2009: 
977), but it still considers both countries as important allies and strives to keep the region 
conflict-free, given that such disruption would affect its interests. However, there are signs 
that seem to indicate a US desire to scale down its responsibilities in the region during 
Obama’s presidency reflected by their reluctance to lead on Libya in 2011 or intervene in 
Mali in 2013. This not only meant that the EU had to take more responsibility for its own 
defence and security, but it may also imply that countries like Spain and Morocco might no 
longer be able to rely on the US undertaking the crucial mediation role it has played between 
the two in 2002 and 2009. 
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Civil society, media and public opinion: the stereotype trap 
The case of Spain 
Compared to European countries that democratized during the 1970s, such as Portugal and 
Greece where political participation remained low and associationalism weaker (Doukas, 
1993: 514-5; Corkill, 1993: 532-3), Spain has a stronger culture and tradition of associational 
life, which emerged in the 1930s and started thriving during the post-Franco era in the late 
1970s and early 1980s (Gillespie 1993, p. 538). However, compared to its northern European 
counterparts like France, the UK or Germany (developed democracies for many more 
decades), civil society in Spain appears to be lacking in social organisation. Sporadic 
mobilisation is a feature of Spanish politics as demonstrated by huge public protests over 
NATO entry, the Iraq War, terrorist attacks, or the May 15th 2011 youth protesters 
Indignados against the Spanish political establishment. In more general terms, the younger 
generations tend to prefer protest politics and certain forms of social and associational 
engagement, while the senior generations tend to prefer electoral and partisan types of 
participation (Morales, 2003: 29). However, society in general is believed to have 
perpetuated an apolitical culture that has not allowed civil society to emerge fully (Vázquez, 
2007: 172). This, in turn, explains the weakness of the trade unions or the use of the party list 
system that creates a top-down dynamic in political parties, itself a disincentive to party 
members to get politically involved (Gillespie 1990: 139-41). Finally, “political apathy, 
compared to low participation in elections and in civil society activities, and the rigidity and 
hierarchical nature of Spanish political parties, are thought to be some of the legacies of the 
dictatorship” (Aguilar 2006: 246). 
 
Yet, despite the limited level of social and political involvement and mobilization in Spain, 
the quasi-apolitical attitudes and the meagre associative activity,65 questions that relate 
directly  to Morocco happen to be issues of public interest, where civil society actors seem to 
be comparatively more interested and active. For example, support for the Polisario Front, 
and therefore antipathy towards the Moroccan position towards the Sahara, has a large base 
in Spain. The pro-Saharawi movement in Spain enjoys wide public patronage (Vaquer, 
                                                          
65 According to the Social Barometer of Spain http://www.barometrosocial.es, overall citizen participation 
remains at less than 4 points on a scale of 1 to 10; Spain, Portugal, Greece and Malta score the worst in Western 
Europe. Similar percentages are reported by the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study 
(EVS) (See Cantijoch and Martin 2009; Laraña 2007; Montero 2006) 
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2004b: 107-8), and according to the Spanish press there appear to be more than 400 active 
Spanish pro-Saharawi associations in the country.66 This may reflect the perceived “historic 
debt” that many Spaniards still feel towards the Saharawi as many of them deeply resent the 
current situation in the Sahara and believe that the Franco regime abandoned the ex-colony to 
a new “Moroccan colonial power”, in complete disregard and disrespect of the Saharawi right 
of self-determination.  
 
Any thorough analysis of Spanish-Moroccan relations needs to give proper consideration to 
public opinion and civil society as non-state actors have proved able to contribute to the 
improvement or deterioration in bilateral relations, as was the case in September of 2001 after 
the mock referendum held in Andalucía that incensed Moroccan authorities, in which 
125,000 participants voted in support of self-determination in the Sahara (Gillespie, 2004: 
21). As the section on immigration argued, Moroccans are the worst appreciated foreign 
contingent.  The image of the country as a whole does not fare any better either. A series of 
opinion polls conducted by the Real Instituto Elcano and Instituto de Cuestiones 
Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE) since 1991 (see Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1) 
reveal that most Spaniards view the country negatively and see it as a threat. In a list of tens 
of countries, Morocco always figures at the bottom of the list next to Iran and Israel as the 
worst valued, with a considerable gap separating it from such countries as Russia, China, 
Mexico or the United States. The percentage of Spaniards who view Morocco as a threat is 
even more alarming, it peaked in 2002 with almost half of the population considering the 
country as the main potential threat to their peace and security (see Table 3.1). Moroccans are 
also negatively viewed and portrayed in Spanish media.67 They appear sporadically in 
Spanish headlines, mainly for a few negative issues (see Table 3.2). It is argued that Madrid 
has often regarded Rabat in terms of the so-called ‘negative mutual dependencies’, i.e. 
through the twin prisms of security obsessions and a negative vision of illegal migration from 
the south (López García and Larramendi, 2002: 188). This same state perception can be 
found at the popular level as well. The images and stereotypes associated with Moroccans are 
often those of illegal immigration, territorial conflict, agricultural and fisheries squabbles, 
drug trafficking, and more recently radical Islam and terrorism, especially after the 2004 
                                                          
66 See el Publico article “Los prosaharauis cuentan con 400 asociaciones en España” (01 September 2010). 
67 For a detailed discussion of such aspects, see the work of Inmaculada Szmolka, based on her PhD thesis 
(Szmolka, 2005) 
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Madrid terrorist attacks whose main perpetrators originated from Morocco and belonged to 
the Moroccan Combatant Islamic Group (Reinares, 2008: 14).  
 
Figure 3.4 Morocco’s image in Spain. 
 
Source author’s own elaboration based on data from the “Barómetro del Real Instituto 
Elcano” and Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE) 2006 
report (Díez, 2006: 22). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 – What countries pose a serious threat to Spain’s peace and security? 
 1991 1992 1995 1997 2002 2006 
Morocco 42% 40% 36% 32% 48% 24% 
Other countries * 58% 60% 64% 68% 58% 76% 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on (Díez, 2006: 176). 
*The list includes a list of other countries but mainly Iran, Iraq, other Arab countries, other 
Islamic countries, the United States 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Public perception of conflict issues between Spain and Morocco by degree of 
importance 
Issue Very 
important 
Fairly 
important 
Slightly 
important 
Not 
important 
No 
opinion 
Morocco-EU fisheries agreement 24% 59% 7% 1% 10% 
Illegal immigration from Morocco 45% 43% 5% 1% 6% 
Spanish territories in Africa 19% 55% 14% 1% 10% 
Spain’s position over the Sahara 14% 58% 10% 4% 13% 
Competition of Moroccan products  22% 54% 13% 2% 9% 
Source (Díez, 2006: 89). 
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In fact, the little that the Spanish know about Morocco is often a reflection of the scant media 
coverage that remains selective, determined by the political agenda and limited to a specific 
set of issues (Vicente et al, 2010: 62).  Positive stories on Moroccan economic, political and 
social achievements, or accounts on Moroccan-Spanish cooperation in economic, political 
and social venues rarely feature in the Spanish media. Despite the considerable differences 
between media outlets in Spain with regard to their editorial line, when it comes to Morocco 
they still tend to mainly cover negative issues that generally trigger adverse perceptions of the 
country and its population. Whether media outlets supply an existing public demand for such 
stories or themselves have contributed to the engineering of negative public opinion towards 
Morocco, the fact remains that Spanish radio, TV and newspaper headlines get populated 
with Morocco-related stories mainly when negative issues pop up to the surface (Vicente et 
al, 2010: 61).  
 
This negative public opinion stands in sharp contrast to official government relations 
characterized by pragmatism and quest for increased interdependence as a means to 
consolidate and improve relations. It is also hoped that the recent rise in Spanish tourists and 
the increasing business opportunities in Morocco may be slowly modifying this tendency. As 
Table 3.3 indicates, although French tourists still constitutes the majority of visitors, the 
percentage of Spanish tourists doubled between 2000 and 2011. In fact, in real terms, their 
number has jumped from about 270 000 to more than a million per year over the same period 
(Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 2013: 122). 
 
 
 Table 3.3 Tourism flows to Morocco from France, Spain and Germany (2000 to 2011). 
 2000 to 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
France 40.1% 39.8% 40.5% 39.6% 36.2% 35.7% 
Spain 10.7% 13.4% 14.1% 15% 22% 21% 
Germany 6.5% 4% 4.3% 4.1% 5.3% 5.7% 
Source: (Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, 2013 : 122). 
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The case of Morocco 
As far as Morocco is concerned, the salient impression seems to be that the country is 
dominated by a strong centralized Makhzen system that only allows a modicum of liberties to 
its population and civil society actors, and that as long as the political elite in Morocco is not 
changed, there would be no significant change in the role of its non-state actors or public 
opinion. The nature of the Moroccan political regime has been identified as a major 
impediment to meaningful reform and civil society activism (Haddadi, 2002; Cavatorta et al, 
2006), and the role of the monarchy as the central institution in the political and economic 
activities is beyond doubt. Although Morocco is far lagging behind with regard to civil 
society mobilisation and role and its situation cannot be compared to its Spanish counterpart, 
the country started developing spaces for its public opinion and witnessing the emergence of 
organized associations and other civil society actors from the mid-1980s (Gandolfi, 2003: 28; 
Sater, 2007: 160).  
 
The relative retreat of the state from certain economic and social domains 
during the 1980s encouraged a spring in associational life in socio-cultural and 
economic spheres. Associational life in its modern form started during the 
mid-1980s with cultural regional associations such as ‘Ribat Al Fath’, ‘Fes-
Saiss’, ‘Bou Regrag’, ‘Souss- Casablanca’, and so on [Layachi, 1998]. Most of 
these associations were created and headed by individuals close to the Palace. 
Their objectives and activities were limited to socio-cultural development, the 
environment, arts and sports. Progressive political liberalization in the 1990s 
led to a burgeoning of associations with a more active spirit in the spheres of 
human rights and democratic development. (Haddadi, 2003: 80) 
 
Civil society actors in Morocco often operate under many constraints, including the slanted 
application of NGO laws, a lack of professional, financial and human resources, and the 
limited membership and audience of these associations (Denoeux, 2000: 169). With more 
than 30 000 registered and active associations in 2002, Morocco is in fact a leading Arab 
country in civil society mobilisation (Claret, 2002: 12). This is partly due to the country’s 
historically important labour movement and trade unions, the relatively open press, and the 
growing number of human rights and advocacy groups such as the Association Marocaine 
des Droits Humains (AMDH), the Organisation Marocaine des Droits de I’Homme 
(OMDH), Transparency Maroc (TM), Maroc 2020, etc. (Dillman, 2003: 179, Denoeux, 
2000: 169-71). 
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In the mid-1980s, civil society in Morocco gradually started developing some coherent public 
discourses and challenging the old power structures. These new associations were generally 
focused on single issues outside of the political sphere. But their very presence started 
shaping public discourses, creating a new generation of mobilized and aware citizens 
committed to public issues. This mobilization contributed to the increase of the public 
sphere’s autonomy from the established dominant power structures and seems to also have 
given independent and critical journalism an impetus, reducing and seriously competing with 
the state’s media hegemony. A tug-of-war between the state and these new non-state actors 
lasted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, culminating in the state engaging this new 
public sphere (associations, NGOs, independent press, etc.) through three main strategies: 
boundary setting, integration, and co-optation, especially after the King’s introduction of the 
“new concept of authority” in 2003, which curtailed some of the previously acquired leeway 
and freedoms (Sater, 2007: 160-1). This state encroachment also resulted in its appropriation 
of some civil society slogans and claims, and therefore stole protagonism and earned credit 
for issues that were previously championed by Moroccan civil society actors such as human 
rights issues, the Family Code (Moudawana), and the Berber language (Tamazight) status, as 
it did more recently during the 2011constitutional reform process. 
 
There is no doubt that associations and NGOs in Morocco play a less significant role 
compared to their European and Spanish counterparts, especially in the context of the 
centralized Moroccan decision-making apparatus. But in the Spanish-Moroccan bilateral 
relationship, Moroccan civil society actors often bring their weight to bear in the equation, 
playing positive and negative roles. The Moroccan spectrum is full of associations, 
universities and NGOs collaborating with their Spanish counterparts in different areas 
ranging from educational and cultural exchanges, women and children’s rights, humanitarian 
and health awareness activities, etc. 68  However, the Moroccan state also tolerates and might 
even encourage anti-Spanish groups and demonstrations. Indeed, many associations, 
intellectuals and publications in Morocco sometimes contribute to a negative portrayal of 
Spain as an unreliable partner standing in the way of Morocco’s interests and territorial 
integrity and call for the “decolonization” of the bilateral relationship (Messari, 2009: 111-
112). The voices of such public expressions and media campaigns are heard especially during 
                                                          
68 The north of Morocco, in particular, boasts a number of associations, educational institutions and NGOs that 
work in close collaboration with Spanish partners, especially from Andalucia and Catalonia. 
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crisis periods between the two countries. The Spanish-Moroccan spats over El Ejido or the 
Laila/Perejil islet, for example, provoked a deep national outcry and saw the organization of 
massive public protests and indignation. A more recent illustration of this was the November 
2010 massive march in Casablanca which rallied hundreds of thousands in protest against the 
perceived hostile reactions in Spain in general, and the PP policies in particular, following the 
Laayoun incidents earlier the same month. Other demonstrations of associations in the north 
of Morocco calling for the liberation of Ceuta and Melilla69 or for compensation and an 
official apology from Spain for its massacres during the Rif wars in the 1920s and its use of 
chemical weapons (Balfour, 2002: Chapter 5) are other relevant instances reflecting the 
adverse feelings of the Moroccan street against Spain.  
 
Less research and fewer studies have been conducted on Spain’s image among Moroccans. 
But the scant studies carried out actually reveal a high percentage of Moroccans having a 
positive image of their northern neighbour (69.4%), mainly due to the successful Spanish 
effort to integrate itself into the European Union and its impressive development and 
democratic transition (Affaya and Guerraoui, 2006: 73; Messari 2009: 12), as well as due to 
its key role in influencing EU decisions in Morocco’s favour (Hernando De Larramendi, 
1997: 407). Spanish sporting prowess is also often mentioned by Moroccans as a source of 
fascination. In Morocco, as in other countries, hordes of young people follow with passion 
achievements of such Spanish sports icons as FC Barcelona, Real Madrid or Rafael Nadal.  
However, there remains a lingering negative perception of Spain due to other historical, 
territorial, political and cultural issues. Some political parties and certain media outlets 
continue to echo the old nationalistic discourses that indulge in the logic of barren 
confrontation and “decolonization”. The dissatisfaction of Moroccan nationalist forces with 
Spain dates back to the days of colonization but probably finds its roots in the more distant 
past starting with the Arab conquest of the Peninsula at the beginning of the 8th century. The 
opacity of the Moroccan regime also contributed for a long time to the lack of open debates 
about many issues and of meaningful involvement of the political and social organizations; 
civil society actors have barely started to participate in the debate and shape the perception 
process since the early 1990s.  
                                                          
69 See El País article: “La coincidencia de la visita del Rey a Ceuta con la Marcha Verde enfureció a Marruecos” 
(13 December 2010) 
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Also, public opinion in Morocco remains significantly influenced by the media and recently 
by the Internet as well. The audio-visual part of the Moroccan media landscape is still largely 
dominated by the state, despite the emergence of vibrant pan-Arab satellite channels such as 
Al-Jazeera and Al Arabia whose coverage of such bilateral issues as Moroccan-Spanish 
relations remains insignificant after all. The state-dominated media and the written party 
newspapers, especially those in Arabic such as Al Alam (the nationalistic Istiqlal Party 
newspaper), tend to play a negative role in the bilateral relationship and reinforce negative 
perceptions of Spain, sometimes leading to the aggravation of already fragile situations 
(Rojo, 2005: 147; García-Sala, 2005: 206-7). Some of the recurring themes about Spain 
include its keenness to “destabilize” Morocco, its “arrogant attitude towards Rabat”, its 
“selfishness” in defending its interests despite the increasing disparities, its “lack of 
objectivity and sympathy” towards the country, its “lack of trust” and its perception of the 
country through “security lenses”, etc.  Books such as Maroc-Espagne: La guerre des ombres 
2000-2010 (Dahbi, 2011), written by the former editor of a Moroccan daily Aujourd’hui le 
Maroc (a daily that often publishes incendiary anti-Spanish editorials), reflect such attitudes 
and can mar perceptions at a more elite level as it reinforces these suspicions and clichés. The 
more independent publications in Morocco, on the other hand, offer a quite different account, 
often criticizing the immaturity or incompetence of Moroccan diplomacy in managing serious 
crises with the Iberian neighbour. Two eloquent examples of this were the critical articles by 
the independent Arabic newspaper Al Ayyam of Morocco’s management of the Laila/Perejil 
crisis in 2002 (Rojo, 2005: 150), as well as the independent weekly Tel Quel criticism of the 
erratic and irresponsible declarations of the Moroccan government in the aftermath of the 
Gdeim Izik camp dismantlement in November 2010 and the ensuing crisis between the two 
countries. Ahmed Reda Benchemsi, the influential former editor-in-chief of the publication, 
summed up the situation in one of his editorials saying: 
 
“What our officials cannot (or refuse to) understand is that Spain is made up 
of institutions, each respecting and distancing itself from the other. The 
government is responsible, the parliament is sovereign, the judiciary is 
independent and the press is free. Each of the four powers plays its role, and 
the alliance of these four components forms a system called democracy. 
Spanish democracy is not perfect, of course. As elsewhere, it is influenced by 
tacit interests and lobbies [...] It is up to us to respond to this influence by ad 
hoc communication strategies [...] Until then, please, gentlemen our 
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ministers, stop shaming us by your careless declarations. Where you see 
zealous patriotism, the world sees immaturity.”70 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has tried to look at key aspects forming part of the bigger picture in the Spanish-
Moroccan relationship that we deem essential for a more thorough understanding of these 
relations and for the definition of the wider context prior to our focus on the specific roles 
that Catalonia and the EU may play in framing, influencing and driving the relationship. The 
chapter reveals a host of important observations. First, we notice that despite a common 
(albeit distant) past, the two neighbours remember it differently and have evolved in separate 
environments and in quite different ways. The result of this evolution is that one country is a 
relatively established democracy and a vibrant economy (at least until very recently); while 
the other is still gripped by authoritarianism, making turtle steps towards economic, social 
and political progress. Morocco and Spain indeed belong to quite different leagues and 
revolve in separate (though increasingly overlapping) galaxies. Yet their contiguous presence 
forces them to face a series of serious political, economic, historical and human 
responsibilities that they both have to manage. It also emerges that while state structures and 
institutions in the two countries may be comparable, they by no means have the same 
positions or functions. While power, including foreign policy decisions, revolves around the 
Palace in Morocco, the Spanish monarch remains a symbolic figure and the key decisions in 
the Spanish case are mostly the prerogative of the executive. We have seen how such false 
similarities can be sources of confusion and may be at the heart of unnecessary sensitivities, 
misunderstandings and even confrontation. 
 
Issues such as the Sahara and Morocco’s territorial claims are among the major sources of 
discord and have shown the potential to produce real conflicts. Some indications might 
suggest that the reinforcement of bilateral cooperation and the exponential increase in 
economic, institutional and social exchanges may not only constitute mutual opportunities for 
the two neighbours but counterbalance belligerent tendencies on both sides as well. While 
increased interdependence proves to be the constructive way forward, immigration, the new 
problem on the block, seems to be casting a long shadow over the optimistic view of the 
                                                          
70 See Tel Quel article: « Les mots, nos maux » (17 November 2010). 
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future. What come into sight are two main aspects related to it. On the one hand the issue of 
immigration (and illegal immigration in particular) costs tremendous energy for both 
governments and tends to create tensions, engendering mutual accusations and deepening 
mistrust. The number of immigrants of Moroccan origin also seems to be viewed with 
concern and discontent by large portions of the Spanish population.71 This reinforces 
prejudice and negative perceptions which are crucial issues in the relationship, as the section 
on public opinion reveals. On the other hand, immigration itself is converting itself into an 
element of interdependence since both countries have to multiply their cooperation and 
interactions in order to find mutually acceptable solutions for its management. 
 
The chapter also indicated how each of the two countries keeps on striving to advance their 
national interest while being carefully attentive to the neighbour’s ups and downs. In this 
sense, both countries utilise all the means available to them to cut the best deals for 
themselves while being keen on preserving the shaky (but strengthening) bilateral balance to 
prevent serious tensions. Spain keeps an eye open for opportunities south of the Strait and 
endeavours to prevent Morocco from gaining more access to the EU market, but it favours 
more aid instead and keeps playing an active role as an advocate and a legitimiser of the 
Moroccan regime within the EU. It also keeps increasing the level of shared common 
interests with Morocco that have so far withstood the test of serious episodes of hostility such 
as during the 2001-2002 crisis and, to a lesser extent, the 2009-2010 period. Morocco, on the 
other hand, has been watching with fascination the rapid transformation of its Iberian 
neighbour over the last 30 years. It has been trying to emulate it and learn from it at times, or 
pressurise and criticise it at other times for its perceived condescending behaviour, lack of 
support on its crucial issues, and what Moroccans see as Spain’s unwillingness to commit to a 
more consistent policies aimed at anchoring the country to the more prosperous European 
shores. The economic gap between the two neighbours is huge indeed and if left unchanged 
will surely continue to pose a threat to bilateral relations. Moreover, in spite of the impressive 
economic exchange figures, Spain remains the main beneficiary with a considerable trade 
surplus and with little to show for in terms of direct investments in the Kingdom. The 
widening trade balance is only partly offset by remittances and tourism proceeds. Also, in 
many respects the Spanish model has entered into a crisis since 2008. It would be expected 
                                                          
71 Although recently concerns about the economic situation, job security and the political system are gaining 
more prominence. 
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that the economic, political and social problems that the country is struggling with would also 
further degrade perceptions and relations both at the popular and official levels. 
 
The two neighbours’ relationship also remains highly asymmetrical and somewhat 
incongruous, given their distinct economic size, political clout, style of life, stereotypes and 
their incompatible priorities: Morocco seeking to garner maximum support for its territorial 
claims, reap maximum economic benefits from relations with the EU and project prestige and 
strategic self-importance in the region; while Spain’s main priority towards Morocco is 
linked to security issues such as illegal migration, terrorism, drug trafficking and other factors 
that may affect its neighbour’s stability like economic stagnation, the Sahara issue and lack 
the of political reform. Morocco and Spain appear to be sitting on different sides of history 
and the deepening of their cooperation seems to be hindered by internal forces of resistance 
consciously or unconsciously standing in the way of further integration and understanding. 
 
What also comes out of the comparison between Spanish and Moroccan public opinion, civil 
society and media contribution to the overall bilateral relationship are a number of interesting 
conclusions. First we realise the extent to which some influential opinion leaders and media 
organs are still hostage to the weighty historical, perceptual, cultural, political and security 
issues that seem to largely define the parameters of this relationship and the debate agenda. 
On both sides, these actors also seem to be confined to a limited set of issues (territory, 
migration, security, criminal activities, as well as the gaping economic, democratic and 
human rights disparities between the two). This seems to mirror to a large extent the 
preoccupations at government and political party levels as well. Second, at the level of 
overall perception of the other, it appears that the trends are different. While the image of 
Morocco and Moroccans seems to have worsened over the years in Spain, mainly due to 
immigration and the 2004 Madrid attacks, the image of Spain and Spaniards seems to be 
slightly better in Morocco mainly due to Spain’s political, social and economic feats. It 
appears that unless civil society actors in both countries are able to transcend the limited set 
of issues that monopolise the debates, and unless they manage to overcome the 
psychological, cultural, historical, political, security and economic stumbling blocks, few 
breakthroughs are to be expected from the role of these actors in deepening or improving 
Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relations. 
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Finally, in theoretical terms, Moroccan-Spanish relations, in spite of the lingering aquabbles 
and cyclical problems, seem to lend substance to a case of deepening and complex 
interdependence since bilateral ties keep developing, interdependence growing and 
confrontation is increasingly considered non-viable (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 10). In fact, the 
relationship also corresponds to other premises of the theory such as the proliferation of 
actors and the multiplicity of channels (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 24–5). The active role of the 
EU, the Spanish regions, superpowers, non-state actors, the existence of a large immigrant 
community, economic interests, political and security matters, etc. reflect the multiplicity of 
channels, issues and interests that force dialogue and cooperation. All these linkages 
consolidate the web of common interests and mutual dependencies, making the option of 
conflict harder to contemplate. The main theoretical premise that the relationship does not 
correspond to is the “flexible (or absence of) hierarchy among issues”. Indeed, territorial 
issues still matter to Rabat more than others; and migration and security concerns seem to be 
preponderant for Madrid. Nevertheless, the two countries are increasingly adopting 
conciliatory policies towards these issues. Rabat is offering more cooperation on migration 
and security matters, and Madrid is adopting a largely appeasing position, especially towards 
the Sahara issue in spite of its unpopularity. Finally, the relationship presents ample evidence 
of asymmetry in the relationship. It includes a host of mutual “sensitivities” and 
“vulnerabilities” that entail either a high degree of mutual dependence on the policies adopted 
by the other, or costly (sometimes unavailable) alternatives in case policies are changed at the 
other end (Keohane and Nye, 1989:12–13). A wide range of policy areas involved in the 
relationship reflect these mutual sensitivities and vulnerabilities, such as economic issues 
(especially fisheries and agriculture for Spain and Morocco, respectively), territorial issues 
(the Sahara for Morocco and Ceuta and Melilla for Spain), and the issue of migration (mainly 
for Spain). 
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Chapter four - The place of Spain in Moroccan-EU relations 
Introduction 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, analysing relationship dynamics between two 
countries is already a complex, multifaceted and intricate undertaking due to the variety of 
actors and influences that shape the processes and outcomes for each party. External 
relations, for each country, can be seen as the result of international relations influences and 
imperatives; as the outcome of internal pressures, demands and policy making dynamics; as 
the translation of preferences and orientations of groups and individuals at the executive 
level; or as a combination of some or all these factors. This chapter aims at examining an 
important component of the influence emanating from outside the bilateral relationship. After 
briefly exploring the impact of key countries like France, Algerian and the USA, the aim here 
is to shed light on Moroccan-EU relations in general, with particular focus on aspects of the 
relationship that affect Moroccan-Spanish relations. 
 
Examining relations between a country and a supranational entity (Morocco and the EU in 
this case) is a daunting enterprise. Extra levels of complexity are aggregated to the simple 
country to country analysis when we are dealing with a compound international institution 
representing a host of other countries and lacking a single decision-making centre and a clear 
and coherent strategy. Indeed, the EU is far from being a unitary actor, but it cannot be 
reduced to an international organisation or an intergovernmental actor either. It is, in fact, an 
“arena for collective bargaining and decision-making among the member states due to the 
varying degree of institutionalization and delegated authority across EU policy areas” 
(Bremberg, 2012: 19). Its decisions are also shaped by its agenda-setting, unelected 
technocratic experts, its increasingly influential parliament, its vocal pressure groups, and, 
depending on the nature of the issues, by member states most concerned by policy areas in 
question. 
 
EU Foreign Policy (EFP) as an expression, therefore, almost becomes oxymoronic because of 
the diffuse and uncertain nature of decision-making dynamics, giving place to what has been 
called: the European Foreign Policy Analysis dilemma (White, 1999).  In an attempt to offer 
a more parsimonious definition, Hill and Wallace described it as “a system of international 
relations, a collective enterprise through which national actors conduct partly common, and 
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partly separate, international actions” (Hill and Wallace, 1996: 5). Christopher Hill also 
offered a useful working definition of European foreign policy as “the ensemble of the 
international activities of the European Union, including output from all three of the EU’s 
pillars, and not just that relating to the CFSP” (Hill, 2004: 145). But as mentioned earlier, in 
varying degrees and according to the policy areas, EFP often reflects the foreign policy 
preferences of national constituencies, the European intergovernmental negotiation and 
cooperation frameworks such as the CFSP, as well as the views of its official foreign policy 
representations (Hill, 1993: 322–3; White, 1999: 46–47).  The aim of this Chapter is to 
examine aspects of Moroccan-EU relations that are of most relevance to Moroccan-Spanish 
relations. It will explore the extent to which EU policies towards Morocco express interests, 
agendas and preferences of the countries that have a stake in specific policy issues, such as 
Spain with regard to immigration, fisheries, agriculture, human rights and cooperation issues. 
In other words, aside from shedding light on the history and range of issues involved in 
Moroccan-EU relations, the Chapter intends to examine the degree to which Madrid 
influences decisions in Brussels that are of relevance to Rabat and the degree to which 
Brussels impacts the bilateral relationship. This exercise will eventually allow us to 
appreciate the degree of convergence or divergence in the Rabat-Madrid and Rabat-Brussels 
relations. 
 
To provide some answers to these questions, this Chapter will first look at the evolution and 
the importance of the Brussels-Rabat relationship since the signing of their first agreement in 
1969 all the way to the unprecedented March 2010 Granada summit between the two to 
discuss, among other issues, the proposals included in the joint document on the “advanced 
status” granted to Morocco in 2008. The second section of this chapter will look more closely 
at the range and the evolution of the relationship, with a focus on discord and cooperation 
issues between the two. A special spotlight will be shed on the major crises and the 
outstanding sticking points in this relationship, especially those where Madrid is involved 
such as the Sahara, human rights, migration, agriculture, and fisheries issues. A close analysis 
of these is more likely to disclose the workings and dynamics of the relationship and reveal 
the decision-making mechanisms and the way they operate at the EU level. The analysis will 
also bring us closer to the role of Madrid in this partnership. This, in turn, should facilitate the 
Rabat-Brussels-Madrid triangulation mapping we are seeking to analyse and interpret here. 
Finally, we will try to come up with some insights and conclusions, and look into the future 
prospects of the relationship. 
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The evolution of EU-Moroccan relations and the place of Spain 
Moroccan-European partnership dates back to the genesis of the Common Market. It started 
taking shape soon after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 with the application of a 
protocol annexed to the Treaty whereby traditional concessions granted by France to 
Moroccan agricultural exports since independence took effect at the wider EEC level as well. 
But the real birth of contractual relations between the EEC and Morocco was in 1969 with the 
signing of an initial five-year association agreement that was strictly commercial in nature 
and that granted product and calendar-specific concessions to some Moroccan exports. These 
exports mainly concerned agricultural and fisheries products.  This agreement was followed 
by the 1976 Association Agreement that added new economic, technical and financial terms 
to the initial partnership (Jaïdi and Martín, 2010:7). The agreement was in line with the 
Community’s Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), adopted during the 1972 Paris Summit 
and that came with a more coherent strategy, replacing the previous piecemeal approach 
towards Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) (Panebianco, 2003:5). The GMP hinted at 
a change in the European Community’s approach towards its southern partner since its 
declared objective was more global in nature and had as a stated objective the “social and 
economic development of Morocco, taking into account the country’s priorities and 
development programs” (Jordan Galduf, 2004: 180). 
 
However, as the test of time would subsequently demonstrate, such lofty objectives and 
lyrical declarations are rarely carried through but rather pertain to the domain of the mutual 
ringing discourses exchanged by both parties. In fact, during the two decades following the 
agreement, Euro-Moroccan relations went through a stage of relative stagnation as economic 
relations never improved markedly. In fact, from the late 1960s till the mid-1990s, “the 
combined export shares of [Moroccan] primary agriculture and food products declined from 
over 70 percent to less than 25 percent”; these were only compensated by the hike in exports 
of manufactured products during the same period (Elbehri, 2006: 5). Rabat was keenly 
seeking an ever closer partnership epitomized by its unsuccessful membership bid of 1987. 
Its rejection effectively put an end to any membership prospect on the grounds that the 
Kingdom was not a European state (Dawson 2009:51). As the bilateral relationship barely 
budged, the asymmetrical nature of the association increased even further in favour of the 
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Community.72 The insignificant trade concessions and the slight increase in the financial 
protocols never reached sufficient levels for growth-boosting or policy-shifting dynamics in 
Morocco. What is more, some of the initial Moroccan aspirations for an agricultural free 
exchange between the two started fading, leaving only sectoral liberalization moves, 
especially following the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 (Tovias, 1997: 126; Jaïdi 
and Martín, 2010: 8-9). In fact, with the entry of the new southern European members in the 
1980s, the European Community achieved a form of agricultural self-reliance and became 
increasingly dependent on agricultural products coming from the south of Europe. The 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) literally barred the way to extra-community imports, 
thereby benefitting countries such as Spain and penalizing others like Morocco (Bicchi, 
2007:122).  
 
In 1996, a new association agreement was signed in Brussels and entered into force in March 
of 2000, replacing the 1976 agreement. This was part of the new generation of agreements 
that the EU signed with Mediterranean third countries and came with a new set of 
embellishing guiding principles that centred on security, political stability, economic 
freedom, human rights and democratic values. The agreement came under the framework of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) launched in Barcelona the previous year and was 
centred on four main axes: the gradual creation of a free-trade area; economic, financial and 
technical assistance; social and cultural cooperation; and continuing political and security 
dialogue. Although the EU’s primary agenda with regard to the EMP has been a subject of 
debate, with some experts leaning towards Realist interpretations and others seeing in its 
programmes a more Liberal/socializing perspective (Attinà, 2003: 200), the security 
component of this new generation of association agreements was probably the most 
important. The Barcelona Process came mainly as a response not only to the new Middle East 
peace process marked by the 1991 Madrid Conference and the 1993 Oslo I Accord, but to the 
post-Cold War international context, the Algerian civil war, the 1991 Gulf War, the mounting 
threat of radical Islamism and the increasing pace of illegal immigration as well (Bichara, 
2009: 13-15). Southern European countries like Spain, France and Italy had succeeded in 
attracting more attention to the Mediterranean dimension of the EU neighbourhood and 
                                                          
72 Since the 1980s, 50 to 60% of Moroccan imports and exports activities have been with the EC/EU while this 
latter’s trade with Morocco has constantly represented less than 1%. Morocco has also seen its negative trade 
balance with the EC/EU increase from a few million Euros in 1988 to 6 billion Euros in 2008 (Bremberg, 2011: 
4-5). 
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making more associations between the stability and prosperity of the EU and that of its 
southern vicinity (De Larramendi and Azaola, 2010: 76). 
 
Yet, for all the great expectations raised by the resounding and promising objectives of a 
“common area of peace and stability” and “shared prosperity”, the Barcelona Process did not 
meet the expectations and failed to bring about the much hoped for dawn of peace, 
democracy and prosperity for all. Its symbolic decline was marked by the absence of almost 
all southern leaders from the 2005 Barcelona summit (Cardwell, 2011: 228; Gillespie, 2012: 
1). In fact, not only did democratization take a back seat and major conflicts in the region mar 
any significant achievements, but the agreements signed with southern partners such as 
Morocco did not even bring novel trade concessions, especially in the areas where these 
countries have a clear comparative advantage. Even the financial instruments (MEDA I and 
MEDA II programmes) proved to be too weak and too limited to bring about significant 
changes in southern Mediterranean countries’ governance, growth or human rights 
achievements. For Morocco, the biggest beneficiary from EU financial assistance to southern 
partners, the 1995–1999 MEDA I programme, for example, had earmarked some 660 million 
ECU for Morocco (less than 4 ECU per person per year), yet by the end of 2000 only 25% of 
the funds had in effect been disbursed, due to a lack of efficiency, experience and credible 
projects on the Moroccan side, but mainly due to the strict conditions and procedures 
attached to EU aid programmes (Dillman, 2003: 35). Conditions were later alleviated and 
management improved, allowing the country to absorb most of the funds allocated to it (from 
25% in 1995 to 90% in 2003) (Bichara, 2009: 57).  
 
In all cases, throughout the stages of this Association Agreement, the EU did not show a 
strong engagement and its approach was lacking the political and financial teeth likely to 
convince the Moroccan regime or the country’s modernizing and democracy-seeking elites to 
introduce significant changes. Europe adopted a largely soft approach towards Morocco, 
refraining from strong criticism of the Kingdom’s authoritarianism, and its incentives 
remained limited to aid and technical assistance which have proved to be a poor instrument 
for transforming the Moroccan governance predicament or its political economy (Holden, 
2005: 177; Dawson, 2009: 55). Such limited engagement from above failed to eradicate 
Morocco’s patronage networks and tended to discourage opposition, “sustain existing elites” 
and enable “the buying off of would-be losers” (Dillman, 2003: 190).  
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But in spite of the inadequate engagement, the disappointing aid packages and the limited 
trade concessions, Morocco remained keen on furthering its privileged relations with the EU. 
This reflected on the one hand the lack of substitute options that the country has in the 
context of dismal regional prospects and a hugely asymmetrical political and economic 
dependency on Europe. On the other hand, Morocco still reaped some material gains (albeit 
limited) from this relationship as well as important symbolic rewards reflecting positively on 
the regime. In fact, the regional and international prestige that the country boasts as an EU 
good and privileged student seems to be an objective in itself for Rabat. Close partnership 
with the EU does convey a symbolic meaning that tends to portray the country as an ‘avant-
garde’ country within its neighbourhood and beyond (Emerson et al., 2007: 26; Levenex and 
Schimmelfennig, 2007:151; Bremberg, 2012: 120), as well as a reform torch-bearer in the 
region and a key EU partner. The Moroccan regime has been instrumentalising this prestige 
at home to garner its domestic image and “advertising this trophy considerably in the region, 
and the EU has deliberately let it do so” (Kausch, 2010: 2). Indeed, the EU not only seems 
conscious about the importance of such emblematic aspects but it seems to coin and also use 
them dexterously, partly through inventing and rebranding forms of association, statuses and 
hierarchies -‘special relationship’, ‘privileged relationship’, ‘advanced status’, etc. (Martín, 
2009: 244) - as carrots and competition prizes for the MPCs. The “advanced status” that was 
first granted to Morocco, then negotiated with Tunisia and Israel, and subsequently granted to 
Jordan in 2010 as well, is a case in point (Fatmi, forthcoming). 
 
Indeed, soon after the entering into force of the Morocco-EU Association Agreement in 2000, 
Rabat started seeking a more significant form of association with the EU that would deepen 
the existing relationship and preserve its supposed “privileged status” with the EU. In March 
2000 on his first official visit as King, Mohamed VI called upon the EU to open a new 
chapter in its relation with Morocco by granting the country a more advanced status that 
would be “[m]ore and better than association… and, perhaps for a while still, a bit less than 
membership that is nevertheless dictated by reason, geography and the daily realities of 
economic, social and cultural lives of our countries”.73 In 2008 an “advanced status” was 
indeed granted to Morocco following several meetings and fine-tuning of different draft 
proposals submitted by Moroccan and EU delegations. This new status calls for the widening 
of the scope of mutual cooperation and foresees an increase in bilateral diplomatic and trade 
                                                          
73 Speech of Mohammed VI in Paris, (20 March 2000). Available at http://www.maroc.ma. 
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relations between the EU and Morocco. It also involves a wide variety of political, economic 
and cultural issues, ranging from trade issues to sustainable development, cultural and human 
exchanges, security, regional cooperation, good governance, the fight against terrorism, the 
regulation of migration, promotion of human rights, cooperation in employment and social 
affairs, energy cooperation, research and innovation, the environment and sustainable 
development (Jaïdi and Martín, 2010: 9-10). Given the loose nature of the agreement, 
Morocco’s initial expectations from the “advanced status” were substantial,74 but they were 
content with it even if it only ended up sanctioning the country’s political, social and 
economic advances, furthering its economic benefits, and preserving the status of the EU’s 
closest Arab partner.75 For the EU, the new partnership has been described as a strategy akin 
to the conversion process that EU candidates have to go through, to draw Morocco closer and 
leave it irreversibly tied to the EU. It was also seen as a way to guarantee Morocco’s 
cooperation in key issues such as migration, counter-terrorism and organized crime and to 
open up the Moroccan market to EU exports (Kausch, 2010: 4). But so far the new status 
remains devoid of concrete content as it does not seem to bring novelties other than what is 
already indicated in the EU-Morocco Action Plan under the ENP. And beyond “the 
declaratory effect and the political rhetoric... the added value of the new Advanced Status 
framework in relation to the current European Neighbourhood Policy is unclear” (Martín, 
2009: 241).  With regard to Morocco’s strategic interests, the Joint Document of the 
partnership did not grant substantial concessions such as the liberalization of agricultural 
trade, the mobility of citizens or more significant levels of financial cooperation that were 
already fixed at 165 million Euros (5 Euros per inhabitant per year) until 2014 (Martín, 2009 
240-1).  
 
As the next section on the main sticking issues between Morocco and the EU shows, Spain 
looms relatively large in almost all their relationship aspects. Indeed, in spite of recurring 
crises, Spain’s perception and conduct towards Morocco largely shifted since its 1986 EC 
                                                          
74 Interviews in the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 15th 2012) and with an EU Commission 
official (February 18th 2013) revealed that Morocco was seeking the creation of “Common Spaces” with the EU 
that would involve deeper sectoral collaboration in such areas as higher education, renewable energy, science 
and technology, etc. along with deeper economic integration, liberalization of agricultural trade, agreements on 
mobility, and even access to EU structural funds. According to a Commission official, the EU might have more 
leeway with mobility but the other Moroccan expectations relative to structural funds or agricultural 
liberalization are not likely to be met. 
75 See the declarations of Mr. Taib Fassi-Fihri, Moroccan foreign affairs minister in Le Matin article “Statut 
avancé : Une nouvelle ère dans les relations avec l'UE”, (31 December 2008). 
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accession.76 As explained earlier, the relationship went from a logic based on rivalry and 
direct engagement to one characterised by a combination of competition and collaboration, as 
well as the utilization of the supranational interface. Indeed, Madrid’s EC/EU membership 
significantly conditioned Spanish-Moroccan relations and affected the way various issues in 
the relationship were treated (Vaquer, 2004b; Barbé, 2007). The fact that a number of 
problematic issues such as fisheries accords, agricultural agreements and immigration control 
shifted to a large extent to the realm of the EU (through such mechanisms as the Common 
Fisheries Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy and the EU Home Affairs policies that 
regroup migration, asylum and internal security) significantly affected the bilateral 
relationship. The availability of these mechanisms, as was discussed in the previous Chapter, 
allowed a degree of de-problematization of issues, avoidance of direct confrontation, and the 
use of supranational (rather than national) resources to address them, in the case of Spain. 
The fact that Madrid was able to “upload” to the EU level some of its problematic issues with 
Rabat did, indeed, reduce tensions and make room for new cooperation opportunities. 
Moreover, on occasions, Spain also used its EC/EU membership to promote some of 
Morocco’s interests and acted as a legitimiser for the regime, pushing for a deeper association 
between Morocco and the EU, lobbying for more aid and acting as a champion for the 
southern Mediterranean in general. 
 
On the other hand, Spain’s EC/EU accession also had negative consequences for Morocco as 
it lost the privileged partnership it had with the EC before the 1986 enlargement thanks to its 
special relationship with France (Vaquer, 2004b: 332). The country also suffered in term of 
market access. The accession of Spain and Portugal had direct implications for its agricultural 
and fisheries exports to the EC since its two main European competitors became part of the 
club and almost managed to meet the continents needs in terms of those products. To this 
day, Spain and other southern European members continue to block more significant EU 
concessions in these products, favouring an increase in aid and technical support rather than 
                                                          
76 It is also worth mentioning that a number of experts hold that the first shift in Spain’s policy towards Morocco 
took place after the PSOE came to power in 1982, with the implementation of a new “global approach” towards 
the Maghreb (particularly Morocco) by the Socialists (Gillespie, 2000: 53; Vaquer, 2004: 321-2). Lemus de la 
Iglesia (2003), on the other hand, talks about three key reasons behind the change in Spain’s policy towards 
Morocco, mentioning its EC and NATO accession as the first reason, the successive strong Spanish 
governments that used their absolute majorities to implement innovative policies and programs, and the 
enduring tensions with Morocco that also encouraged Spain’s executives to seek more cooperative policies 
(Vaquer, 2004: 322). However, Spain’s EU accession brought with it a series of new possibilities and 
mechanisms such as Europeanization of policies that was, hitherto, inexistent. 
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market access. The next section on the sticking points between Morocco and the EU will 
further detail the extent of Spain’s importance. 
Major Moroccan-EU bilateral issues and Spain’s input 
Since the outset, Moroccan-EU relations have been diverse and slightly incremental, ranging 
from trade and economic issues, political dialogue, security and defence cooperation and 
cultural and human cooperation.  However, the bilateral relationship has also been marred by 
a host of recurrent issues that often bring cooperation to a halt or even bring the two parties to 
invoke retaliation measures such as the blocking of financial packages or the suspension of 
trade or fishing negotiations. Although such obstacles have rarely arisen and are far from 
representing the wider array of bilateral cooperation, they nevertheless provide a useful 
insight into the structural differences between the two partners, the limitations to their 
association, the underlying deeper interests for each one of them, as well as the influence of 
key member states in the relationship, such as Spain. The main sticking points in the Rabat-
Brussels relationship have been territorial issues (mainly the Sahara issue), fisheries, 
democracy and human rights, and illegal migration. 
The territorial issues  
As was established earlier, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of the Sahara issue in 
Moroccan foreign policy. The issue sits at the top of the country’s priorities and is intimately 
linked to its untouchable pillar of territorial integrity, which itself is closely tied to the regime 
and the monarchy’s image and stability (Damis 1987: 198; Willis and Messari 2005: 156; 
Rosenblum and Zartman 2008: 321; Rivlin 2009: 188-9). Aware of this condition and of the 
crucial importance of this issue for Morocco, most EU institutions often keep a low profile 
regarding the issue of the Sahara in comparison to their more pronounced engagement in 
other Mediterranean issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Bosnian or the Cyprus 
issues (Vaquer, 2004a: 95). The European Parliament (EP), however, has often showed a 
remarkable degree of autonomy in sharp contrast to individual European countries. At certain 
stages, the EP became the only European institution to openly support the cause of self-
determination for the Saharawi people and bash Morocco for human rights issues in the 
region. Spanish MEPs, however, have often made efforts to stymie such initiatives.  Indeed, 
countries like France and Spain often voiced support for Rabat and pushed for policies of 
engagement leading to incremental change, rather than confrontation. In 1992, the European 
Parliament even managed to block the fourth financial protocol with Morocco, calling upon 
122 
 
the country to abide by human rights principles and UN Security Council resolutions, in a 
reference to the Sahara. This had infuriated the Moroccan authorities who resorted to the 
suspension of the fisheries agreement with the EC (Vaquer, 2004a: 102-4). During that 
period, Moroccan relations with France were also at a low, but Gonzalez’ government fully 
supported Morocco achieving a significant rapprochement between Rabat and Madrid. The 
European Parliament also directed strong criticism to Morocco on various other occasions 
such as during the Aminatu Haidar incident in 2009 or following the 2010 intervention by 
Moroccan authorities to dismantle the Gdaim Izyk camp near the town of Laâyoune, calling 
for the setting-up of human rights monitoring mechanisms in the Sahara and calling upon the 
Kingdom to abide by international law regarding the exploitation of the natural resources of 
the region (European Parliament, 2010). 
 
Although not as important as the Sahara, another territorial issue that is also present in 
Moroccan-EU relations where Spain has the biggest stake is the question of Ceuta and 
Melilla and the other African territories under Spanish control. Indeed, with these becoming 
Spanish as well as EU territories after the 1986 enlargement, and with the drawing of the 
external EU border engendering an overlap “of two meaningful territorial lines: the border 
between Spain and Morocco, and the border between EU and non-EU territory” (Ferrer-
Gallardo, 2009: 25), Morocco’s territorial struggle with Spain has suddenly become an EU-
wide issue. Even if the Laila/Perejil conflict represented an embarrassment for EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) back in 2002, mainly due to the insignificance 
of the islet and France’s sympathetic position towards Morocco (Monar, 2002: 251-253; 
Gillespie, 2006: 117-118), potential squabbles over Ceuta and Melilla are likely to see Rabat 
contending with Madrid and Brussels at the same time. 
Fisheries: 
Relations between Morocco and the European Union have also been heavily conditioned by 
the question of fisheries, an issue that is intimately involved in Spanish-Moroccan relations. 
The EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) was born in the 1970s when the Commission 
acquired exclusive competences in the signature of international fishing agreements with 
third countries. With the 1986 Iberian enlargement, the CFP acquired importance within the 
European Community since it had doubled both its fleet and its fisheries production. 
Although Spain was constrained to downscale its fishing capacity mainly via the 
modernisation of its fleet, Morocco remained an important partner with regard to the policy 
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since Madrid continued to heavily rely on access to its waters abundant in fishing resources. 
With the EC becoming responsible for negotiations, a number of fishing agreements were 
concluded that allowed the Community’s fleet access to Moroccan waters in return for 
financial and technical assistance (Vaquer, 2003: 61-62). Morocco was well aware of the 
fisheries trump card it possessed and was ready to use it against the EC/EU and Spain (the 
main beneficiary in this case) to nullify political pressures or seek political and economic 
concessions (as it did in 1992 in response the EP’s financial blockage).  
 
The 1994–95 fisheries negotiations constituted a difficult phase in the Rabat-Brussels 
bilateral relations exposing even further the difficult nature of this issue. The episode 
culminated in an EU–Morocco crisis that was only surmounted by linking the issue to 
Morocco’s Association Agreement negotiations. The two negotiations took place in parallel 
and ended with the signing of both agreements just two weeks prior to the start of the 1995 
Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona (Damis, 1998: 61; Vaquer, 2003: 64). The 
Moroccans felt that the deal was to their disadvantage but were willing to make concessions 
in return for substantial agricultural concessions and other privileged partnership terms. In 
fact, the unsatisfactory outcome of the 1994-5 negotiations came to cast its long shadow on 
the inconclusive 2000–01 fisheries negotiations between Morocco and the EU. However, this 
time, only Moroccan-Spanish relationship was affected with Prime Minister Aznar 
threatening that there would be consequences for the relationship between Spain and 
Morocco and between Morocco and the European Union.77 But the breakup of the fisheries 
negotiations did not greatly affect Moroccan-EU relations as much as it soured those between 
Rabat and Madrid (Vaquer 2003:75-6). Indeed, no other fisheries agreement was concluded 
after 1999 until the coming into force of the 2007 EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership 
Agreement (FPA) which provided for financial compensation of 144 million Euros to 
Morocco in return for granting fishing access to 119 European vessels (mainly from Spain) in 
“waters falling within the sovereignty or the jurisdiction of Morocco” (European 
Commission, 2006), which implied the extension of fishing activities to Western Sahara 
waters. But an attempt to extend the agreement in December 2011 was voted down by the 
European Parliament on legal, environmental and economic grounds. The EP called for full 
respect for international law and for any new agreement to benefit the Sahrawi population, 
                                                          
77 El País, (26 April 2001) 
 
124 
 
for the need for more environment-friendly fishing practices, and for more efficient use of 
EU resources.78 In this sense, EU-Moroccan relations also reflect the incremental increase in 
the powers of the European Parliament as a result of the Maastricht and the Lisbon treaties. 
Good governance, democracy and human rights 
It was the 1993 Maastricht Treaty and the coming into existence of the European Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that were behind the consolidation of good governance 
principles as conditionality instruments of the EU’s external relations towards third countries 
(Haddadi, 2003: 74). Under the EMP and the ENP, the EU mainly relied on these instruments 
to promote democracy and human rights. The rewards for adherence to values of good 
governance had strings attached to them that mainly consisted of stronger relations with the 
EU and increased assistance. The EU’s approach relied on persuasion and ‘soft power’ using 
its financial and institutional firepower. Funding for judicial transparency and security 
programs, empowerment of non-state actors, and the setting up of institutions such as the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) were among the main 
methods that were adopted (Aliboni 2005, 48-51).  
  
Between Morocco and the EU, democracy and human rights issues have constituted yet 
another bone of contention. As with other MPC, the issues are among the conditionality tools 
that the Union uses to continue supporting the Kingdom economically and diplomatically. 
Pre-Lisbon Treaty, democracy promotion, as in the case of Morocco, mainly came under the 
mantle of the European Commission, but since then the European Parliament, the European 
Endowment for Democracy (an autonomous institution) and the European External Action 
Service have been gaining increasing prominence in this area as well. EU member states are 
also vocal in these issues, but some like Spain seem to adopt more pragmatic positions on 
such issues favouring a “status quo” rather than engagement approach (López García and De 
Larramendi, 2002: 171), or prefer to delegate these issues to European institutions. Such 
solutions may spare them the diplomatic and economic consequences that they would assume 
if they were to express their criticism to Rabat directly. The EU, therefore, provides “the 
necessary ‘scale and diplomatic cover’ which member states are unable or unwilling to 
deploy bilaterally” (Kausch,  2008: 4). 
                                                          
78 See European Parliament News release “MEPs reject extension of the EU-Morocco fisheries agreement and 
call for a better deal” (14 December 2011). 
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In comparison to its neighbours, the reform strings attached to EU support seem to have 
yielded for Morocco some results on the human rights and governance fronts, especially 
following the establishment in 2006 of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) to 
shed light on human rights violations between 1956 and 1999. But the achievements 
remained fragile and under threat, especially following the terrorist bombings in Casablanca 
in 2003 which halted the reforms underway and thereby effectively ended the ‘era of 
leniency’ in the country (Sater, 2009: 186; Storm, 2009: 1008; Cavatorta and Dalmasso, 
2009: 500).  Cases of EU criticism towards Rabat due to human rights issues are not unusual. 
Aside from the 1992 EP decision to freeze the renewal of Morocco’s financial protocol 
largely due to human rights abuses committed by the regime, several EU Parliament and 
Commission reports highlighted the issue. For example, the 2004 ENP country report 
prepared by the Commission pointed to a number of serious democratic flaws and lingering 
defects in the Moroccan political system such as the lack of respect towards constitutional 
principles, the absence of a separation of powers, the restricted powers of the parliament and 
government, the absence of judicial independence, the insignificant role of the political 
parties and the restricted role of civil society (European Commission, 2004). The 2007-13 
Commission ‘Country Strategy Paper for Morocco’ also noted that despite some progress, 
Morocco still needed to improve its record on democracy, respect for human rights, good 
governance, and consolidation of the rule of law (European Commission, 2007). 
 
However, not only has EU conditionality terms been criticized as ineffective and lacking 
rigour (Aliboni 2005, 52), but the EU’s “strategies” are not backed up by adequate resources 
likely to help implement changes in such crucial areas either. Even with a broad definition of 
democracy and human rights issues (which would include participatory rural development 
programmes and technical aid to the judiciary), the amounts allocated remain inadequate (less 
than 5% of the MEDA/ENPI allocation to Morocco). And in spite of the positive 
conditionality through ENP mechanisms, the EU still lacks clear strategies and political will 
in this respect (Youngs, 2001; Aliboni 2005, 53). According to the person in charge of EU 
coordination and advocacy at the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), 
“even after the Arab Revolutions human rights issues remained visible in treaties and 
communications, but in real politics the issue is not a priority... More strategic and security-
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related issues such as immigrant readmission and the externalization of European borders 
management clearly gain precedence”.79  
 
Moreover, with earmarking and distinction not always clear cut, MEDA/ENPI funds 
designated for democratization are directly channelled through government bodies and 
programmes and are at times redirected for modernisation rather than democratization 
projects (Holden, 2005: 468), and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR) funds that go directly to NGOs remain far less significant (Kausch, 2008: 9). 
Qualitatively, human rights and democratization projects are also criticized for their lack of 
efficiency with budget allocations at times financing projects with little impact on these 
issues.80 In a sense, this demonstrates the little priority that the EU and its member states give 
to human rights issues and the promotion of democracy in Morocco. On the bright side, 
however, this toothless conditionality at least maintains the issues of reform, good 
governance and democratization on the agenda through regular discussions, reports and 
action plans within the framework of the ENP structures. In 2009, as on previous occasions, 
the European Commission highlighted the slow pace and superficial nature of judicial 
reforms and the country’s regression in international corruption indices. It also warned 
against the legal impediments to free press, the sluggish advances in the application of Equity 
and Reconciliation Commission recommendations relative to the adoption of international 
recommendations, judicial independence and the separation of powers, as well as the need to 
consolidate fundamental social rights and labour norms (European Commission, 2009). Most 
observers, however, agree that good governance, democracy and human rights promotion 
have increasingly taken a backseat in return for regional stability and the resulting economic 
and security priorities (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 697; Bicchi, 2011: 11; Van Hüllen, 2012: 
119; Grant, 2012: 4). This is also reflected in the priority shifts between the EMP and the 
Union for the Mediterranean and the resulting de-politicization of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations; while the EMP had a tendency to promote a more normative and regionalist 
approach, the UfM prioritized a more project-specific agenda (Aliboni and Ammor, 2009: 7; 
Seeberg, 2010: 287).  
                                                          
79 Interview with the officer in charge of EU coordination and advocacy at the Euro-Mediterranean Human 
Rights Network, (15 March 2013). 
80 In the interview with Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network officer, it perspired that budget allocations 
can also be problematic as they are often dedicated to such things as the purchase of goods (computers, laptops, 
office equipment, etc.) rather than to more value-added actions, such as training programs for judges, civil 
society actors and human rights activists, etc. 
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Migration 
With a yawning and remarkably steady income gap since the 1980s between Morocco and the 
EU that stood (at least until the 2008 economic crisis) at 1 to 9, massive immigration from 
Morocco to Europe was an inevitable outcome and soon converted itself into a crucial aspect 
in the bilateral relation in the early 1990s (De Haas and Vezzoli, 2010). Moroccans residing 
abroad are estimated at almost 3.2 million citizens (about 10% of the country’s population) 
and some 2.75 million of these officially live in the European Union, with an extra 200,000 
illegal immigrants thought to be living mainly in southern European countries such as Spain 
and Italy (De Haas and Vezzoli, 2010). Immigrant remittances have shown an increasing trend 
over the past decades and make a considerable contribution to Morocco’s economy, 
accounting for 8 to 9% of its GDP, and constituting a vital and relatively stable source of 
foreign capital (De Haas and Plug 2006: 603; Berriane and Aderghal, 2008: 34; De Hass 
2009). Remittances have so far proved surprisingly resilient to the 2008 economic crisis. 
According to World Bank data, these amounted to about US$4.22 billion in 2004, US$5.45 
billion in 2006, US$6.9 billion in 2008 and US$6.45 billion in 2010. In 2008, for example, 
remittances far exceeded Foreign Direct Investment (US$2.5) and Official Development Aid 
(US$1.2) combined, and were equivalent to almost 20% of the country’s overall exports in 
goods and services.81  In fact, they were more important than phosphate exports even when 
their prices peaked in 2008 (US$5.9 billion), constituting 33% of the overall country's exports 
in goods.82 And the EU is not only the source of livelihood for a huge number of 
economically active Moroccans who would probably have remained jobless, but it is also a 
vital source for poverty alleviation and an important reservoir of investment capital. In 2006 
Morocco was the largest remittance receiver in Africa and its economy remains very reliant 
on these inflows (Rivlin 2009: 185; De Hass 2009). 
 
“Europe is the safety valve for the explosive race between demography and 
economy, and if the demographic growth rate has been brought down to 1.9 
percent, the Moroccan economy still has to sprint fast to catch up. Emigration 
helps bridge the gap: since 1990, remittances have brought in 30 percent more 
foreign exchange than either tourism or phosphate sales, the next two most 
important sources.” (Rosenblum and Zartman 2008: 337). 
 
                                                          
81 See Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. 
82 See BBC article “Morocco's fish fight: High stakes over Western Sahara” (5 December 2011). 
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With regard to migration, the priority for Morocco has been to “cherish the goose with the 
golden egg”, push for immigrant integration in host countries, and develop “enlightened” and 
favourable policies towards its population abroad, with a view to strengthening their bonds 
with their home country (De Haas and Plug, 2006: 603). Rabat has also sought enhanced 
European assistance in return for border control and a lowering of the barrier for its legal 
migration (Kausch, 2008: 3). On the other hand, Europe, while officially acknowledging the 
importance that migration in the relationships, has largely perceived the phenomenon as a 
threat and its main concern has been to control legal migration and keep illicit immigrants at 
bay. This, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, reflected its securitized perception of the issue 
as well as of its relationship with Morocco (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 970; Bicchi, 2007: 
23–24). Migration control has continued to represent an EU priority in its relationship with 
the southern neighbourhood in general and with Morocco in particular. It continues to be a 
bone of contention, not only because Rabat is uncomfortable with the idea of acting as the 
‘Gendarme of Europe’ (Belguendouz, 2003), but also because it is increasingly affected by 
externalities of European “fortification” as more and more transit migrants to Europe end up 
staying in Morocco (Wunderlich, 2010: 249-250).  
 
Spain, France and Italy, the EU countries most affected by illegal immigration from the South 
and which host large contingents of Moroccan legal and illegal immigrants, have been 
seeking to stop the flow of illicit transit by bringing the issue to the top of the European 
agenda. Spain in particular managed to persuade other EU member states that its borders with 
Morocco are not only Spanish but European borders as well. The issue of northbound illegal 
immigration originating from Morocco became Europeanized, with EU resources for border 
control made available through the European agency Frontex from 200583 (Zapata-Barrero 
and De Witte, 2007: 89; Pérez, 2010: 103). Gradually, EU immigration policy came to be 
made up of two basic instruments: coordination mechanisms across EU countries for 
regularisation processes,84 as well as the fight against black labour markets and the 
coordination of border control and cooperation among countries of origin and transit that 
include readmission clauses (Mestres, 2011: 4). The EU gave paramount importance to 
                                                          
83 See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries. 
84 It is, however, worth mentioning here the wave of discontent that Spain provoked within the EU, especially 
following its 2005 regularization process of hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants. Member states like 
France and Germany criticized Zapatero for the efecto llamada (the invitation effect) that the process created 
and called upon Spain to discuss and harmonize such big decisions in the future since they affect all member 
countries (Karaboytcheva, 2006: 21). 
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collaboration on illegal migration among countries of origin, destination and transit with the 
“Rabat Process”85 initiated in 2006. The EU also put in place “efficient border management, 
readmission agreements and the effective return of ‘irregular immigrants’”, thus successfully 
externalising its immigration control policies to third countries such as Morocco through 
capacity building, export of surveillance technology, and information exchange with its 
neighbours (Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011: 3-4). The issues of migratory flows management, fight 
against human trafficking and readmission of nationals and non-nationals have been hot 
issues throughout the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation process. The EU’s response strategy 
included increasing coupling measures between resolution of these issues and assistance 
incentives (Saarinen, 2008 in Darbouche, 2009: 233-242). In fact, Rosemary Hollis says that 
“all the EU initiatives and bilateral agreements with Arab and other neighbouring states have 
included commitments to cooperate on border controls... the implementation of specific 
measures for migration control is among the conditions to be met by the MPCs in order to 
receive more EU financial assistance” (Hollis, 2012: 93). 
Agriculture 
Agriculture is yet another vital sector in the Moroccan economy as it represents about 15 
percent of the country’s GDP and employs more than 40 percent of the labour force. Because 
of its proximity, Europe is the country’s main trading partner and importer of over two-thirds 
of its agricultural and food products exports. The equivalent of some $1.3 billion dollars is 
absorbed by the EU market.86 Trade in agricultural products is a recurrent and contentious 
issue in Moroccan-EU relations. Yet again, Spain happens to be a key part in this equation.  
 
In spite of its persistent efforts, Morocco’s access to the European market is far from 
comprehensive and a number of its most competitive products are restricted by means of 
tariff-rate quotas and import schedules. As a result of pressures by militant farmers but also to 
preserve their privileged access to the EU market, some European governments (mainly 
Spain, but also Italy and France) have remained largely protective of their European market 
                                                          
85 The Rabat Process refers to the July 2006 Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development that was held in the Moroccan capital. It involved the 27 EU member state in addition to Norway, 
Iceland and Switzerland and 27 African states, with Algeria notably absent. The conference resulted in an action 
plan to facilitate legal migration, fight irregular migration and promote migration and development (Collyer, 
2009: 282). 
86 See United States Department of Agriculture Morocco Agricultural Economy and Policy Paper (March 2009) 
at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/country/Morocco/Morocco.asp (accessed 18 June 2012). 
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share that is directly threatened by cheap competing agricultural products coming from 
Morocco. Since the 1980s, they maintained a remarkable resistance against more significant 
concessions for Moroccan fisheries and agricultural products, evoking excuses such as the 
Sahara issue, labour cost differentials or EU safety, environmental and working conditions 
standards.87   
 
A quick look at the bigger picture reveals the extent to which Moroccan-EU relations are 
extremely asymmetrical. While Morocco provides some 0.5% of EU imports and receives 
some 1% of its exports, the Union represents some 60% to 70% of both its imports and 
exports (Martínez Capdevila, 2012: 181). What is more, according to the EU Trade 
Directorate General, over the 2007 to 2011 period, the overall trade balance was largely 
favourable to the European Union, with exports averaging €13.6 billion per year relative to 
imports of €7.9 billion, resulting in a whopping yearly average trade deficit of €5.72 billion.88 
Among the few products where Morocco had a competitive advantage over the EU and its 
major Mediterranean countries (Spain, France and Italy) over the 2008 – 2010 period were 
certain fruits and vegetables such as tomatoes with an average trade surplus of about €479 
million, pulses (€275 million), citrus (€270 million), melons, watermelons and papayas (€103 
million), and other vegetables (€256 million) (Pappalardo, 2012: 40-1). Yet, few concessions 
have been made with regard to such products in over four decades of EU-Moroccan bilateral 
relations. It took Morocco and the EU three years to achieve their first agricultural agreement 
under the 2000 Association Agreement, which reveals the complexity of the negotiations and 
the difficulties in achieving an agreement. Finally, in September 2003 a four year agreement 
was adopted but no major concessions were made with regard to agricultural products where 
Morocco was more competitive.  
 
Negotiations for a new agricultural deal stalled for almost four years. Finally, a new 
agreement was reached in 2010 and approved by the European Parliament in February 2012, 
overcoming pressures from agricultural lobbies and hostile campaigning from Spanish, 
Italian and French delegates.89 The deal would allow the EU immediate duty-free access for 
                                                          
87 See Capreform.eu article: “EU-Moroccan Agricultural Trade Deal Running into Trouble in European 
Parliament”, (25 July 2011). 
88 See DG Trade document “Morocco: EU bilateral trade and trade with the world” (23 May 2013). 
89 Interview with European Commission Official, (18 February 2013). 
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45% of its agriculture and food exports, rising to 70% over ten years, in return for immediate 
duty-free access for 55% of Moroccan agriculture and food exports to the EU. However, 
excluded from the agreement were the very products where Morocco has the highest 
comparative advantage, such as tomatoes, that remained subject to strict quotas, calendar 
restrictions and entry price systems.90 “Put simply: EU exporters get wide access to 
Moroccan markets while Morocco is still not allowed to freely sell its cheap agricultural 
products in the EU because European politicians need to protect Spanish tomatoes and 
French courgettes” (Kausch, 2010: 4). Indeed, the result of the new agreement was nowhere 
close to what the Moroccans had wished for in terms of an “advanced agricultural status” that 
would result in the country’s inclusion in the Common Market Organization of Fruits and 
Vegetables.91 Instead, all that the agreement achieved was a puny 22% increase over four 
years (compared to the previous agreement), with the lingering of the same market access 
restrictions (Martínez Capdevila, 2012: 188-190). Finally, even Morocco’s “advanced status” 
with the EU does not refer to the dismantling of agricultural trade restrictions. Instead, it 
offers support for Morocco’s ‘Green Plan’ and assistance in modernization of its agricultural 
sector. “Such an explicit focus on non-tariff issues relating to agricultural trade rather than 
focusing on dismantling tariffs on the EU side can of course be seen as poorly disguised 
protectionism” (Bremberg, 2012: 126). 
Development aid and other cooperation issues 
In spite of its limited nature, development aid granted to Morocco remains important, not 
only in quantitative but in qualitative terms as well. Rabat is the main Mediterranean 
beneficiary of EU development aid with €1.6 billion between 1995 and 2006 within the 
framework of Meda I and Meda II programs and €1.34 billion between 2007 and 2013 under 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (Martínez Capdevila, 2012: 
182) (See Table 4.1). Morocco has also benefited from €887 million in loans delivered by the 
European Investment Bank (Miller and Bower, 2010: 504). This generosity might be 
explained, as Tovias argued, by the fact that the EU was willing to concede more “aid not 
                                                          
90 Increases in quotas of “sensitive” agricultural products were not significant: Tomatoes go from 233,000 to 
285,000 tons, courgettes from 25,000 to 50,000 and clementines from 130,000 to 175,000 in. Also, tariffs for 
olive oil were removed. To illustrate the limited impact of these concessions on the economy of a country such 
as Spain, consider that Morocco produces 130,000 tons of olive oil but barely exports 25,000 tons, while Spain 
is the world’s biggest olive oil exporter and producer (its yearly production is estimated at 1.4 million tons). See 
El País articles, “El sector agrícola rechaza de plano el acuerdo de la UE con Marruecos” 18 February 2012 and 
“El aceite andaluz, en la encrucijada” 19 February 2012. 
91 Interview with European Commission Official, (18 February 2013). 
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trade” in a bid to “shake up” Mediterranean non-member countries such as Morocco in order 
to restructure their economies and adjust to industrial free trade imperatives (Tovias, 2006: 
193-194). 
 
Table 4.1 Financial assistance EU-Morocco (1995-2013) 
 Total amount 
(million euro) 
Amount per year 
(million euro) 
Amount per 
inhabitant (euro) 
MEDA I (1995-1999) 660 132 4,7 
MEDA II (2000-2006) 982 140,3 4,8 
ENPI (2007-2010) 654 163,5 5,45 
ENPI (2011-2013) 580 193,3 6,2 
Sources: (Jaïdi and Martín, 2010: 70) 
 
Aid, however, has rarely proved an efficient way to boost economies, especially when it 
trickles down in limited proportions as opposed to Marshall-like initiatives. What is much 
more likely to “shake up” and transform economies is the unleashing of countries’ own 
competitive potential that ultimately helps people help themselves. With a mediocre global 
competitiveness ranking,92 Morocco still has a long way to go before its economy becomes as 
competitive as its European neighbours. However, should the EU adopt a reverse policy 
based on trade rather than aid, more salutary economic effects may follow. This would 
encourage competitiveness, entrepreneurship and local and foreign investment likely to 
trigger multiplyer economic, political and social effects. Removing the restrictions imposed 
on Moroccan agricultural and fisheries exports is one way of achieving this. Spain is among 
the key European players (if not the main) preventing such policy shifts. As Figure 4.1 
clearly indicates, Morocco’s trade balance in goods with the EU soared between 1990 and 
2012. It went from a positive trade balance in favour of the EU of about €500 million a year 
throughout the first half of the 1990s to almost €8 billion in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92 According to Global Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2012-2013), Morocco is ranked 
70th out of 144 countries, with a score of 4.1, which is considered not competitive enough (Schwab, 2013: 264-
5). 
133 
 
 
Figure 4.1 EU-Morocco trade volume in goods (in millions of Euro) (1990 - 2012) 
 
Sources: European Commission - Trade DG (Morocco). 
 
Aside from development aid, Morocco also participates in various other programmes offering 
expertise, technical assistance, mobility and cooperation (such as Twinning, regional 
cooperation, European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, and the Erasmus 
Mundus External Co-operation Window programme).93 Rabat and Brussels have also 
increased civil protection cooperation, liberalized air traffic since 2006 (Grant, 2012: 4) and 
developed close information sharing, defence, security and counter-terrorism collaboration 
(Keohane, 2008: 143). In fact, security and defence issues are pressing concerns for the EU 
(and Spain) and for which the Union seeks to deepen cooperation with Morocco. Against the 
background of regional instability, illegal immigration networks, terrorist threats, drug 
trafficking94 and organised crime, the EU has often expressed its appreciation of Morocco’s 
stabilizing influence in the region and its close collaboration. The country is considered to be 
of strategic importance for Europe regarding all these issues as well as the lingering threat of 
North African-based terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
especially in the aftermath of 9/11 (Wennerholm et al, 2010: 15-16). A major part of this 
cooperation has increasingly been taking place with Spain, especially following the March 
                                                          
93 See more details posted at the EU Commission Morocco country profile. 
94 “Intelligence reports and criminal justice statistics still indicate that Morocco constitutes the primary foreign 
source for cannabis resin (or hashish)... Moroccan and Spanish trafficking enterprises are primarily responsible 
for bringing hashish into Spain, which is the natural European entry point” (Paoli and Reuter, 2008: 21). 
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2004 Madrid bombings (Jordán and Horsburgh, 2006). EU-Moroccan cooperation extends to 
European defence as well. In 2005, Morocco agreed to contribute with military personnel and 
assets to operation EUFOR Althea to boost EU’s peace-keeping efforts in former Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 150 Moroccan troops were subsequently deployed under European command in 
the region, making it the only Arab contingent to serve in an EU-led operation (El Katiri, 
2010: 3). Security, defence and counterterrorism cooperation, however, is often criticized as 
being too prioritized at the expense of reform, democratization, development and social 
priorities (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 696). 
Spain, Morocco and the EU 
France may be the European country with the closest affinities as well as political and 
economic ties with Morocco, but Spain is catching up fast (especially economically).95 
Madrid and Paris are also the two European capitals with most influence on Rabat’s 
relationship with the EU (see Tovias, 1998; Soler and Vaquer, 2010). Indeed, as the above 
analysis has shown, Spain is closely involved in almost all the important aspects of the 
Moroccan-EU relationship: the territorial issues, fisheries, migration, agriculture, security and 
counterterrorism, etc. Depending on the nature of the issues and its vested interest, it can 
sometimes promote and defend Rabat’s interests or block and lobby against them. Indeed, as 
much as it favours its neighbour’s closer integration with the EU as it did on various 
occasions, including in 2010 with the organisation of the first EU-Morocco summit under its 
presidency (Barreñada, 2010: 7), it has been known also to campaign against increases in 
Rabat’s agricultural and fisheries exports to the EU. The most dominant issues illustrating the 
Rabat-Madrid-Brussels trilateral relations, however, are fisheries and migration. 
 
Prior to its EC accession in 1986 and until the early 1990’s, the Moroccan-Spanish 
relationship was mainly bilateral, with the occasional intervention or implication of third 
parties such as France or Algeria. During its EC accession negotiations, Madrid was mainly 
concerned with cutting beneficial deals for itself with the EC, perceiving Morocco in 
competitive terms (Gillespie, 2000: 136-8), especially with regard to agricultural exports. In 
the early 1990s, however, Madrid’s perception of the southern Mediterranean countries in 
general, and Morocco in particular, started to shift, particularly following the fall of Berlin 
                                                          
95 As previously mentioned, in 2012, Spain overtook France to become Morocco’s first commercial partner. See 
La Vanguardia editorial; “España en Marruecos” (10 October 2012). 
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Wall in 1989 and the Algerian military intervention in the early 1990s. With the EC showing 
enthusiasm to incorporate the central and eastern European countries and fearing that “the 
centre of gravity of the European Union might shift eastwards, leaving Spain once more on 
the periphery” (López García and Larramendi, 2002: 182), Spain started promoting the 
Mediterranean cause. Its reputation as a “champion of Mediterranean and Moroccan 
interests” within Europe was further reinforced by the organisation of the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995 and its subsequent endeavours to 
secure more equity in the distribution of EU funds between the ex-eastern bloc countries and 
the Mediterranean. (Barbé, 1995: 109-12). 
 
Unsurprisingly, and at least up until 2007 and the launching of Sarkozy’s Union for the 
Mediterranean project, Spain was probably the European member state most committed to 
promoting EU Mediterranean policy (Baixeras, 1996: 150), while demonstrating its political 
entrepreneurship skills by building alliances within the EU and working with like-minded 
member states to find backing for its Mediterranean vision (Bicchi, 2011: 7). Madrid’s 1989, 
1995, 2002 and 2010 EC/EU-Presidencies were all seen as opportunities to promote the 
Mediterranean as a European priority (Soler and Vaquer, 2010: 1). With regard to Morocco, 
therefore, the dominant logic for Spain since 1986 has shifted from a zero-sum to an 
increasingly win-win approach. Madrid realised it would be more beneficial for it to defend 
Morocco’s interest within the EC/EU by pushing for increased aid to Morocco rather than 
trade concessions. Not only did this imply a low-cost solution since it did not devote its own 
but EU resources (especially when the country was a net recipient under successive EU 
budgets), but that also meant that its privileged access to the EU market was not under threat 
from cheaper Moroccan products. Rabat, on the other hand, also started off within a zero-sum 
logic prior to Spain’s accession, but since 1986 it resorted to seeking compensation from the 
EU for the perceived adverse consequences of Madrid’s accession and started multiplying 
efforts to consolidate relations with the EC. Its unsuccessful 1987 membership application 
should probably be seen in this light (De Larramendi, 1997: 271– 6, Gillespie, 2000: 139).  
 
With its EC accession, Spain also saw the issues linking it to Morocco become increasingly 
“Europeanized”96 since the accession treaties bound it to such policies as the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy which directly affect its interests and 
                                                          
96 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the concept. 
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relationship with Morocco. Europeanization in itself often proved beneficial for Spain since it 
allowed it to use EU resources, avoid direct confrontation and gain a higher negotiation 
ground in such thorny issues as fisheries, agriculture or migration (De Larramendi and 
Azaola, 2010: 512, Gillespie, 2000: 134). In the process, Spain was also using its status as a 
privileged interlocutor of the Maghreb states to acquire “a voice within the international 
organizations, where it could influence among other things the trade and aid offers made by 
the EC in the course of negotiating international agreements,’’ (Gillespie, 2001: 17). A clear 
illustration of the Europeanization process is evidenced by a closer look at EU-Morocco 
fisheries agreements. Spain’s first socialist government under Felipe González succeeded in 
establishing a tight network of economic interests with Morocco which helped attenuate the 
bilateral security and diplomatic problems. This partly explains how Spanish vessels (that 
accounted for half the EU fishing capacity) represented 92% of the EU fleet operating in 
Moroccan waters at the time when it joined the EC in 1986 (Torreblanca 2001: 17). The 
transfer of responsibilities from Madrid to Brussels during the renewal of negotiations with 
Rabat on fisheries in 1995 was fairly advantageous to Spain since it brought an uncoupling of 
this thorny issue from the economic, cultural and security issues, as well as the political and 
territorial differences plaguing the two countries’ relations (Gillespie, 1995: 167– 8). Even 
though the final agreement had a number of strings attached and meant reduced access for 
Spanish boats, Madrid had managed to use EU financial resources to “rent” Moroccan waters 
for its fishing fleet, succeeded in sparing itself Moroccan confrontation and pressures, and 
used the higher supranational bargaining ground for negotiations. The results were a far better 
fisheries agreement than it would have otherwise achieved using bilateral channels (Jones, 
2000: 139; Torreblanca, 2001: 17).  
 
However, far from being a panacea, Europeanizing issues with Rabat did not always 
guarantee the expected results for Madrid as it sometimes backfired (Vaquer, 2007: 3). 
During the subsequent 2000-1 fisheries negotiations, Spain had to face a different reality to 
that of 1995. With negotiations in the hands of the EU Commission, Morocco this time 
squarely refused to renew the accords without guarantees of more substantial compensation 
and assistance in modernising its own fishing fleet and industry (Torreblanca, 2001: 17). Left 
with no political or diplomatic bilateral instruments to reach an agreement with Morocco, 
Spain was unable to tone down the rising voices of opposition from the fishing community. 
Europeanization and the bilateral vacuum, on this occasion, only exacerbated tensions 
between Rabat and Madrid. Aznar’s notorious declaration that ‘‘there would be consequences 
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for relations between Morocco and Spain’ (Amirah-Fernandez, 2008: 352) only made the 
situation worse.  Mutual withdrawal of ambassadors and the Laila/Perejil episode were soon 
to follow (Escribano and San Martín, 2005: 14-5).   
 
Equally, the issue of illegal migration was soon Europeanized as well. By lobbying hard and 
raising awareness within the EU, Spain along with other southern European countries such as 
Italy managed to persuade the member states that the phenomenon and its implications do not 
only affect the south but the EU community as a whole, and that border control should be a 
Europe-wide concern (Zapata-Barrero and De Witte, 2007: 89). In this endeavour, Spain and 
its allies succeeded. Soon afterwards, European, rather than Spanish, Agreements of Return 
started to be issued; additional EU resources for border control through the European agency 
Frontex were made available; and European labour offices started operating in countries of 
origin to regulate legal labour immigration (Zapata-Barrero and De Witte, 2007: 89). Unlike 
other issues such as fisheries where EU members may have competitive interests, the fight 
against illegal migration is a subject of considerable consensus among EU member states.  
 
Yet, Moroccan cooperation and close Spanish-Moroccan collaboration are essential for 
efforts to succeed. Aznar’s attempts in the late 1990s and early 2000s to use EU pressure 
against Rabat to curb northbound migratory flows came to naught (Belguendouz, 2003), and 
his attempts to link EU aid and cooperation with third country collaboration to combat illegal 
immigration and facilitate re-admission also flopped, partly thanks to French opposition 
(Vaquer, 2004b: 242-244). But a few years afterwards, a combination of internal pressures, 
reconciliation with Madrid, the desire to Europeanize its own border policing and the promise 
of more Spanish and EU funds finally convinced King Mohammad VI to collaborate in the 
fight against illegal migration (Wunderlich, 2010: 263). Just as the Spanish government 
incorporated migration control and security cooperation conditions to its development aid 
with North African countries (Kausch and Youngs, 2009: 696), the 2002 EU Council 
Conclusions stipulated that “any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement 
which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should 
include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in 
the event of illegal immigration’ (Council of the European Union, 2002: 10). Morocco had 
since continued close collaboration with Spain and the EU on border control, especially under 
the administration of Zapatero, but it continues to oppose the readmission of non-Moroccan 
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citizens. Once again, “EU cooperation with Morocco was strongly influenced by Spanish–
Moroccan relations” (Wunderlich, 2010: 263).  
 
Conclusions 
EU-Moroccan relations have often been hailed as laudable in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and the European Neighbourhood Policy contexts; it is a relationship that has 
been improving for the last four decades, with Morocco and the EU both showing 
considerable enthusiasm for a deeper partnership that culminated in the latest “advanced 
status”. The relationship involves a host of issues ranging from economy to migration, 
territorial issues, democracy promotion, cooperation and aid programs, etc. Since its official 
inception in 1969, the bilateral ties kept consolidating. However, the socio-economic rift 
between Morocco and the EU remains huge and despite a substantial and swelling positive 
trade balance, the EU (partly influenced by Mediterranean European countries such as Spain) 
still acts in defence of rather narrow economic interests while offering little in the way of 
economic concessions, labour movement and even financial assistance. This has not only 
been the case with agriculture and fisheries agreements which continue to reflect the interests 
of European countries (and mainly Spanish interests) more than those of the Alawi Kingdom, 
but is also reflected in the insufficient aid packages that still remain below growth-
stimulating levels, especially when contrasted with the soaring trade deficit for Morocco that 
almost reached €8 billion in 2012. What is likely to alleviate the deficit is not more aid but 
more market access, something that southern members like Spain lobby hard against 
 
Furthermore, judging by the budgetary breakdown of its financial protocols as well as its 
lukewarm positions, the EU also appears to give secondary importance to democracy and 
human rights issues in Morocco compared to its other economic, political and security 
priorities. The regime structures in place are, therefore, bolstered at the expense of the 
modernizing and democratizing forces in the country. On the political and economic fronts, 
the means the EU provides are too limited to constitute strong incentives for change or any 
significant breakthroughs. And with the absence of a potential EU membership “carrot”, 
prospects for deeper reforms remain slim (Dillman, 2003: 193). Moreover, even if the 
political will materializes, Europe in its present crisis would be unable to offer much in terms 
of the three “Ms” (access to EU Markets, increased aid Money and free Movement of 
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people).97 In the meantime, Morocco remains content with such prized symbolic trophies as 
the “advanced status” that transmit an EU legitimization and maintain the country’s status as 
‘role model’ for other Arab Mediterranean countries (Martín, 2009 : 242).  
 
What is more, while the incessant reshaping and reformulation of EU initiatives towards 
Mediterranean third states such as Morocco over the last 15 years (the 1995 Euromed 
Barcelona Process, the 2004 ENP, the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean and the latest 
Advanced Status) can be considered as a means for the EU “to fulfil its external aims and 
promote its values”. However, it can also be seen as “a disjointed, even chaotic EU approach 
to the region” (Cardwell, 2011: 237, 220), or criticized as “introducing a growing level of 
complexity and confusion... [and] eroding the credibility of the EU’s strategy in the region” 
(Martín, 2009: 245). From the perspective of southern MPCs like Morocco, this glut of 
initiatives does not contribute to establishing a coherent, durable and effective strategy likely 
to bring MPCs closer to the European norms and governance style.98 The most promising 
framework that Morocco signed up to is the so-called “advanced status”, but it remains a 
largely empty shell and is also likely to crack under the weight of the thorny issues of the 
Sahara, human rights, immigration control and the gap between the lofty objectives and the 
means deployed to achieve them. To complicate things further, the timing of this new status 
could not have been worse for Morocco and other MPCs as it is happening during a 
prolonged period of EU economic and financial crisis, high unemployment, EU countries 
bailouts, record high sovereign debts and mounting fears about the Euro and the Union itself.  
 
Equally, our analysis has not only demonstrated the pivotal role of Madrid in almost all the 
policy areas involved in the Moroccan-EU relations, but it has also illustrated the central role 
of member states like Spain in hindering or facilitating EU cooperation and ultimately policy 
convergence with third countries such as Morocco (Wunderlich, 2010: 262). Finally, the 
analysis also reveals that beyond the fancy labels and grandiloquent discourse emanating 
from Madrid or Brussels, concessions are inconsequential and often come with strings 
attached. The keenness to preserve vested interests is therefore cloaked behind a veil of 
discursive courtesy and symbolic gestures but, in actuality, relations are getting increasingly 
securitized, gains maximized and the move towards democratization and reforms minimized.  
                                                          
97 Interview with an EU Commission official (18 February 2013) 
98 Interview with a consultant at Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12 August 2012). 
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In theoretical terms, the question relative to the EU’s “normative power” remains open 
(Manners 2002: 241; Lavenex 2004: 695; Bicchi 2006: 286-7; Adler and Crawford, 2006: 7-
10). For can we claim that European engagement towards Mediterranean third countries such 
as Morocco has brought about a “reorientation or reshaping of politics (and governance)…in 
ways that reflect policies, practices or preferences advanced through the EU system of 
governance”? (Bache and Jordan, 2006: 30). In other words, has Morocco’s exposure to 
European governance practices contributed to significant political, social and economic 
changes in the country? There is no doubt that EU engagement with Morocco does bring with 
it a refreshing breeze of universal values and healthy norms and procedures of governance, 
but even after more than four decades of deliberate orientation and exposure to the EU model, 
it would be hard to talk about any significant changes in the country’s policies, governance or 
level of economic development. EU’s “softly-softly” approach with Morocco has only 
brought meagre results with regard to good governance, democratization and human rights 
and the country still operates according to its old norm, perpetuating old practices and 
adhering to its distinctive code of values.  
 
Also, Europeanization with its exporting (or uploading) and importing (or downloading) 
aspects appears to carry sufficient conceptual firepower to account for the role of the 
supranational entity in the bilateral relationship from a “northern” perspective. Indeed, the 
theoretical framework seems to adequately explain the process whereby a number of key 
Spanish policy areas such as fisheries, agriculture, migration or trade have been partly or 
fully Europeanized. Negotiation, policy frameworks and resource provision have partially or 
completely shifted from Madrid to Brussels with positive and negative consequences for 
Spain and Morocco. The fact that fisheries agreements, for example, started to be a Brussels-
Rabat affair removed Madrid’s control over the final outcome and invited the views of other 
EU member states, but it removed pressure and confrontation prospects with Rabat as well. 
The change also offered Spain a more persuasive negotiation (EU) platform and 
compensations when agreements break up. For Morocco, this change may have implied less 
negotiation leverage but it also brought with it a wider range of negotiation prospects that 
were previously unavailable with Madrid. “Neighbourhood Europeanization” also accounts 
for the whiff of values and normative contagion reflected in the conditional EU assistance 
and the lip-service paid to issues of good governance, democratization and human rights. 
However, Europeanization only accounts for one side of the relationship since Morocco’s 
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relations with Spain (or the EU for that matter) are not Europeanized. Rabat’s external 
relations, as we have seen, remain mainly intergovernmental and are driven by priorities of 
defence of territorial integrity, regime preservation, ever-closer partnership with Europe and 
maximization of ensuing gain. Its main strategy in achieving these goals resides in 
diversification of options, triangulations and omnibalancing, as well as negative sanctions 
and lack of cooperation. Europeanization, therefore, covers only one side of the relationship, 
which begs the question whether Omnibalancing theory might be able to account for Rabat’s 
behaviour. However, considering that no clear evidence to that effect could be highlighted – 
as Rabat does not appear to resort to triangulation strategies between the EU and Spain, the 
way it does between Spain and other countries – it seems that the Realist theory would not 
apply to this case. 
 
However, the supranational entity, within the logic of Europeanization, does play an 
important role for both countries. In fact, since the mid-1990s it has increasingly been serving 
as a platform where a number of critical Spanish-Moroccan issues are debated and resolved. 
The role that the EU plays can simply be seen as an illustration of the contributions made by 
non-state actors in this intergovernmental relationship. This way, Brussels’ role can be said to 
form part of a wider web of actors and contact channels in Moroccan-Spanish relations, 
which would edge us closer to Complex Interdependence theory. One of its main premises, 
aside from the absence of hierarchy among issues and non-resort to force in international 
relations, is the proliferation of actors (including non-state actors) and channels through 
which countries interact. In this framework, the EU can be seen as a conduit facilitating an 
increasingly diverse network of interdependencies. This would probably be a simplification 
or “essentialization” of the role of the EU since it is a full-fledged actor, but it would suit the 
conceptualization of the EU impact on Spanish-Moroccan bilateral relations. This would 
also allow the adoption of a simpler and parsimonious conceptual mantle to this triple 
relationship. 
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Chapter five - Moroccan-Catalan relations and the place of Spain 
Introduction 
 
“For a national movement to triumph it needs two indispensable conditions: it 
needs a considerable internal momentum and it needs, as well, external 
prestige and sympathy; without the internal strength and the external prestige, 
its life, the life of a national movement is impossible".  
Antoni Rovira i Virgili99 
 
 
Having examined Moroccan-Spanish relations and covered the most salient aspects in the 
relationship, and highlighted Moroccan-EU relations with a special focus on the issues where 
Madrid is most relevant, this Chapter seeks to cover Moroccan-Catalan relations and bring 
out aspects of the relationship that impact Madrid-Rabat relations. But analysing the 
relationship between a sovereign state and a region within another sovereign state is not the 
most usual undertaking. It is bound to be an unbalanced and conceptually challenging 
exercise as it would normally involve the comparison of two dissimilar entities with 
structurally different mechanisms, drives and objectives, and the scrutiny of areas where 
power is not equally distributed between the actors. But in this particular case, the task starts 
to make more sense once key characteristics of Catalonia’s devolution, identity, nationalism 
and its perceived (as well as actual) role within and outside Spain are clarified. The areas that 
will come under special scrutiny in this chapter (immigration, economic and cooperation 
issues) come within the remit of both the state and the sub-state entities, and although the 
Spanish constitution considers international relations a state prerogative, subsequent 
constitutional evolutions in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s that were the result of political 
negotiation and legislation allowed for additional prerogatives to be given to autonomous 
communities in such areas as immigration management, cooperation policies and trade 
promotion networks (Barbé and Soler i Lecha, 2009: 432-3). As will be discussed in more 
details, the boundaries of such prerogatives, however, are not totally clear and constitute a 
subject of constant interpretation, negotiation, bargaining and even struggle between 
Barcelona and Madrid. Prospects such as the establishment of enhanced autonomy statutes by 
                                                          
99 This is a famous quote that Antoni Rovira i Virgili, a renowned Catalan politician and a respected historical 
figure, pronounced in 1915. See article: “Una proposta geopolítica i geoestratègica per a les relacions 
internacionals de la Catalunya del segle XXI”, March 2010, Fundació CATmón. 
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the Spanish autonomous communities, like the Catalan Estatut of 2006, have been further 
opportunities for historical regions such as Catalonia to increase devolved powers and assert 
their international projection. And the quest for increased autonomy and the growing sense of 
national identity in Catalonia constitute further crucial clues likely to help us shed light and 
better comprehend the nature, advancement and future of Catalan-Spanish as well as Catalan-
Moroccan relations. 
 
Talking about Spanish-Catalan relations may be understandable to some extent considering 
the nature of the Spanish devolved state system that includes regions such as Catalonia and 
the Basque Country that boast advanced regional governments, strong nationalist identities 
and distinctive historical legacies. Analysing Moroccan-Catalan relations, however, may not 
sound so obvious, especially with regard to the nature of the two polities, Morocco’s interests 
and orientations and the seemingly scarce issues of common interest that may necessitate the 
establishment of a fully-fledged “relationship”. But the undertaking starts to make sense 
when objective reasons reflecting the pertinence of this relationship are considered: Both the 
old and the recent histories bear witness to the importance of the relationship between 
Morocco and Catalonia, with significant chapters in their past and present attesting to 
enduring impacts and long-held memories and impressions that go beyond the simple 
awareness of the existence of the other. Catalonia also happens to be a significant player both 
in Spanish political life, in the EU and in the Mediterranean. Its relations with Morocco 
constitute a priority compared to other Mediterranean countries. Besides, more than a third of 
Moroccan immigrants living in Spain reside in Catalonia, a region that barely constitutes 16% 
of the Spanish population.  Moreover, more than a third of Spanish businesses operating in 
Morocco are Catalan (Aubarell, 2004b: 66), and the region’s investments in Morocco 
represent almost a quarter of Spain’s investments in Morocco. A growing network of civil 
society actors is equally contributing to the development of this bilateral relationship. Finally, 
Catalan Premiers and diplomats have traditionally played important political and economic 
roles in the Mediterranean region, have undertaken mediation roles between Spain and 
Morocco and have been received with honours in the Alawi Kingdom. Of all the other 
Spanish autonomous communities, only Andalucía (remotely followed by the Canary Islands 
and the Madrid region) might claim a status second to Catalonia. 
 
This chapter will shed light on all these issues to try to gauge and evaluate this bilateral 
relationship and examine the extent to which it corresponds to and impacts Spain’s relations 
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with Morocco. But before touching upon that, the chapter will first take a look at some of the 
most significant distant and recent historical chapters that left their impact on the collective 
memories and discourses on both sides, and whose effects can still be detected to this day. 
This historical depiction will also underline the various recent initiatives that have brought 
the two sides closer since the 1980s. The chapter will also devote a section to the explanation 
of Catalan nationalism that is a key factor in making sense of the region’s enthusiasm for 
establishing international relations as well as its approach, strategy and objectives in such 
endeavours. Moroccan migration to the autonomous region will equally be gauged and 
discussed, with a special focus on the issues where Catalonia has obvious competences such 
as immigrant outreach and integration. In this section, a discussion of Catalonia’s influence 
on Spain’s migration policies and its bargaining for further competences will also be 
discussed. The situation of the Moroccan contingent in Catalonia, its major characterising 
traits, employment conditions, social issues, integration and education levels will also be 
looked at. The chapter will equally highlight the increasing importance of business and trade 
relations between Catalonia and Morocco, as well as the growing economic opportunities and 
the top-down institutional roles especially undertaken from the Catalan side. The part played 
by the Catalan regional government La Generalitat, its agencies and the business 
associations, the degree to which they complement or oppose Spain’s efforts, as well as the 
Moroccan evaluation and response to these initiatives will also be elucidated. Finally, the 
chapter will look at some aspects of institutional cooperation and civil society initiative and 
try to come up with some conclusions. 
 
 The historical perspective: 
The first significant encounter between the Catalans and Arab and Berber forces coming from 
Morocco took place shortly after Tariq Ibn Ziyad first crossed the strait of Gibraltar in 711. 
By 718, Visigoth Catalonia would fall into the hands of the Muslim newcomers who only 
managed to control the region for less than a century, while holding a firmer grip on most 
parts of Spain, including some Catalan areas like the Ebro region that would not be forfeited 
until the beginning of the 12th Century. However, miscegenation and the social and cultural 
blending would go on for several centuries as the Muslim influence, the social evolution and 
the cultural transformation of the region “continued until the eventual expulsion of the 
Moriscos in the seventeenth century” (Catlos, 2004: 390). Another key event in the history of 
Catalonia that seems to have contributed to the emergence of the first traits of a Catalan 
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national identity100 is intimately related to another Moorish invasion. Indeed, a strong 
historical current in Catalonia sees in the July 985 breaching of the walls of Barcelona and 
subsequent sacking of the city by Al Mansur’s armies coming all the way from Cordoba “a 
formative step in the creation of a Catalan national identity” due to the significant impact it 
had on the collective Catalan imaginary (Kosto, 2004: 1).  The repeated unheeded appeals of 
Borrell II of Barcelona to the Frankish court for help with this new Arab invasion in return 
for renewed allegiance finally made the Catalans decide to go their own way by 988, planting 
the first seeds of Catalan nationalism (Zimmermann, 1983: 5-40; Freedman, 1989: 117-129, 
cited in Kosto 2004: 1-2). Interestingly enough, such events do not seem to have given rise to 
an underlying negativity towards the Moors the way they did in Spain. Finally, it is also 
significant that the coming together of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile through the 
marriage of  the “Catholic Kings” Ferdinand II and Queen Isabella I of Castile in 1469 was 
motivated by the objective to conquer the last Muslim kingdom of Granada, which was 
achieved in 1492. The union eventually had negative consequences for the crown of Aragon 
(and therefore Catalonia)101 that was significantly overshadowed by Castile to the point that 
tensions resulted in the Catalan revolts of 1640 to 1652 against the crown of Philip IV 
(Guibernau, 2012: 157).102  
 
While these may seem remote historical events with little impact on Catalan perceptions, the 
fact that the Catalan government decided to celebrate with fanfare the millennium 
commemoration of its national identity back in 1988 (García de Cortázar, 1988) shows the 
strong symbolism and impact that such historical events may have and how the Catalan 
nationalists can utilize them. Such events may not necessarily be collective historical 
                                                          
100 It is important to clarify at this stage that Catalonia as a name, a political entity or with its current borders did 
not exist at the time. It was rather a loosely united set of small kingdoms established around the County of 
Barcelona that constituted a buffer zone between the Muslim and the Frankish kingdoms. These small kingdoms 
mostly shared some common cultural and geographic traits and extend north to parts to today’s France, while 
parts of today’s Catalonia were still under Muslim rule. 
101 The union between the County of Barcelona and Aragon (under the Crown of Aragon) took place in 1089 
and can be described as a “political” arrangement, with the blessing of Pope Urban II, aiming at conquering the 
Islamic emirate of Zaragoza, an objective that was achieved in 1118. It is also worth mentioning that during 
their union (1089 – 1716), Catalonia and Aragon each kept their own laws, language and assemblies. For more 
on the subject, see (Davies, 2011: 151-228). 
102 The revolts reached their peak with the so-called Guerra dels Segadors (Revolt of the Reapers) of June 7th 
1640 that is considered by some Catalan historians as one of the first European nationalist revolutions 
(Guibernau, 2012: 157). It is also worth mentioning that the Catalan national anthem is called Els Segadors (the 
reapers), in reference to these revolts. 
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memories surviving throughout the centuries, but they seem to be rediscovered or reinvented 
by Catalan nationalist intellectuals and political parties as new or renewed historical 
landmarks. Also, with regard to Morocco, these distant historical events are not likely to 
endear Morocco to the Catalans as these have largely been adverse historical chapters. It 
might be worth noting, however, that Catalan nationalism is generally asserted in opposition 
to Castile, and Spain in general (not Morocco), and that these historical events have not 
spawned such popular fiestas as Moros y Cristianos103 famous in other regions of Spain that 
dramatize and perpetuate the image of the “Moro” as the “other”. 
In the more recent history, the Moroccan question also had an impact on Catalonia and its 
population, directly or indirectly. One outstanding example of this is the important role that 
the Spanish humiliating defeat in the Annual battle in 1921104 played in Miguel Primo de 
Rivera’s accession to power and the establishment of the 1923-1929 dictatorship. The 
consequences of this event (along with the ensuing widespread protests in Barcelona against 
conscription) were calamitous for the Catalans as it would deeply curtail their autonomy and 
usher in a dark era in their history (Chumillas i Coromina 2007: 18-22). The other more 
recent traumatic episode between the two was during the 1936-1939 Spanish Civil War 
following the notorious contribution of the Regulares (the Moorish Guard), the 85 000 
Moroccans who fought for General Franco against Republican regions such as Catalonia. 
These were greatly feared during the war because of their military prowess and were widely 
regarded as bloodthirsty and ruthless. The notorious roles they played during the war and the 
fall of Catalonia (1938-9), such as during the Ebro battle or the capitulation of Barcelona, 
also marked the Catalan collective mind (Esenwein: 154). These more recent encounters 
between Catalans and Moroccans are more vivid and partly contribute to the negative 
portrayal of the latter’s. The stereotypes evolved and worsened even further following the 
massive immigration of Moroccans to the region as will be discussed later. 
More recently, however, and soon after the ratification of the new Spanish constitution in 
1978 and the creation of the system of regional autonomies that include Catalonia, most of 
the initiatives to strengthen the Moroccan-Catalan bilateral relationship seemed to come 
                                                          
103 The festivals are famous in the south of Spain and in Valencia. They are representations of the Christian 
“reconquest” of Spanish cities that were under Moorish rule. 
104 The battle of Annual occurred during Spain’s colonial period in northern Morocco (1912 – 1956). It saw 
13000 Spanish soldiers defeated by some 3000 Moroccan resistance fighters. The defeat left a traumatic impact 
and led to a major political crisis in Spain and a redefinition of its colonial rule in Morocco. 
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mostly from Catalonia. In many ways, the paradox reflects Catalan pragmatism, quest for 
economic opportunities and a sense of anticipation of looming problems. The first initiatives 
and strategic orientations were outlined by former Catalan President of the Generalitat Jordi 
Pujol (1980-2003) who was among the first to promote a Spanish policy towards the 
Mediterranean in general, and towards Morocco in particular. Since the late 1980s, Pujol’s 
Catalonia started having ambitions to see itself “emerging as a cohesive space in Europe and 
the Mediterranean" and considering the Maghreb region among the vehicles for its 
internationalization policy, with Morocco establishing itself as the focus of Catalonia’s 
Mediterranean relations (Aubarell 2004a: 78). As early as 1987, for example, Barcelona 
hosted a meeting sponsored by the Aspen Institute of Italy, the Catalan autonomous 
government and the Barcelona City Council on Mediterranean development. From this 
meeting emerged the “Barcelona Declaration” that called for continued support from Europe 
to the countries of the southern rim of the Mediterranean with a view to avoiding grave 
disparities in the Mediterranean and in Europe at large.105 Such early initiatives denote the 
pioneering role of Catalonia in the subsequent Euro-Mediterranean Process (or the Barcelona 
Process) and the idea of a shared area of prosperity in the western Mediterranean. In the same 
vein, Jordi Pujol and his government had constantly made the southern Mediterranean, and 
the Maghreb in particular, one of their priorities, working towards putting the issue both on 
the European and the Spanish agenda. In a speech in Tunis in 1991, Pujol reiterated Europe’s 
and Spain’s need to get involved in the region and in the development of the Maghreb in 
these terms: 
 
The northern Mediterranean countries will have to get prepared to 
face the cultural, social, economic and human problems that 
migration is likely to cause. Most importantly, we have to undertake a 
huge effort to promote development aid for the Maghreb countries… 
For the sake of solidarity as well as self-interest, Europe will have to 
contribute strongly to the development of the Maghreb… I think that 
Spain is now in a good position to launch the initiative. It has been a 
while since Catalonia suggested to the Spanish government the 
usefulness to take the lead in such an initiative. We still insist on this, 
knowing, as I said previously, that now is a good moment to do 
this.106   
 
                                                          
105 Speech by ex-president Jordi Pujol in Stockholm on November 5th 1987 titled “The political and economic 
importance of the north-western Mediterranean” (Paraules del President, 1987: 15). 
106 Speech by ex-president Jordi Pujol in Tunis on November 5th 1991 titled “La Mediterrania, les migracions i 
el desenvolupament economic” (Paraules del President, 1991: 380-381). 
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Pujol made three official visits to Morocco (in 1994, 2000 and 2001). His initiatives have 
continued almost unchanged by the subsequent governments of Pasqual Maragall (2003-
2006), José Montilla (2006-2010) and Artur Mas (2010 - present). Within the Maghreb, 
Morocco was (and continues to be) Catalonia’s main priority. The 2011-2014 development 
cooperation plan of the Generalitat reveals that the country continues to figure as the top 
“priority country” for Catalonia’s foreign relations and cooperation, followed by Palestine, 
Western Sahara, and other African and Latin American countries (Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2011). But far from being purely altruistic or driven by sheer solidarity, this prioritization has 
largely been motivated by “self-interest”, as Pujol put it in the quote. We argue here that this 
self-interest has evolved over time and has been tightly linked to five main priorities: 
economic opportunism, security concerns, immigration control, international projection, and 
an ambition to influence Spanish politics and reap dividend. Indeed, solving the “problem” of 
the massive Moroccan immigration that was already looming in the 1980s and started to 
become a reality in the 1990s and 2000s is one of Catalonia’s main priorities that will be 
further discussed.  Getting the most out of the economic opportunities that the southern 
neighbours represent (including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) is yet another objective 
driving Catalonia’s prioritization of the Maghreb. Another priority towards the Maghreb is to 
pre-empt any problems likely to threaten the stability of the region for fear of security spill-
overs. Finally, Catalonia’s eagerness to be involved abroad and influence Spain’s 
international relations through negotiation and compromise also translates its quest for 
internal influence and “international prestige and sympathy” that the opening quote by Rovira 
i Virgili refers to. Catalonia played a role in Spain as well by promoting and adopting a 
policy of engagement towards the Maghreb.107 In so doing, Catalonia’s preferred method was 
based on political influence from within the Spanish political framework (especially after 
1993 and 1996 hung parliaments that forced the Socialist and Popular parties to pact with the 
Catalan CiU), offering support to the central governments in exchange for increased 
autonomy and political participation. In 1998, for example, when the number of immigrants 
in Spain was barely 700 000, CiU submitted a bill aimed at promoting immigrant integration 
and regulating future migratory flows that later culminated in the 2000 Ley de Extranjería 
(Aliens Act) (Enriquez 2011: 124). But before getting to grips with these issues, there is first 
                                                          
107 Catalans are credited with their early engagement with Morocco and the Maghreb in general. For example, it 
was Pere Duran Farrell, a Catalan businessman, who first had the idea of a gas pipeline from Algeria to Spain 
via Morocco back in 1969. The idea took form long after his death and the gas pipeline now bears his name 
(Ghilès, 3013). 
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a need to shed light on the most salient characteristics of Catalan identity and nationalistic 
drives, an exercise that is crucial for a better appreciation of these issues as well as the 
Catalan-Moroccan bilateral relationship. 
 The rise of Catalan nationalism 
It is important to realize that Catalonia, according to the nationalist discourse, is not a mere 
Spanish region but a full-fledged nation with distinct features: a typical culture and history; 
traditional institutions and local legal traditions; an ethnic consciousness and identity; and a 
distinctive socio-economic reality (Canal, 2011: 62). As alluded to earlier, nationalistic 
feelings in Catalonia, although intermittent, can be traced back over hundreds of years. More 
recently, however, calls for a federal Spain with a bottom-up construction of the state started 
emerging by the middle of the nineteenth century, promoted by such Catalan ideologues as Pi 
i Maragall. This gradually gathered momentum and gave rise to movements for cultural 
renaissance (Renaixença), including the revival of the Catalan language that had been 
neglected for more than two centuries prior to that. The movements “constituted the basis for 
political nationalism” (Muro and Quiroga, 2004: 23) and eventually culminated in a decade 
of relative self-rule under the administrative government of the Mancomunitat 108 (1913 - 
1923) (Canal, 2011: 62), before being crushed by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera. 
Led by Francesc Macia, Catalanism revived under the Second Spanish Republic (1931 – 
1938) which granted the region a strong but limited autonomy before it was halted once again 
by General Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. Forty years later, Catalonia recovered its 
autonomous government (La Generalitat), endorsing by referendum a new status of 
autonomy in 1979 (León, 2003:16-17; Guibernau, 2012: 157-8). 
 
After 23 years under the moderate nationalist party coalition Convergència i Unió (CiU) 
(1980 to 2003) that was never openly advocating secessionism but sought incremental 
autonomy from within the central government, more radical political changes were initiated 
under the presidency of Pasquall Maragall after the November 2003 Catalan elections. The 
Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSC), in coalition with the Catalan Republican Left (ERC) and 
the Initiative for Catalonia-Greens (ICV), took over promising more social democratic 
policies but also bolder and more assertive policies towards Madrid. In fact, with the 2003 
                                                          
108 The Mancomunitat de Catalunya is an administrative liaison that was officially set up in 1914 in Barcelona 
to coordinate between the four main regions of Catalonia, referred to as diputaciones (Barcelona, Tarragona, 
Lleida and Girona) (Conversi, 1997: 31). 
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election, the Catalan political map was substantially redrawn especially after ERC (a political 
party that openly supports secessionism) became the third political force in the autonomy. 
The most distinctive initiative of Maragall was to call for the drafting of a more ambitious 
Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia than the one of 1979. An amended version of the Catalan 
Statute was indeed amendment in 2005 through negotiation at the level of the Spanish 
parliament, following a compromise between Spanish president Zapatero and the CiU. The 
amended version was endorsement by a popular referendum in Catalonia as well as 90% of 
the Catalan Parliament. However, following an appeal of the Popular Party and other national 
constituencies, the Spanish Constitutional Court finally watered down the newly adopted 
Statute in 2010, to the dismay of a large portion of the Catalan population and political elite 
(Guibernau, 2012:  160-3). Public consternation was made worse since the clauses that were 
particularly deemed unconstitutional were the ones relative to Catalan identity, nationalism 
and fiscal autonomy (references to Catalonia as a “nation”, reference to its “national” 
symbols, the preferential status and importance accorded to Catalan language, conditionality 
over Catalonia’s contribution to Spain’s “Solidarity Fund”, the possibility for it to raise its 
own taxes, etc., were especially amended) (Tornos Mas, 2011; Guibernau, 2012: 166-7). A 
general consensus among the Catalan political elite holds that the watering down of the 
Catalan Statute constituted a watershed moment. Many indeed say it represented a “before” 
and “after” phases in the Catalan nationalist discourse (Pujol, 2011; Canal, 2011: 68). 
 
As a matter of fact, voices calling for independence started to grow louder even before that as 
a result of a general feeling of political marginalization. The radicalization of the Catalan 
political panorama, concern over immigration and social issues, and the 2008 economic crisis 
conspired to make demands for secession all the more resounding. According to an opinion 
poll conducted by the Spanish Council of Sociological Research (CIS) in 2008, 35% of the 
Catalans were supporting independence, while some 45% opposed it and 20% were 
undecided (Belzunces, 2008), a significant shift compared to the hitherto timid support for 
independence.109  In June and July 2010, two opinion polls (by El Periodico newspaper and 
the Noxa institute respectively) showed that support for independence among the Catalans 
had grown even more, and was, then, oscillating between 47 and 48 per cent, against 35 to 36 
                                                          
109 On average, overall support for independence in Catalonia was less than 20% between 1991 and 2007 (Civit i 
Carbonell 2013: 21) 
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per cent who stood against it (Guibernau, 2012:  163-4). In June 2012, another opinion poll 
showed that 51% of the Catalans intended to vote in favour of independence.110 Aside from 
popular disgruntlement and political radicalization, the rapid surge in support for 
independence over the last few years is also explained by Spain’s and Catalonia’s stifling 
economic crisis and the ever-increasing public debt. Not only did the Catalans start to feel the 
need to negotiate a new tax deal that would allow them to retain a higher share of the levies 
raised in their territory, especially in times of crisis, but there was also a growing frustration 
regarding the ingratitude and even hostility of the rest of Spain towards the Catalans because 
of their demands in the context of a difficult situation.111 Reminiscent of the 2010 march in 
Barcelona that gathered over a million Catalan demonstrators resentful towards the watering 
down of their Statute, an estimated 1.5 million people joined a protest rally on September 11th 
2012 in Barcelona in support of some form of independence.112 Faced with the mounting 
wave of protests, the reluctance of the central government to make concessions or even 
negotiate demands for a new financial mechanism similar to the one in force in Euskadi and 
Navarra, and sensing a unique opportunity to bolster his party’s popularity, the leader of the 
reputedly moderate nationalist coalition party (CiU), Artur Mas, dissolved the parliament and 
called for new elections, promising to hold a referendum on self-determination, if re-elected. 
 
The roots of the mounting support for Catalan independence, however, go back at least a 
decade before that, especially following Prime Minister Aznar’s landslide victory in March 
2000. One of the implications of that victory entailed that the Popular Party no longer needed 
the support of other parties for a parliamentary majority, unlike during its previous mandate 
when it relied on the backing of such regional parties as CiU. As a result, the PP’s previously 
open attitude towards Catalan claims was replaced by “a neo-centralist political discourse 
charged with conservative overtones. During its [second] mandate, the PP was dismissive of 
                                                          
110 See The Economist Article “Europe’s next independent state?” (22 September 2012).  
NB. Although these comparisons do not emanate from surveys by a single organization asking precisely the 
same questions, the disparities remain nevertheless significant. 
111 Such frustrations came up in a number of interviews and may explain the recent rise in nationalistic feelings 
in Catalonia since 2008. An interviewee expressed the feeling in the following terms: “I was never a supporter 
of Catalonia’s Independence, I even used to ridicule those who talked about secession. But now that I see the 
degree of unfairness and the way people in Madrid are calling us tight-fisted, arrogant and selfish after all the 
years we spent supporting the poor regions in this country, I feel more independentist now tan ever before.” 
(Interview with Catalan university official 04 September 2012). 
112 See Time magazine article “Barcelona Warns Madrid: Pay Up, or Catalonia Leaves Spain” (11 September 
2012). 
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claims for greater autonomy for the historical nationalities and adopted an arrogant attitude 
towards former political allies” (Guibernau, 2012:  164). This has, directly or indirectly, 
contributed to the rise of the leftist republican party ERC as the third political force in 
Catalonia in the 2003 Catalan elections (the second in the 2012 elections) and the subsequent 
replacement of the twenty three-long political dominance of CiU in Catalonia (1980 – 2003) 
by the tripartite (PSC, ERC and ICV) that lasted for almost eight years (2003 – 2010).  
 
Besides Catalonia’s political marginalization by the central government (rectified to a certain 
extent during the Zapatero years), and the downgrading of its Statute by the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, the acute sense of nationalism also grew during the last decade as a 
result of other factors such as the increasing migration and the perceived significant Catalan 
financial contribution to the poorer regions of Spain in a context of increased economic 
difficulties. Indeed (as will be explained later), migration especially from Latin America, 
Morocco and Eastern Europe increased the Catalan population by almost 1 million between 
2000 and 2010. The percentage of immigrants living there increased from less than 3% of the 
total population to almost 15% (OECD Review, 2008: 8). But in spite of the considerable 
contribution of immigrants to the enhancement of the Catalan economy, immigration keeps 
being considered among the top concerns of the population besides unemployment and the 
economic and housing crises (although these two issues have gained prominence after 2008). 
Indeed, as in the rest of Spain, immigration is viewed by the nationalists as a menace to the 
social, linguistic and cultural cohesion of the community, and to job security, especially since 
the 2008 economic crisis. The limited say that the Catalan regional government has over 
issues of immigration undoubtedly increased its desire for more autonomy over such issues 
threatening its sense of identity. Finally, the perceived increasing net contribution of 
Catalonia to the Spanish coffers, and its lack of control over fiscal matters (provided for by 
the Spanish constitution to the Basque Country and Navarra) were probably the most 
important factors behind the strong resurgence of Catalan nationalism over the last decade 
and the ensuing secessionist claims, especially since 2008 with the aggravation of Spain’s 
sovereign debt, the deepening economic crisis, the stubbornly high year on year deficit and 
the rocketing unemployment rates (Kennedy, 2012: 679). Between 2007 and 2009, the 
Catalan government estimates its net fiscal contribution to the central government at over 8% 
of the region’s GDP, peaking at 17.2 billion Euros in 2008 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012a: 
55). Although such calculations are disputed by some economists, the fact remains that the 
net contribution to the central government (within the framework of the so-called “solidarity 
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clause”) started to be felt especially acutely among the Catalans at a moment of increased 
austerity, economic recession, worsening credit ratings, increased cuts in health care, 
education and other social services.  It should be noted, however, that within the wider 
Spanish context, Catalonia’s situation is far from being exceptional since several regions are 
in a similar situation, contributing more to the system than they get from it. 
 Immigration 
Between 1999 and 2009, Catalonia’s population grew by 1,259,890, jumping from 6,207,533 
to 7,467,423. While the growth among the native population (i.e. those holding Spanish 
nationality) accounted for 17.5% of the total increase, the growth among the immigrant 
population, which exceeds a million in the autonomous community, accounted for 82.5% 
(Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009a: 13-15). Among these, the Moroccan migrant contingent, 
with a population exceeding 280 000 in 2012 (up from less than 3500 in 1986, 72 748 in 
2000 and 135 976 in 2004), constitutes by far the largest cluster of immigrants (See Figure 
5.1). Romanians (the biggest immigrant community in Spain) come a distant second with a 
contingent of less than 90 000 in 2010. Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia, thus, constitute 
about 25% of the total number of immigrants in the autonomous community. They 
consistently have been the main immigrant group in Catalonia since the mid-1990s. At the 
national level, these figures do not correlate as the size of the Moroccan immigrant 
population, though important (at 754 080 in 2010), comes second to the Romanian (831 235 
immigrant),113 and constituted around 13% of Spain’s immigrant population in 2010 
(5,747,734). Therefore, more than 33% of Moroccan immigrants in Spain reside in Catalonia, 
a region that constitutes less than 16% of the total Spanish population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
113 See Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) report “Avance del Padrón municipal a 1 de enero de 2011”. 
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Figure 5.1 - Evolution of the number of Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia (1991-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on statistical data from Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya 
(Idescat). 
 
Probably the main reason behind the high concentration of Moroccan immigrants in 
Catalonia is its attractive labour market. But alone, the labour market may not sufficiently 
account for the phenomenon, for other reasons such as social and family networks, regional 
immigration policy, and even a comparatively higher openness towards North African 
immigration are not to be discarded. Indeed, despite a mounting wave of xenophobia against 
Muslims (Amnesty International, 2012: 84-89), a number of 2012 interviews offer indicative 
evidence of the extent to which Moroccans feel comparatively more “tolerated” in Catalonia 
compared to the rest of Spain. “Here at least, we are treated with some dignity. I used to live 
in Alicante, and the treatment of Moroccans there was worse. In fact, here you are more 
likely to feel racism from a non-Catalan Spaniard than from a Catalan”.114 Catalonia’s 
economic attraction and immigration network dynamics,115 however, remains the main reason 
behind this concentration. The community bears an added importance as its sheer size makes 
it, by default, the representative of the wider Arab and Muslim communities living in 
                                                          
114 Interview conducted by the author with a Moroccan social assistant working at Barcelona courts as translator 
for Moroccan immigrants (04 September 2012). 
115 A study by Jordi Moreras found that Moroccan immigration to Catalonia, as to other regions of Spain, 
follows certain trends linked to the geographic origins of immigrants. For example, there is a greater 
concentration of immigrants from certain Moroccan cities such as Nador, Larache and Tangier living in the 
region (Moreras, 2004: 310-311). 
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Catalonia (Aubarell 2004b: 68). However, in spite of the relatively more hospitable 
conditions that Catalonia offers, the Moroccan contingent remains among the least desired 
immigrant groups and remains far from being integrated both for self-induced and external 
reasons. The discrimination against Muslims and the limited integration of the Moroccan 
contingent largely due to cultural, linguistic and educational factors are probably the most 
outstanding reasons (on which more later). 
 
Immigration is an area where the autonomous government of Catalonia has limited 
prerogatives, and even though the June 18th 2006 Estatut conferred some additional powers 
on the Generalitat, the key immigration responsibilities such as visa issuance, work permits, 
regularisation of the status of illegal immigrants, etc. are still largely within the competence 
scope of the Spanish central government. Article 138 of the Estatut does, however, devolve 
further powers to Catalonia including immigrant outreach, reception, guidance, and 
integration, as well as a partial say in the issuance of work permits for foreigners whose 
employment is in Catalonia (in coordination with the central government) (Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2009a: 62-63). But these powers hardly bear any significance with regard to more 
decisive issues such as providing Catalonia with a major say in selecting or regularizing the 
situation of its immigrants. The margin available to the Catalan Government through its new 
Statute, therefore, barely allows it to develop programmes and government actions to try to 
target desired sources of immigration. Despite this limited scope of competence, the 
Generalitat invests huge efforts and resources to attract a skilled and qualified workforce and 
to insure the successful integration of its immigrants founded upon the promotion of a 
Catalanist/nationalist identity that is mainly driven by language learning, as will be further 
explained.  
 
Catalonia’s immigrant outreach endeavours have mainly concentrated on Morocco, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. In 2003, the Convergence and Union (CiU) former government 
established a Catalan delegation in Casablanca called (Xarxa d’Informació i Selecció Laboral 
en Origen or XILA -Information and Labour Selection Network in Countries of Origin) for 
the purpose of selecting potential qualified Moroccan migrants (similar offices were also set 
up in Poland and Colombia). The idea behind the establishment of the office was not to 
increase the number of Moroccan immigrants but rather to target and attract the most skilled 
among them and equip them with the necessary linguistic and cultural skills for their 
integration.  This office, therefore, served as a training and guidance centre for Moroccan 
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workers seeking to migrate to Catalonia, thus providing a different approach to immigrant 
outreach. But this initiative, along with the opening of the government office in Casablanca, 
was not without controversy with Madrid since the central government saw these offices as 
quasi-embassies, thus creating a sovereignty conflict. These offices were consequently 
declared unconstitutional and the Spanish Constitutional Court called for their closure 
(Larroque, 2012).  
 
Another immigration-related, albeit dwindling, phenomenon that the autonomous government 
has been concerned about and the subject of considerable press coverage as well as 
Moroccan-Catalan cooperation is the illegal immigration of unaccompanied minors. The 
issue had prompted a series of official contacts, including the 2001 visit to Morocco of Jordi 
Pujol (thought to have been encouraged by Aznar as it took place during difficult bilateral 
relations between Rabat and Madrid). During the visit, Pujol called upon Morocco to accept 
the repatriation of the minors and urged it to step up its migration controls.116  The problem 
was particularly sensitive as it affected a vulnerable group of unprotected and undocumented 
underage immigrants that could not be treated the same way as regular illegal immigrants. 
The Catalan government and NGOs (such as Fundació Jaume Bofill and Association Ibn 
Batuta) tried to learn from the French experience and the experience of other Spanish regions 
such as Andalucía, and multiplied their efforts and contacts with Moroccan officials and 
NGOs (such as Association Darna in Tangier) to find a solution to the problem (Quiroga, 
2002). Eventually, a programme called "Catalunya-Magrib" was elaborated in 2006 and 
funded by the Catalan government, the EU and the Moroccan government for the prevention, 
repatriation and training of Moroccan unaccompanied underage illegal immigrants.  In 2009, 
the total budget for this programme exceeded 3.5 million Euros.117 This issue remains 
important in Catalan-Moroccan relations, although the number of registered underage illegal 
immigrants decreased from its 2003 peak of 1100 to reach 580 cases in 2006 and 466 in 2007 
(Aubarell 2004a: 79). The phenomenon was also serious in other autonomous communities 
such as Andalucía, Canarias and the Basque Country (Quiroga 2009: 39).  
 
                                                          
116 See El País article “Pujol reclama a Marruecos más control policial sobre sus fronteras” (15 February 2001). 
117 For more details on this Project, see http://www.catalunyamagrib.cat/. Also see Generalitat article: “El 
Programa Catalunya-Magrib de la Generalitat gradua els primers menors marroquins que han rebut formació” 
(04 March 2009).  
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Yet another area where Catalonia has been seeking to play an increasing role is integration of 
immigrants. The issue has been particularly significant since it is intimately tied to Catalan 
identity, culture, language and nationalistic aspirations. In its ‘nation-building’ process, 
successive Catalan governments have been promoting differentiated national identity 
characteristics distinct from the ones associated with Spain; they have put in place integration 
strategies for their immigrants based on this vision. The various integration plans (1993-2000, 
2001-2004, 2005-2008, as well as the National Pact on Immigration signed in 2008) designed 
by the CiU and ERC (the two political parties that were in charge of integration issues) have 
been largely driven by nationalist/Catalanist integration policies. In essence, a successful 
integration also meant embracing the Catalan cultural and linguistic identity, a basic message 
that rallied most of the political hues in Catalonia (Larroque, 2012). A key aspect of this 
paradigm is the Catalan language, the main national integration instrument. Indeed, language 
is so closely linked to nationalism in Catalonia that many experts talk about Catalan 
“linguistic nationalism” (Boyer, 2004; Zapata-Barrero, 2008: 144). Catalonia devotes a third 
of its linguistic policy budget to Catalan “welcome classes” for the benefit of new 
immigrants. Mastery of Catalan language certainly increases immigrants’ integration chances 
and makes a difference in the labour market, but most immigrants see little added value in 
learning the language (Larroque, 2012), which may be due to the temporary nature of some 
labour migration in Catalonia and the fact that most immigrants by far prefer to invest efforts 
in learning Spanish rather than Catalan. Another reason may also be attributed to Catalans 
themselves and their tendency to use Spanish, rather than Catalan, when conversing with 
immigrants.118 For Catalonia, however, the issue bears almost existential implications as the 
survival of the Catalan culture (therefore Catalanism and nationalism) almost hinges on a 
successful promotion of the language.  
 
The issue of integration is, therefore, a crucial, complex and problematic matter mainly 
owing to cultural, social, linguistic and educational reasons. As far as the Moroccan 
population is concerned, it remains far from being assimilated into Catalan society both for 
external and autogenous reasons. For example, among the characteristics of the Moroccan 
immigrant population in Catalonia (shared with other immigrant contingents) is the 
phenomenon of “cultural ghettos”. Moroccans tend to favour living within cultural clusters 
                                                          
118 This observation was made by former Generalitat President Jordi Pujol in an interview with the author (05 
September 2012).  
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inside cities and in small towns. In many Catalan towns, Moroccans constitute an important 
percentage of the population (Ullà 25.1%, Manlleu 16.8%, Salt 15.1%, etc.) (Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2009b). Another important factor is the contingent’s limited educational 
achievements which affect their integration, professional prospects and social mobility. Out 
of almost 15 000 Moroccans aged between 16 and 20, barely 2000 pursue secondary 
education, reflecting the alarmingly small number of Moroccan immigrants that go beyond 
the stage of compulsory education (typically from 6 to 16 years of age).119  
 
The 2008 economic crisis in Spain exposed this vulnerability and the precarious working 
conditions of this group. Shortly before the crisis hit Spain, the rate of unemployment among 
Moroccans in Catalonia was below 15% in 2007 (compared to 5% among Spanish citizens 
and 12% among other immigrant groups). By 2009 their unemployment rate jumped to 44% 
(compared to 12.7% among Spaniards and 30% among other immigrants) (Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2009b). These figures reflect the Moroccans’ comparatively low educational and 
skill levels, lack of integration and the bias against the group, as the CIS and the Real 
Instituto Elcano polls indicate (see Chapter 4). Other features that set the Moroccan 
immigrant population apart are its high birth rate (11% of the population are babies aged 0 to 
4 years), its youth (the average age is 27 years compared to an average of 42 years among the 
native population) and the high percentage of men compared to that of women (156 men for 
100 women, which is also typical among other Muslim immigrant communities in Catalonia 
such as the Pakistani and Malian) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009b).  
 
The group’s lack of integration as well as its ethnic and religious difference exposes it to 
various types of stereotypes and discrimination as well. Moroccans or “Moros”120 in 
Catalonia, as in the rest of Spain, are often associated with the least favoured group of 
immigrants (see Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion). At times, they are even subjected 
to various kinds of social and cultural marginalization, segregation and even aggression. 
                                                          
119 From experience while living in Tarragona (south of Barcelona) and volunteering with Fundació Pere 
Tarrés, a non-profit organization dedicated to educational action, the author noticed first-hand the difficulties of 
convincing Moroccan children and parents to pursue further education as they were more attracted or contrived 
to seek employment opportunities to help with family finances, or because they failed to perceive the added 
value of further education. 
120 A derogatory term that generally refers to populations of Muslim origin, especially north Africans and 
Moroccans. 
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Illustrations of these abound, but some of the most iconic examples of discrimination are the 
cases of Catalan towns and neighbourhoods (such as Premià de Mar, Badalona, Santa 
Coloma de Gramanet, Poble Sec, and Salt) protesting against the building of mosques in their 
vicinity (Hernandez-Carr, 2011a: 102-3; Amnesty International, 2012:80). Also, cases of 
violent behaviour, although rare, do exist as well. Examples of these are incidents that took 
place in 1999 and 2003 in Ca n'Anglada, a neighbourhood of Terrassa (a town in the province 
of Barcelona) with a high concentration of Moroccan immigrants. The incidents involved 
various acts of racism, attacks with Molotov cocktails, and stabbing, all perpetrated by young 
skinheads.121 Particularly worrying, however, is the rise of xenophobic political movements 
such as Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) and Vía Democrática whose discourse is primarily 
anti-immigrant and anti-Moroccan. Places where these movements have thrived also happen 
to be those with a high concentration of Moroccan immigrants, such as Vic, Manlleu, El 
Vendrell, l’Hospitalet de Llobragat, Mataró and Santa Coloma de Gramanet. While lacking 
parliamentary representation, these political groups have been extending their sphere of 
influence since 2007, culminating in the autonomous and municipal elections of 2010 and 
2011, respectively. In 2010, for example, PxC achieved 75000 votes (2.42% of the total), 
compared to less than 5000 votes it had obtained back in 2003 (Hernandez-Carr, 2011b). The 
economic crisis in Spain certainly accounts for a good part of this rise in xenophobic 
movements. However, the phenomenal surge and the rapid expansion of such, hitherto, 
unknown openly racist groups in Catalonia constitute serious worries for Moroccan 
immigrants and deal a severe blow to Spanish and Catalan exceptionalism in such matters. 
 
Since 2008 Moroccan immigrants are the victims of all sorts of negative 
repercussions. They are the ones being fired the most, they are the ones 
blamed for the crisis and joblessness and are increasingly subjected to acts of 
racism. Not a week goes by without hearing of at least an incident involving 
assaults against Moroccans. What is strange is that these incidents happen in 
our own neighbourhoods and are often perpetrated by non-Catalan 
Spaniards.122 
 
                                                          
121 See El País articles “Los 'skins' vuelven a Ca n'Anglada” and “Olvidar Ca n'Anglada” (15 May 2003). 
122 Interview conducted by the author with a Moroccan social assistant working at Barcelona courts as translator 
for Moroccan immigrants (04 September 2012).  
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Such testimonials clearly denote the link between such incidents and the current economic 
crisis in Spain. The fact that such acts are perpetrated by other Spanish immigrant groups 
may denote that these originate from social groups who see the Moroccan contingent as the 
main source of competition in the labour market. The same observation was highlighted by 
an official at the Generalitat who mentioned that over 90% of the members PxC are not 
Catalan but other Spanish citizens who migrated to Catalonia in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, 
and that they mainly hail from such neighbourhoods as Santa Coloma de Gramanet.123 It 
remains unclear, however, whether such declarations are founded on empirical evidence or 
are personal impressions.  
With the frantic mobilization around independence in Catalonia that accentuated in 2012 and 
a possible referendum in the offing, immigrants have, all of a sudden, become a central piece 
in the equation. The final result of the plebiscite on independence remains uncertain, which 
explains the relentless offensive by parties of all political hues to win over the sympathy of 
the immigrants who represent more than 15% of the Catalan population124 (although it still 
remains unclear whether a referendum would be open to legal resident immigrants, i.e. non-
citizens).125 In many ways, Catalan nationalists fear a Quebec scenario where a motion to 
secede from Canada was very narrowly defeated in 1995 (50.58% to 49.42%), with the 
migrant vote proving decisive (Mumme and Duncan, 1996: 86-89). The Moroccan contingent 
is among the groups being especially targeted by such campaigns, with promises of better 
conditions and treatment by Catalanist campaigners.126 Defenders of Spanish unity, on the 
other hand, sketch a scenario of possible marginalization and loss of acquired rights for 
immigrants (nationality or residency permits) should Catalonia become independent.127 The 
Moroccan and Spanish governments are not standing neutral in this debate. Rabat fears the 
                                                          
123 Interview conducted by the author with a Moroccan social assistant working at Barcelona courts as translator 
for Moroccan immigrants (06 September 2012).  
124 See the Catalan Statistics Institute at http://www.idescat.cat/poblacioestrangera/?b=0 . 
125 See the New York Times article “Immigrants have helped set Catalonia apart in Spain” (31 October 2012). 
126 Inaugurated in 2012, the headquarters of Fundació Nous Catalans (foundation new Catalans), a Catalan 
Government-backed establishment that regroups representations of various immigrant communities living in 
Catalonia. The establishment offers a space for various immigrant groups to meet and organize activities. But, as 
its name suggests, it is used to promote the Catalan identity and culture. One of its active groups is the 
“Catalano-Moroccan” units that has been used as a platform to promote a nationalistic discourse, including in 
mosques, schools and homes. See the unit’s webpage at: 
http://www.nouscatalans.cat/component/contingut/categoria/espai-catalanomarroqui  
127 See El País article: “Atraer al inmigrante al ‘Estat propi’” (17 November 2012). 
 
161 
 
implications of a seceding Catalonia on the status of the Sahara, especially given that the 
Catalan form of autonomy had long been trumpeted as a model to follow within the 
framework of Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the Sahara. And Madrid indirectly fights all 
forms of Catalan nationalist campaigns, including those directed at immigrants,128 in a bid to 
weaken Catalonia’s independence movement. 
 The Economy 
The geographical proximity between Morocco and Catalonia, increasing business 
opportunities, mutual political will as well as the long and consolidated economic relations 
between the two partners have contributed to making Catalonia Morocco’s first economic 
partner in Spain since the  1980s.  Between 2000 and 2009, imports and exports between the 
two have consistently been around 22% of the total exchanges with the Spanish state, slightly 
higher that Catalonia’s share of Spanish GDP. In 2010 and 2011, new records were registered 
with Moroccan exports to Catalonia accounting for almost 25% and imports around 23% of 
trade exchanges with the northern neighbour. Also, Catalan investments between 2000 and 
2011 represented 23.6% of total Spanish investments in Morocco (Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2012b: 5-6), and firms hailing from the autonomous community started representing some 
40% of the Spanish firms active in Morocco.129 The Catalan government, its Chamber of 
Commerce, business associations such as PIMEC as well as government business agencies 
such as ACC1Ó (which established an office in Casablanca in 1990 providing support to 
hundreds of Catalan firms) have been reinforcing their cooperation strategies with Morocco 
since the 1980s. The business opportunities for Catalan companies are spread across various 
sectors ranging from agriculture and food industry to tourism, energy, infrastructure, 
construction, off-shoring, renewable energy, chemical industry, telecommunications and 
textiles (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2007).130 The companies active in Morocco, however, are 
mostly SMEs, despite the existence of big companies in Catalonia. The business 
opportunities not only derive from the geographical proximity and complementarities of the 
economies but also from the comparatively cheaper and reasonably skilled Moroccan 
                                                          
128 See El País article: “El agente 007 de Marruecos en Cataluña” (19 May 2013). 
129 See article in Diario Calle de Agua “La patronal catalana programa una visita a Marruecos en el próximo mes 
de mayo”, (05 February 2010). 
130 See also the Catalan Chamber of Commerce, Presentation note on Morocco (17 January 2011) available at: 
http://www.cambrabcn.org/pai08/downloadPdf?pdfId=22629 (accessed 6 March 2012). 
 
162 
 
workforce, the opportunities afforded by the Free Trade Agreements that Morocco signed 
with the United States, Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt, as well the access tariff advantage 
that Morocco has based on its 2000 Association Agreement with the EU. In 2008, Joaquim 
Llimona, formerly responsible for external relations at the Generalitat and president of the 
PIMEC international commission, said that “Morocco is the most strategic country for us. 
Our economic exchanges are in net progression… We are assisting over 100 Catalan 
businesses in Morocco, mainly in the north of the country”.131 In fact, for decades and 
especially with the economic crisis hitting Spain since 2008, Catalonia seems to have 
increasingly directed its focus towards its southern partner, relying on Morocco’s potential 
for growth, and aligning itself on Rabat’s development strategies. Most of the Catalan 
business endeavours correspond to such Moroccan strategies as “Maroc Vert” (aiming at 
developing the agricultural sector), “Plan Emergence” (aiming at reinforcing and 
modernizing the Moroccan industrial sector, particularly off-shoring, automotive industry, 
aeronautics, electronics, textile, agricultural and food industry), and “Plan Azur” (aiming at 
converting the country into one of the twenty top tourist destinations in the world by doubling 
its hosting capacity) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012b: 8). 
 
The increase in trade and economic relations is also partly due to the consolidation of 
institutional relations and mutual political will. Following Jordi Pujol’s footsteps, the two 
subsequent socialist Catalan presidents adhered to equally dynamic political and economic 
strategies towards Rabat. Pasqual Maragall made two official visits to the country (2004 and 
2006) 132 where he sought to consolidate bilateral economic and institutional relations. In 
2008 José Montilla visited the country with a delegation of over 60 Catalan businesses,133 and 
in 2012, Artur Mas, leading a delegation of some 120 businessmen, also chose Morocco as 
his first destination outside of the European Union. His trip was largely business-oriented 
with a delegation made up of entrepreneurs hailing from the construction and services 
sectors, where Morocco is planning some €10 billion investment package over the 2010 – 
                                                          
131 See l’Economiste  article : « Les PME catalanes intéressées par l’ALE Maroc-USA » (7 July 2008). 
132 See El País article: “Maragall visita Marruecos para reforzar los lazos euromediterráneos” (16 January 2006). 
133 See article on the Generalitat de Catalunya website: “Una seixantena d’empreses catalanes viatgen al Marroc 
per estrènyer llaços comercials i estudiar noves inversions” (07 April 2008). 
163 
 
2020 period.134 It is unclear whether such high-level visits actually achieve their declared 
economic objectives, but they nevertheless remain significant political gestures. 
 
Morocco, on the other hand, while showing no indication of a coherent and thorough business 
strategy towards Catalonia, remains predisposed and open to Catalan initiatives so long as 
they do not cause it any frictions with Madrid, Rabat’s main priority in this equation. “All our 
dealings with our Catalan counterparts are coordinated with the Spanish embassy [in 
Rabat]”135 said an official at the Moroccan foreign ministry when asked about the level of 
involvement of the Spanish authorities in Catalan-Moroccan relations. Rabat also values 
Barcelona’s role as an intermediary in Morocco’s bilateral relations with Madrid and is aware 
of the economic opportunities involved in maintaining good relations with Catalonia. The 
Catalan director general for development cooperation at the Generalitat told a revealing 
anecdote in an interview in 2012. During his visit to Morocco after the Laayoun events of 
November 2010 which negatively affected relations between Morocco and Spain, the Spanish 
ambassador in Morocco conveyed to him a message from former Spanish Prime Minister 
Zapatero to the newly elected president of the Generalitat Artur Mas, asking the latter to act 
as an intermediary and help in the improvement of relations between Madrid and Rabat.136 
This role is in fact a continuation of a long tradition mainly initiated by Jordi Pujol.137 But the 
rosy trade indicators and the ever increasing business and institutional relations conceal other 
less encouraging aspects, some of which bring about scepticism and even scorn.  
 
For Catalans, the positive aspects associated with Morocco, including lower production costs, 
proximity, an open market, political stability and a convenient entry point to other markets in 
the region, are often counterweighted by a host of negative factors. These include rampant 
                                                          
134 See El País article: “Artur Mas viaja a Marruecos con 120 empresarios catalanes” (28 February 2012). 
135 Interview conducted by the author with a Moroccan official at the ministry of foreign affairs (15 August 
2012). 
136 Interview conducted by the author with director general for development cooperation at the Generalitat (06 
September 2012). 
137 In an interview conducted with former president of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol (05 September 2012), he 
confirmed to the author the intermediation role during times of crises and the reinforcement role during periods 
of cooperation that his government used to play between Spain and Morocco. He mentioned as an example his 
three-day visit to Morocco in 2001 to try to intervene during the early stages of the crisis between Spain and 
Morocco. He was received by the King and thanked for his efforts through the award of the Alaui Wissam (A 
Royal medal awarded to distinguished endeavours). 
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poverty, illiteracy, cultural and linguistic barriers, red tape and corruption. Indeed, a number 
of Catalan entrepreneurs as well as representatives of the Catalan business agencies active in 
the country identify the three last points as particularly off-putting and depriving the country 
of further Catalan investment inflows. This was reflected by a number of interviewees. A 
Catalan businessman active in Morocco explained how “Catalan investors need a longer time 
and a lot of patience to adapt to the Moroccan context... They need to speak at least French 
and need to understand that business in Morocco happens at the personal level... you have to 
invest a lot in the personal relationships and learn to appreciate the culture”.138 Another 
interviewee explained how “business deals in Morocco are often sealed face-to-face around a 
dinner table... part of it is to understand the culture”.139 An official in charge of Africa and the 
Middle East at the Catalan agency ACC1Ó explained that bureaucracy and especially 
corruption are often reported among the serious problems mentioned by Catalan investors.140 
These aspects seem to restrict the economic growth potential in this relationship and might 
explain the gap between the official efforts and enthusiasm, and the reality on the ground. 
 
From the Moroccan perspective, different kinds of issues are raised but they largely echo 
complaints levied against Spanish firms in general. There is a general feeling that the country 
is perceived by its Catalan (and Spanish) counterparts as a mere outlet where merchandise 
can be sold, that Moroccan business collaborators are not perceived as equals but merely as 
potential “agents” who would help in getting Catalan products into the Moroccan market for 
a fee, that there are not enough employment-boosting projects or joint-ventures and that the 
investment levels in the country remain derisory.141 Indeed, such observations find support 
elsewhere. Various interviews with Catalan business people, agency representatives and in 
their brochures and literature make reference to expressions such as: “sell our products”, 
“access the market”, “open franchises”, “provide material and equipment”. In contrast, there 
is little of what Moroccan counterparts seem to favour, in terms of peer-to-peer relationships, 
                                                          
138 Interview conducted by the author with a Catalan investor in Morocco (28 June 2012). 
139 Interview conducted by the author with a Catalan investor in Morocco (30 June 2012). 
140 Interview conducted by the author with the consultant for internationalization and African and Middle 
Eastern Markets at ACC1Ó (05 September 2012). 
141 As indicated in Chapter three, overall Spanish FDI at 3 billion Euros between 1993 and 2008, represents less 
than 5% of the country’s total international investments. 
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developing partnerships and joint-ventures, creating employment opportunities, technology 
and know-how transfer, etc.  
 
Macroeconomic data on economic relations and the level of investments between Catalonia 
(as well as Spain) and Morocco also reflects these concerns. Between 2000 and 2011 not only 
did Morocco maintain a negative trade balance with Catalonia (€ 5.4 billion to € 6.7 billion), 
but the level of investments and job creation also remained puny. During the same period, 
Catalan investments averaged less than € 65 million per year (23.6% of the total Spanish 
investments in the country) (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2012b: 7), a fraction compared to 
investments made by some Gulf countries such as the UAE and Qatar, or the remittances of 
Moroccans living in Spain.142 As one Moroccan official in the Ministry of foreign affairs put 
it, “Spain and Catalonia are indeed becoming primary trade partners, but Morocco still 
sustains a deficit in this relationship... the level of their investment remains much less 
significant than the hype made around it”.143 Clearly, for Catalonia, the more significant 
economic opportunities do not lie in the southern Mediterranean, but Morocco still remains 
the large fish in a regional pond. However, such disparities between discourse and reality 
may reflect an over-sell of the relationship as a whole. 
 
Just as Catalonia multiplies its official visits to Morocco, Moroccan officials also organize 
formal and informal visits to Barcelona (with prior coordination with Madrid). These visits 
are usually opportunities to strengthen official ties, promote Moroccan initiatives, lobby for 
special projects such as Morocco’s autonomy proposal for the Sahara, reach out to Moroccan 
immigrants, or encourage economic ties and promote Catalan investments in the country. The 
relationship also includes cultural and religious cooperation given that the Moroccan 
immigrant contingent constitutes the biggest Muslim community in Catalonia. It is even 
believed that Morocco works towards extending its influence over the Moroccan immigrant 
community using religion through such organizations as the Federación Española de 
                                                          
142 Although remittances from Spain barely account for 11% of what the country receives from abroad (see Al-
Monitor article “Euro Crisis Sends Moroccan Workers Packing”, in 2006 Morocco received close to €520 
million in remittances from Spain (the share of Catalonia being 35 to 40% of the total). See United Nations 
document on Moroccan migration to Spain at http://www.un-
instraw.org/data/media/documents/Remittances/UNDP%20project%20local%20dev/1-
FACT%20SHEET%20MOROCCO-ENweb.pdf (accessed 16 November 2012). 
143 Interview conducted by the author with a Moroccan official at the ministry of foreign affairs (14 August 
2012). 
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Entidades Religiosas Islámicas (the Federation of Islamic Religious Entities in Spain) at the 
Spanish level and the Consell Islàmic Cultural de Catalunya (The Islamic Cultural Council 
of Catalonia) at the Catalan level.144  
 
The formal relationships, however, do not seem to yield ground-breaking or original ways of 
boosting economic relations or solving migration problems. While certainly facilitating 
relations and constituting important cooperation frameworks, official visits at times seem out 
of touch with reality or missing valuable opportunities. Arguably, both Catalonia and 
Morocco have suffered in their relations from being over-bureaucratised; thus much of the 
official effort is self-serving and not sufficiently achievement-oriented. For example, both 
Spanish and Catalan representatives seem to place a disproportional emphasis on the meeting 
with the monarch during their official visits, even if this is of substantive as well as symbolic 
significance. Some of the most creative and fruit-bearing initiatives, however, seem to 
emanate from outside the state. Cases in point were revealed through interviews that 
demonstrated, on the one hand, the degree of resourcefulness of individuals and independent 
institutions, and on the other hand the limited vision and field of action available to 
government. For example, three interviewees pointed to the untapped potential between 
Morocco and Catalonia in the context of the current financial crisis,145 a context that can (and 
is proving to be) propitious rather than deleterious to economic relations. 
 Institutional cooperation and civil society 
At the institutional and civil society levels, Catalonia and Morocco have also been active, 
signing partnership agreements, increasing cooperation, and stepping up exchanges between 
associations and other civil society actors.  In the area of cooperation and development 
projects, Morocco is clearly Catalonia’s priority (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2010: 42215). 
                                                          
144 See El Pais article: “Marruecos utiliza la religión para controlar a sus inmigrantes en España” 2 August 2011. 
145 One of the interviewees (Interview with a Moroccan-Catalan investor in Barcelona -28 June 2012-) pointed 
to the fact that many unemployed Moroccan immigrants in Spain are currently receiving meagre unemployment 
benefits (some 420 Euros a month), when there is an opportunity for both governments to consolidate these 
funds with Moroccan start-up funds in the form of investment packages (rather than hand-outs as the Spanish 
government offered in 2008). That would likely offer better opportunities to these unemployed immigrants, 
boost investment opportunities in Morocco, benefit Morocco with the immigrants’ know-how and skills 
acquired in Spain and reduce the number of unemployed immigrants in Spain. Instead, these immigrants are idly 
depleting their accumulated benefits, and governments are wasting valuable opportunities and time. Another 
interviewee (Interview with the director of a Moroccan bank with an office in Barcelona -04 September 2012-) 
referred to the May 2012 three-day visit of Moroccan head of government Abdelilah Benkirane to Catalonia as 
demonstrating a “visible unawareness and short-sightedness of the Moroccan government with regard to 
possible business opportunities with Catalonia in particular and Spain in general”. 
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The Catalan Parliament and the Moroccan House of Representatives have signed various 
cooperation agreements mainly focusing on immigration and mutual investment. The Catalan 
government has often allocated investment funds to promote bilateral business, such as the 
2008 European Fund for the Mediterranean for which 62 million Euros were earmarked.146 
The Catalan Development Cooperation Agency (ACCD), which has an office in northern 
Morocco, has also increased its aid package dedicated to Morocco from an average of 90,000 
Euros per year since 1995 to 1.1 million in 2002 and 1.25 million in 2003. These cooperation 
projects are mainly focused on Moroccan northern regions due to historical ties with them, 
given that these areas came under the Spanish protectorate between 1912 and 1956. 
Education and training, productivity improvement, good governance, promotion of renewable 
energy, water and projects aimed at female empowerment constitute the bulk of these projects 
(Aubarell 2004a: 78-79). The visibility and impact of such actions, however, remain minimal. 
They are sometimes regarded in Morocco as public relations acts serving more to buff up the 
image than to achieve impact. New venues of cooperation that are starting to yield some 
impact, however, are Catalan co-development policies that have started making it possible for 
Moroccan migrants to help their towns and villages of origin with financial and logistical 
support for development projects, and although these projects have not reached the level 
registered in other European countries such as the Netherlands, France or Belgium, the 
mobilization of Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia around such projects is starting to pick up 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2009: 1628-30). 
 
More significantly, however, Catalonia has endeavoured to be at the epicentre of the Euro-
Mediterranean process. The process itself is associated with it and bears the name of its 
capital (Barcelona). Moreover, initiatives such as the establishment of the Institute of the 
Mediterranean (IEMed), initially established in the late eighties by the Catalan government 
but which now represents a consortium (made up of the Generalitat, Barcelona City Council 
and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is an important forum for the Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue. It was this institute that was entrusted with the organization in 
Barcelona of the Euro-Med Civil Forum (in conjunction with the Euro-Mediterranean 
conference in 1995) as a result of sustained lobbying by the Catalan government both of 
Felipe González and at the EU level (Barbé and Soleri Lecha 2009: 344). Since then, IEMed 
                                                          
146 See El País article, “Cataluña y Marruecos piden reimpulsar la cooperación euromediterránea” (10 April 
2008). 
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has positioned itself as an important vehicle devoted to Mediterranean issues. Also, the 
establishment in the city of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) 
and the confirmation of the city as the headquarters of the permanent secretariat for the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM) are further examples of Catalonia’s international projection and 
strategic positioning in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Successive Catalan governments 
have also been pushing for a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank, with headquarters in 
Barcelona, to boost investments directed towards the southern Mediterranean rim in general, 
and towards Morocco in particular (Barbé and Soleri Lecha, 2009: 347-350).  
 
Barcelona Town Hall Ajuntament de Barcelona, the Barcelona Provincial Council Diputació 
de Barcelona, and the development agency of the Catalan municipalities Fons Català de 
Cooperació al Desenvolupament have also provided technical, human and financial support 
to their Moroccan counterparts. What is more, activities of Catalan civil society actors such 
as Pagesos Solidaris, Jaume Bofill, Món-3, Sodepau, Entrepobles and Un sol Món (Nieto 
2006: 297 - 282) or organizations such as Ibn Batuta, ATIME, Fundación Tanja and Al Wafae 
denote the increasing participation of non-state actors involved in co-development projects, 
mutual dialogue, integration and other immigration issues. These associations offer a range of 
activities that are directed towards the population and where officials are often involved. 
Their role, visibility and impact are increasing, prompting the Catalan and Moroccan 
governments to support them and organise joint activities with them. Trade unions in 
Catalonia such as UGT, CCOO and USOC have also traditionally offered support to 
immigrant workers, including Moroccan immigrants. Their support ranges from legal 
counselling and advice to support classes and administrative procedures.147  
 
Other projects aimed at consolidating mutual understanding and cooperation such as the 
establishment of a Maison du Maroc (a kind of Moroccan cultural centre) in Barcelona are 
also advancing.148 However, similar to the situation across Spain, it is worth underlining that 
a number of Catalan political parties such as ERC and a number of civil society actors do not 
hold much sympathy for Morocco mainly because of the Sahara, immigration and the 
                                                          
147 An interview with the coordinator of immigration issues at Unió Sindical Obrera de Catalunya (USOC) 
revealed that assistance provided to migrant workers increased following the 2008 economic crisis. Demand for 
Catalan and Spanish support classes increased and the number of assistance requests soared, reflecting the 
massive labour crisis that affected immigrant, especially the Moroccan contingent. 
148 See L’Economiste article “Une Maison du Maroc à Barcelone” (09 November 2009). 
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negative media coverage of the community. These factors negatively influences Catalan 
public opinion towards the country and the Moroccan community as a whole. Morocco’s 
government, on the other hand, strives to gain the sympathy of the Catalan government and 
public opinion, especially since the country seeks to maximize backing for its 2007 autonomy 
proposal for the Sahara. Catalonia’s autonomy model is often brought up by the two sides as 
a viable solution to the stalemate in the region.149 
 Conclusions 
As the initial quote from Antoni Rovira i Virgili implies, the need for external recognition, 
prestige and sympathy certainly provides some explanation for Catalonia’s Mediterranean 
(and Moroccan) policies, as one driver is the political ambition of Catalan nationalism. But 
this analysis sheds light on some of the other reasons behind Catalonia’s prioritization of 
Morocco in its policy towards this region as well as Rabat’s attitude and reactions. 
Catalonia’s enthusiasm for Morocco is equally explained by the growing business 
opportunities that Morocco represents, the security threats posed by radical Islamist networks 
and related criminal activities, as well as identity concerns provoked by the “ghettoization” 
and difficult integration of the Moroccan contingent whose growth in the autonomous region 
took phenomenal proportions since 1990. Catalonia also seems to have long had a vision not 
only of the benefits to be had from an EU Mediterranean policy and the positioning of Spain 
as a leading actor in this respect, but also (at least up until 2008) for the potential risks behind 
the massive Moroccan immigration to the region as well as the need to amend the laws 
governing foreign residents to make them easier for immigrants to integrate. For this purpose 
and for the sake of external prestige, Catalonia also sought to expand its internationalization 
and intermediation efforts. It also sought to exert an influence upon Madrid in this regard 
with a view to achieving its own goals and interests. 
 
Therefore, underlying Catalonia’s keenness to gain international prominence (the external 
prestige that Rovira i Virgili refers to) is the nationalistic aspirations held by an increasing 
number of the Catalan elite and population, as well as concerns and interests that drive it to 
pursue increased relationships and projection towards countries such as Morocco. 
Nationalism and the prioritization of identity, security, prestige, political influence and 
                                                          
149 See El País article, “Cataluña y Marruecos piden reimpulsar la cooperación euromediterránea” (10 April 
2008). Also see the Catalan News Agency (CNA): “The Catalan President asks Morocco to give an autonomous 
regime to Western Sahara” (24 February 2011). 
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cultural issues help us account for the region’s economic, cooperation and immigration and 
linguistic policies. It is important, therefore, to appreciate that Catalonia’s predisposition 
towards Morocco largely stems from pragmatic and utilitarian considerations. In an interview 
with former president Jordi Pujol, he put it this way: 
 
I have always believed that a good relationship between Spain and Morocco 
would be useful for both countries, and Catalonia, Spain and Europe have 
always been interested in a quick and significant development of Morocco... 
because as long as Morocco doesn’t develop, it may create a degree of 
instability that can, in certain aspects, project itself outside in such forms as 
massive immigration... We [Catalans] like to welcome people from outside, 
but we would have preferred an immigration from Morocco that is smaller in 
size.  That is why we have always believed that Spain and Catalonia have to 
assist Morocco in its development... because we cannot keep saying “we do 
not want Moroccan oranges and tomatoes”, “we want the right to fish in 
Morocco”, “we want to keep our investments in Spain or in Catalonia”... and 
at the same time say that we do not want Moroccan immigration.”150 
 
Such lucid and straightforward explanations (that rarely come from politicians’ mouths) 
partly endorse these interpretations and make such ideas as the conversion of the 
Mediterranean into an area of shared prosperity acquire more sense. Far from being an 
altruistic objective in itself, the concern over the prosperity of the Mediterranean region 
appears to be mainly driven by security concerns such as the desire to reduce migration flows 
and instability threats. Pragmatism and security concerns (immigration included) override 
other “solidarity” or “region building” discourses. When this statement is combined with the 
earlier one referring to Mediterranean development being an imperative both for “the sake of 
solidarity as well as self-interest”, with the overriding importance of Catalan identity and the 
difficult integration of Moroccan immigrant, the main priorities of the region start to make 
more sense. 
 
Morocco, on the other hand, is aware of the importance of Catalonia and has established two 
important consulates there (one in Barcelona and the other in Tarragona). The country 
welcomes and seeks to maintain and boost its privileged position with its Catalan partners. 
Rabat’s prioritization by the Catalan government and businesses, the growing direct 
investments and the rising number of Catalan companies choosing to operate in the country 
                                                          
150 Interview conducted by the author with former Catalan President of the Generalitat (05 September 2012). 
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not only reflect the increasing number of opportunities there but also Rabat’s desire to step up 
the cooperation. The prominent hospitality given to official visits (Catalan delegations have 
often been received by the king) and the country’s openness to cooperate and find solutions 
to issues such as the one related to unaccompanied underage illegal immigration is a 
testimony to its diplomatic flexibility aimed at preserving its priority position.  
 
Morocco is also keen on the integration and well-being of its quarter million-strong 
immigrant population in Catalonia that is not only a source of important remittances but also 
possesses important potential for Morocco’s influence in Spain and Catalonia in particular. 
The large number of Moroccans living in Catalonia not only means that the country remains 
an important interlocutor and preserves its position as a priority partner, it also means that 
Morocco becomes a key actor with regard to other social, religious and cultural aspects 
organizing the lives of its own community there, and to some extent the Muslim community 
living in Catalonia as a whole. Finally, Morocco also seeks to defend and promote its 
interests relative to its foreign policy priority issue, namely the Sahara. Part of the Moroccan 
strategy behind the promotion of bilateral relations and the increasing linkages between civil 
society actors at both ends seems to be the toning down, if not the reversal, of Catalan 
sympathy and support for the Polisario. The evocation, at least up until 2012, of the Catalan 
autonomy model as a source of inspiration for the country’s claimed decentralization policy 
that would start in the Sahara is yet another illustration of how Rabat seeks to consolidate this 
strategy, temper the sticking issues and preserve its privileged partnership. 
 
Catalonia has developed an interest in continued outreach in the Mediterranean region since 
the mid-1980s (at times focusing exclusively on a north-west Mediterranean arc). This 
interest stems not only from geographical proximity but also from an explicit commitment to 
and vision of a western Mediterranean area of shared prosperity (Escribano and Jordán, 1999: 
133; Gallina, 2006: 17). Europe and the Maghreb have consistently been at the epicentre of 
much of the Catalan internationalization strategy and the Catalan government has been 
particularly conscious of the importance of this region for the future of Europe, Spain and 
Catalonia (Aubarell 2004a: 78). Barcelona has also worked hard to promote and lobby for 
this vision in Spain. From Morocco’s side, however, there seems to be little evidence to 
suggest that the country has been proactively seeking to capitalize on its relationship with its 
Catalan counterpart to achieve political objectives with Madrid; while it has always remained 
open and welcoming Barcelona’s initiatives, it seems to have mostly been on the receiving 
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end. The Moroccan state outlook has predominantly remained “Realist”, predisposing it to 
deal on a state-to-state basis as Rabat’s ultimate priority is visibly its relationship with 
Madrid. As the country’s foreign policy “omnibalancing” strategy would suggest (see 
Chapter 2), Rabat’s predisposition towards Barcelona should have been more obvious. But 
while the country maintains and advances good relations with the region so as to reap the 
benefits of this rapprochement, Rabat gives greater importance to its relationship with Spain. 
Evidence suggests that Rabat coordinates with Madrid most of its dealings with Barcelona 
and does not seem to engage in triangulation strategies in this context either. Once again, this 
offers the possibility to construe the role of the autonomous region as yet another actor and 
contact channels in an essentially intergovernmental relationship. And Catalonia has proved 
to take up intermediation roles during difficult periods, and its consolidated relations with 
Morocco are, at least for Rabat, improvements of relations with Spain as a whole. Catalonia 
could, therefore, be seen as another component of the intensifying network of relations 
binding Spain and Morocco, which would lend further credence to a conceptualization based 
on Complex Interdependence. 
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Chapter six - Analysis of the triple dyadic relations dynamics 
 Introduction 
Having separately scrutinised Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan 
relations in the last three chapters, this analysis chapter aims at achieving two main objectives 
linked to the research questions posed at the beginning of this dissertation. First, it will try to 
close the loop with regard to a collective characterization and analysis of the three bilateral 
relations during the (1990 - 2012) period, as well as the contribution and impact of Catalonia 
and the EU in Moroccan-Spanish relations. To do that, the chapter will primarily recapitulate 
and try to organize the three dyadic relationships in a manner more amenable to interpretation 
and analysis, while concentrating on the policy areas most common among all four actors, 
namely economy, migration and cooperation. After scrutinizing the main intergovernmental 
axis, the chapter will also try to distinguish trends among the three bilateral relationships to 
see whether they have taken similar courses or have deviated from each other, while trying to 
provide interpretations for such trends. Then it will try to come up with an informed 
evaluation, based on the analysis established so far, of the degree of importance and impact 
of the sub-state and the supra-state actors, and whether this complexity of actors and 
relationships has proven to be constructive or damaging to Moroccan-Spanish interactions. 
As to the second objective, the chapter will revisit the theoretical debate introduced in 
Chapter 2 and that has informed the analysis throughout the three subsequent chapters to see 
how to adequately conceptualize this complex set of relationships and capture the three levels 
of the relationship in theoretical terms. Besides the empirical exercise, therefore, the other 
purpose of this conclusion is tie together the different theories suggested and discussed in the 
body of the thesis with a view to come up with some theoretical conclusions and 
contributions.  
 Dynamics of a triple bilateral relationship 
In the last three chapters covering Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan 
relations, this research has sought to provide a detailed account of the three dyadic 
relationships over a time frame of 22 years and with more focus on the policy areas affecting 
the three polity levels under study: immigration, economic and cooperation issues. The 
research also sought to highlight in every chapter the degree of impact or involvement of the 
other actors. This chapter, however, offers the opportunity to draw together the conclusions 
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reached in the previous chapter and bring together all the threads of this three-pronged 
relationship to see and appreciate how they fared, behaved and interacted collectively. This 
exercise would involve superposition of the three pairs of relationships with a view to 
shedding light on individual and combined relationship patterns. The exercise may also 
establish the extent to which these relations have converged or deviated from each other and, 
consequently, the degree to which they have impacted each other positively or negatively. 
The question is: which would be the best way to gauge the trends of this triple relationship?  
One way to map the three European actors’ relationships with Rabat over the two decades 
timeframe that this research has established would be to graphically chart the three bilateral 
relationships between 1990 and 2012, indicating their respective highs and lows based on a 
set of reliable criteria. Easier said than done, though, because that is a task replete with 
uncertainties, approximations and potential pitfalls. “Measuring” relationships is a very hard 
and potentially unmanageable task, and gauging improvements or deteriorations in ties would 
need to be assessed against a set of constant and objective criteria that are particularly hard to 
determine, let alone measure. Trying to compare relationships involving three kinds of 
polities (two states, a supranational actor and a sub-state entity) is a task that is even more 
intimidating. Moreover, relationships are largely matters of perception and perspective; and 
views also depend on the different levels of actors. Relationships between Spain and 
Morocco, for example, may be perceived by government officials as deteriorating while they 
are thriving among civil society actors or business people. Finally, another difficulty with 
regard to the mapping exercise is the time line. On the one hand, the period spans over 22 
years, and it would be particularly complicated to follow the evolution of these relationships 
on a year-on-year basis. Things become even more intricate when we realise that relations 
may vary sometimes within the same year. For example, it is hard to assign a value to official 
Moroccan-Spanish relations, say, in 1995 since during most of that year relations were at a 
low level due to the inconclusive fisheries negotiations with the EU (which had an impact on 
Spanish-Moroccan bilateral ties) but they improved markedly towards the end of the year as a 
result of the signing of a new fisheries deal, Morocco’s Association Agreement with the EU, 
and the launching of the Barcelona Process in November of that year.  
 
However, given the importance of finding a way to illustrate and plot these relationships, this 
research has adopted a trade-off solution that may help us gain some insight into the 
behaviour and evolution of these relationships and the degree of convergence or divergence 
of relationships between Rabat and Madrid, Rabat and Brussels, and Rabat and Barcelona. It 
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may not be comprehensive but it is likely to help us, nonetheless, capitalise on some key 
moments and events in this complex relationship that are hardly debatable and that would 
facilitate an assessment of overarching trends and mutual impact. To achieve this 
approximation, this analysis will mainly concentrate on the major highs and lows as reflected 
in selected official relations and data. In other words, the analysis will look at some 
outstanding events and incidents, official visits, initiatives, declaration and reactions, as well 
as corresponding figures and data, especially concerning trade and immigration flows 
between the two neighbours. This chapter will, for example, focus on the timing of the ten 
High Level Meetings between Spain and Morocco in this 22 year phase. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, these are widely considered to be an effective tool to measure the temperature of 
the bilateral relationship (see Figure 6.1). It will also look at specific major events and 
incidents. For instance, there is hardly any disagreement over the fact that Moroccan-Spanish 
relations went through a crisis period between 2001 and 2002, with July 2002 representing 
the lowest point in the relationship over the last two decades. Starting 2004, however, the 
bilateral relationship started to warm up, especially following Zapatero’s election in March of 
that year. Also, as mentioned in Chapter 4, 1992 is yet another symbolic year marking a 
serious breakdown in Moroccan-EU relations, following the European Parliament’s blockage 
of the fourth financial protocol with Morocco as a result of the country’s dismal human rights 
record. 2003, as referred to in Chapter 5, marks a high in Moroccan-Catalan relations with the 
launching of a representation office of Catalonia in Casablanca shortly before the leftist 
tripartite Catalan government (PSC, ERC and ICV) took over from Jordi Pujol’s CiU. It is 
important, however, that data and events highlighted here be read in conjunction with the 
preceding analysis. Aside from events, there are processes that have been referred to in the 
body of the thesis and that will be revisited here as well. 
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of the 10 Moroccan-Spanish High-level Meetings (1993-2012). 
 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on dates of the High-level meetings between 1993 and 2012. 
NB. These visits have been distributed according to the same time-frame pattern adopted in 
Figure 6.2 to see if they correspond to the highs and lows on the overall relationship as will 
be discussed later. 
 
In order to be able to appreciate the evolution of the three linked relationships over more than 
two decades in a clearer and more illustrative way, key periods will be collapsed together 
instead of following the relationship on a year-on-year basis. This is not merely a solution 
dictated by the potential complexity of a yearly analysis and the imperative of parsimony but 
it also makes more sense since overall crisis or collaboration periods tend to spread over long 
periods of time,151 as the subsequent analysis will demonstrate. In order to make sense of 
these peaks and troughs in Morocco’s relation with Spain, the EU and Catalonia from 1990 to 
2012, values ranging from (1) representing poor relations to (5) representing excellent 
relations will be allocated. These values are assigned by the author based on the 
argumentation that will follow in this analysis and that echoes the analysis throughout the 
thesis as well. This way, the trend of bilateral as well as collective relationships will be 
appreciated. As the following chart shows, values have been assigned for seven periods 
                                                          
151 As the subsequent analysis will reveal, phases of tension or close collaboration indeed have tended to spread 
over relatively long periods of time, but this does not mean that collaboration phases were tension-free or that 
difficult periods were characterised by an absence of collaboration. The salient observation, however, is that the 
relationship appears to develop in a cyclical pattern showing a seesaw trend, and that these cycles tend to spread 
over periods of two to four years. 
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marked by significant changes in the relationships (1990-1993, 1994-October 1995, 
November 1995-1999, 2000-2002, 2004-2008, 2009-2010, and 2011- ).152 In doing so, the 
analysis is certainly “sacrificing” and overlooking some years and events that are 
undoubtedly important in these relationships. However, concentrating on the dates and events 
chosen was also motivated by the overall aggregate symbolism and significance of these as 
the ensuing analysis will show. Our chart looks as follows:  
 
Figure 6.2 Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations (1990 – 2012) 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on data and analysis provided. 
Note: Moroccan-Catalan relations only gained sufficient significance by 1994. 
 
 Analysis of each period: 
First phase (1990 to 1993) 
The 1990 to 1993 period is important for a host of reasons. One of these is the fact that it 
marks a particularly critical phase for the Moroccan regime’s international image and 
prestige, especially with regard to human rights issues. Internationally and vis-à-vis the 
EC/EU, the country was under heavy criticism due to its human rights abuses and alleged 
non-compliance with the UN Peace Plan for Western Sahara (Vaquer, 2004b: 133). Because 
of that, even its relationship with its closest ally (France) was undergoing its worst crisis 
                                                          
152 This is not to suggest that these periods work precisely for each relationship. In fact, these phases work 
fundamentally for the Morocco-Spain axis. The two other relations do not seem to have hugely distinct 
periodization. 
MOROCCO-SPAIN, MOROCCO-EU AND MOROCCO-
CATALONIA RELATIONS (1990 -2012) 
Morocco-Spain Morocco-EU Morocco-Catalonia
178 
 
since the country’s independence in 1956. This was aggravated by other incidents such as the 
publication of Notre Ami Le Roi (Gilles Perrault’s disparaging book of King Hassan II), and 
the pro-Saharawi initiatives of Danielle Mitterand, the wife of the former French President 
(Vaquer, 2004b: 108). In this period Morocco started deepening its relations with other 
partners such as the United States153 and Spain. The rapprochement between Rabat and 
Madrid had, in fact, started with King Hassan’s visit to Spain in September of 1989 which 
was marked by the signature of a number of bilateral cooperation, military and economic 
agreements (González Campos, 2004: 19). Felipe González’ December 1990 visit to 
Morocco came to confirm this tendency and consolidate Madrid’s ties with Rabat. For 
Morocco, this represented an opportunity to counterbalance its deteriorating relations with 
Paris (El Houdaigui, 2003: 124), and for Spain it was a way to cement its political and 
economic relations with its southern neighbour, especially in a context of increasing 
economic opportunities and mounting security risks, notably with regard to rising religious 
fundamentalism in the region as well as the ensuing 1991 Algerian civil war. This period is 
also characterised by the signature of the bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Good 
Neighbourliness and Cooperation, the renewal of the Fisheries Agreements between Morocco 
and the EC in 1992, and the holding of the first Spanish-Moroccan High Level Meeting in 
1993.  
 
Between Morocco and the EC/EU, however, the period represents probably the lowest point 
in their bilateral relationship, mainly due to successive revelations on the country’s human 
rights abuses. This culminated in 1992 when the EP blocked the fourth financial protocol 
with Morocco, and called upon the country to abide by human rights principles and UN 
Security Council resolutions. It is interesting to note in this stage the marked divergence 
between Spain’s and EC/EU’s relations with Morocco as opposed to the remaining periods. 
This probably illustrates the slow adaptation and Europeanization process that took some 
years after Spain’s accession. It is also noteworthy that the relevance of Catalonia at this 
stage was hardly significant, partly because Morocco had not fully elaborated its relationship 
with the Spanish regions, and the country’s importance for the autonomous region was still 
marginal as economic exchanges and the number of Moroccan immigrants living there (still 
less than 20,000 as shown in Figure 6.3) were still inconsequential. 
                                                          
153 This is probably best illustrated by Morocco’s participation in the coalition of the Persian Gulf War (1990-
1991) opposed to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. 
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Figure 6.3 Evolution of Moroccan immigration in Spain and Catalonia (1991 – 2012) 
 
Source: Author’s graph based on statistical data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
and Institut d'Estadística de Catalunya (Idescat). 
Second phase (1994 to October 1995) 
The phase between 1994 to late 1995, however, marked the first dip of this 22-year period in 
Moroccan-Spanish relations. During those two years Morocco, partly responding to internal 
pressures emanating from opposition parties, made repeated claims to its sovereignty over 
Ceuta and Melilla, including at the UN General Assembly where former Moroccan Prime 
Minister Abdellatif Filali referred to the two cities as “the last colonies in Africa”. The 
granting by Spain of autonomy status to the two cities in September 1994 worsened the crisis 
and increased the diplomatic tensions between the two neighbours (González Campos, 2004: 
20). As a result, Morocco started threatening to suspend the 1992 Fisheries Agreement, which 
it finally did in April 1995. In the same period, relations with the EU had improved slightly 
compared to their lowest 1992 level, and Catalonia entered the stage in 1994 with the first in 
a series of three visits by its premier (Jordi Pujol) whose CiU party had entered a pact with 
the PSOE following the 1993 elections. Pujol’s high-profile visit to Morocco and his 
reception by King Hassan II signalled the opening of a new chapter in Moroccan-Catalan 
relations.154 Among the objectives of the visit was to discuss the prospects of a wider regional 
                                                          
154 See El País article “Jordi Pujol viaja a Marruecos como invitado personal del rey Hassan” (19 September 
1994). 
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partnership (the eventual Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) and establish a parallel channel of 
communication to find a solution to the ongoing Moroccan-Spanish problems.155 Signs of 
Catalonia’s international projection and keenness to play a regional role had started to 
emerge. 
Third phase (November 1995 – 1999) 
November of 1995 laid the foundations for improved relations across the board. That month 
saw the renewal of the Fisheries Agreement until 1999, the signature of Morocco’s 
Association Agreement with the EU, and the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Conference in Barcelona, all within two weeks. The Barcelona Process would usher in a new 
chapter in Moroccan-Spanish, Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations marked by 
optimism and high hopes for which Morocco was willing to make concessions such as the 
renewal of the fisheries accords under terms that it judged unfavourable (Damis, 1998: 61; 
Vaquer, 2003: 64). Moreover, in February 1996, the Spanish government adopted a new 
economic and financial cooperation agreement with Morocco (De Larramendi, 1997: 429). In 
this four-year period, relations between Rabat and Madrid were largely fluid, with the 
holding of four more High Level Meetings. Average yearly commercial transactions between 
the two also improved markedly multiplying by almost 2.3 compared to the previous 1994 to 
October 1995 phase (see Figure 6.4). For Catalonia, the Barcelona Process would boost its 
prestige regionally and internationally and would consolidate the role it played in the 
Mediterranean region in general and with Morocco in particular. But although Moroccan 
relations with Spain and the EU improved, there were still some outstanding expectations, 
lingering suspicions and a feeling of unfairness on the part of Morocco. Rabat was on the 
outlook for individualised forms of preferential treatment and economic reward considering 
that it had made important concessions in the form of the renewal of the fisheries agreement 
which it announced would be the last. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
155 Interview with former president of the Generalitat Jordi Pujol (05 September 2012). 
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Figure 6.4 Moroccan-Spanish average annual bilateral trade (imports + exports) and trade 
balance (positive for Spain). (1990 – 2012)  
 
Source: Author’s graph based on statistics from Dirección General de Comercio e 
Inversiones. Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio. 
 
Fourth phase (2000 – 2002) 
The fourth phase in our graphic representation (2000 – 2002) undeniably represents the worst 
crisis phase in Moroccan-Spanish relations due to a number of reasons and a succession of 
adverse events and incidents, most salient among which were the following: First, unlike 
Zapatero who was then in opposition, Aznar’s government showed ambivalence over support 
of the Baker I plan recommending extended autonomy for the Sahara rather than 
independence. Second, the two parties and the EU failed to reach an agreement over the 
renewal of the fisheries accord which had expired in 1999. Third, the relationship between 
Madrid and Rabat was further marred by the mounting issues of drug trafficking and 
immigration. The number of Moroccan immigrants had more than doubled over the previous 
three years hitting the symbolic 200,000 mark (see Figure 6.3), and illegal immigration in 
particular started to constitute a particularly thorny issue that would keep swelling at least up 
until the 2008 economic crisis.156 Fourth, in February 2000 there were the El Ejido events 
                                                          
156 In the summer of 2001 more than 18,500 illegal immigrants had reached Spanish coasts by small fishing 
boats (pateras), a hitherto unprecedented level (Vaquer, 2004b: 232). 
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which saw various acts of xenophobia and racism directed especially against Moroccan 
immigrants and which prompted the Moroccan government to demand the protection of 
Moroccans living in the region and that Spanish authorities commit to the enforcement of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the 
two countries.157 Fifth, in October 2001 Morocco withdrew its Ambassador in protest over 
the mock-referendum on Western Sahara independence held in 200 municipalities of 
Andalucía, considering the incident a grave provocation. Sixth, in the run-up to the June 2002 
European Council in Seville, Spain started to gather support within the EU to force countries 
such as Morocco to cooperate in the fight against illegal immigration, which was perceived as 
an initiative to seek retribution mainly against Morocco (Vaquer, 2004b: 243).  Finally, the 
bilateral troubles came to a peak following the Laila/Perejil crisis in July 2002 when the two 
neighbours came as close as ever before to direct confrontation following successive 
“occupation” of the tiny islet by Moroccan and then Spanish forces. From an economic 
perspective, average bilateral exchanges during this period increased, but not dramatically 
(multiplying by less than 0.2) (see Figure 6.4).  
 
Moroccan-EU relations were also affected at this stage, especially due to the inconclusive 
fisheries negotiations, but not to the same degree as in 1994-1995 (Vaquer 2003:75-6). 
Although the European Union rejected Morocco’s fisheries proposal in April 2001, it stopped 
short of imposing any sanctions on the country as requested by Spain, partly due to French 
opposition (Cembrero, 2006: 50-51). During this crisis, Catalonia also saw fit to enter the 
scene. Jordi Pujol made two trips to the country (in July 2000 and February 2001), the first of 
which was meant mainly to consolidate business relations while the second was an official 
visit when he was received by King Mohammed VI and decorated with the Grand Cordon 
Alawi Wissam, the second highest distinction in the country. It became increasingly clear that 
even if it lost the ability to influence Spanish politics from within the government (as the CiU 
was no longer collaborating with the government through parliamentary pacts as it did back 
in 1993 and 1996, following the PP’s absolute majority in March 2000 elections), Catalonia 
continued its regional and international outreach and projection. Pujol’s second visit also 
reflected the growing importance that Morocco started to represent for the region with regard 
to economic opportunities and the looming problems of immigration. As Figure 6.3 shows, 
by 2002, the number of Moroccan immigrants living in Catalonia exceeded the 100,000 
                                                          
157 El País 11 February 2000. 
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mark. Pujol’s reproachful remarks towards Morocco at the end of his visit, urging the country 
to strengthen its migration controls, put a little dent in the relationship.158  
Fifth phase (2004 – 2008) 
The return of ambassadors in January 2003 to Rabat and Madrid put an end to a bilateral 
crisis that lasted for 15 months. In December of the same year, the sixth High Level Meeting 
was held in Marrakech (four years after the previous one). The meeting addressed a number 
of sticking issues, ranging from illegal immigration, fisheries, agriculture, territorial issues 
and terrorism. Effective cooperation on these issues, however, only started with the coming to 
power of the PSOE under Zapatero’s leadership in the 2004 elections. In his official visit to 
Morocco in April, just weeks after his election and his first trip abroad, Zapatero announced 
the opening of a new chapter in the bilateral relationship.159 His first term did, indeed, 
inaugurate a new phase of reconciliation, rapprochement and cooperation in Moroccan-
Spanish relations. This post-Aznar optimism was also reflected in a 2005 opinion poll by the 
Real Instituto Elcano in which 31% of those polled believed relations with Morocco would 
improve, while barely 10% believed their country’s relationship with the US would 
improve160 (largely in reaction to Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq).  
 
Although this stage also had its share of problems and minor spats, the 2004 to 2008 period 
was largely characterised by collaboration and trust-building. Spain’s King made two visits to 
Morocco (in 2005 and 2006) and three more High Level meetings were organized (in 2005, 
2007 and 2008).161 In February 2007, a new EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement 
was signed that made it possible for Spanish boats to resume fishing in Moroccan waters for 
the first time since 1999, and in March of the same year Zapatero promised that his country 
would be Rabat’s main ally within the EU.162 As Figure 6.4 indicates, average annual 
bilateral trade soared as well during this period compared to the previous one, as exchanges 
                                                          
158 See El País article “Pujol reclama a Marruecos más control policial sobre sus fronteras” (15 February 2001). 
159 See El Mundo article “Zapatero anuncia una nueva etapa en las relaciones con Marruecos tras reunirse con 
Mohamed VI” (25 April 2004). 
160 See Real Instituto Elcano Barometer 10th wave.  
161 It is important to notice that the next High-level meeting (the tenth) would not be held until 2012, four years 
after the ninth, which also testifies to the relative chill that marked the relationship during Zapatero’s second 
term. 
162 See El Mundo article « Zapatero garantiza que España será el 'mejor aliado' de Rabat en la UE » (5 March 
2007). 
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almost doubled. With Spanish exports to its southern neighbour exceeding € 2.5 billion by 
2006, Morocco came to represent 37% of total Spanish exports to the African continent 
(Valle Muñoz, 2007: 28). Average trade balance at 130 million Euros, although still 
favourable to Spain, stood at its lowest level of the 22-year period under study.  
But just as discord periods are punctuated with instances of cooperation, this does not mean 
that this four-year period was devoid of complications. For instance, in 2007 King Juan 
Carlos made an official visit to Ceuta that deeply infuriated the Moroccan government, 
prompting a brief recall of its ambassador.163  However, the adoption of Morocco’s Advanced 
Status with the EU in 2008, partly thanks to Spain’s support, helped dispel some of the 
accumulating tensions. The Advanced Status, despite its largely symbolic value, also 
represented the culmination of improved Moroccan-EU relations during that period whereby 
Rabat managed to assert itself as the good pupil among the rest of the Mediterranean Partner 
Countries (MPCs) (Jaïdi and Martín, 2010: 10-11). Catalan-Moroccan relations had also been 
consolidated since 2003 through the increase in business relations, official cooperation 
mainly over immigration issues, and institutional collaboration projects such as the 
establishment of the short-lived Catalan delegation (subsequently closed due to 
disagreements with Madrid over its constitutionality, as discussed in Chapter 5). Two official 
visits by the former President of the Generalitat Pascual Maragall in 2004 and 2006, and 
another visit by his successor José Montilla in 2008 illustrated the on-going significance of 
Morocco for the autonomous region, and a continuation of Pujol’s vision of ever-closer 
cooperation with Rabat.  
Sixth phase (2009 – 2010) 
Predictably enough, it was just a matter of time before bilateral relations between Rabat and 
Madrid started to dip once again. The 2009 to 2010 period brought its share of problematic 
issues that would cast a long shadow on otherwise stable and slowly improving ties. The first 
ripples in the relationship came in December of 2009 as a result of Morocco’s expulsion of 
the Aminatu Haidar. Her ensuing hunger strike at the Spanish airport of Lanzarote not only 
affected Morocco’s international image but exposed Zapatero’s government support for the 
country as well (Capella Soler, 2011: 3). A motion proposed by the Socialist group in the 
Spanish parliament forced the government to step up pressure against Morocco to accept the 
                                                          
163 See El País acticles “Marruecos llama a consultas a su embajador en España” (2 November 2007) and “La 
coincidencia de la visita del Rey a Ceuta con la Marcha Verde enfureció a Marruecos” (13 December 2010).  
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unconditional return of Haidar and urged it to support the extension of the mandate of the UN 
mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to human rights monitoring, two initiatives that 
deeply exasperated Morocco.164  
 
Less than a year afterwards, another episode came to put yet another blotch on the 
relationship when Moroccan forces proceeded to dismantle the Agdim Izik camp near 
Laayoun, resulting in bloody confrontations (although most casualties were among the 
Moroccan security forces). The incidents also sparked tensions between Morocco and Spain 
(Soler and Vaquer, 2010: 76-77) and, as in the Haidar case, the Spanish parliament adopted a 
motion calling upon the government to condemn the violence of the Moroccan intervention in 
dismantling the camp. Moroccan reaction came in the form of official complaints165 and a 
massive march directed against the Popular Party where hundreds of thousands of protesters 
led by former Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas el Fassi massed in Casablanca in late 
November 2010.166 The 2009 and 2010 crises, however, were probably not as serious as the 
preceding ones, reflecting on the one hand Zapatero’s efforts to maintain good relations with 
Rabat, and the increasing maturity and interdependence in the relationship between the two 
countries. Relations with the EU were not greatly affected either. In fact, 2010 saw the 
celebration of the Morocco-EU summit in Granada (the first of its kind ever in Euro-
Mediterranean relations) which the Spanish government had supported as an objective of its 
EU presidency. Moroccan-Catalan relations did not register any major changes either, but the 
post-2008 economic conditions started to affect Catalonia’s immigrants the hardest, 
especially the Moroccan community. Unemployment and social tensions started to spark 
various incidents and acts of xenophobia, which affected official relations as well.167 
 
 
                                                          
164 See El País article “El Congreso fuerza al Gobierno a subir la presión a Rabat por Haidar” (16 December 
2009). 
165 Moroccan reactions were expressed by Khalid Naciri, former government spokesperson, who described the 
position of Spanish parties and actors as “negative and hostile”, mentioning that Spain should have 
congratulated Morocco for its “responsibility”, instead, and presented condolences to the families of the 11 
Moroccan law enforcement agents who perished during the dismantling process. See El País article “Marruecos 
amenaza con desatar una crisis con España por el Sáhara” (3 December 2010). 
166 See l’Express article. “Manifestation au Maroc contre un parti espagnol sur le Sahara” (20 November 2010). 
167 See La Vanguardia article “El Gobierno marroquí sigue con preocupación el caso Vic” (9 June 2010). 
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Seventh phase (2011 – ) 
Finally, Arab revolutions context is an equally important stage in Moroccan-Spanish relations 
worth examining. Morocco’s “Arab Spring” protests were mainly led by the February 20th 
movement, named after the initial country-wide demonstrations. Some 37,000 people 
(according to official estimations; 300,000 according to the protesters) took part in the 
protests, causing widespread mayhem (Hoffmann and König, 2013: 5-6). Under these critical 
circumstances, the Spanish reaction was quick to materialize, reflecting the deep concern of 
Madrid over the stability of its southern neighbour and the desire not to see the situation 
spiral out of control as it did in Tunisia and Egypt. On February 22nd, two days after the 
protests had begun, Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero in an interview with Reuters insisted on 
the singularity of the Moroccan case in the context of Arab revolts, pointing to the country’s 
multiparty political system and early democratization and reform processes, and its greater 
“potential for stability and gradual progress”.168 Given the general context, the gravity of the 
situation and the fact that France had previously paid a hefty diplomatic price for its hurried 
support of Ben Ali’s regime,169 Zapatero’s stance was extremely bold and determined, 
reflecting the nature of the two countries’ relationship in critical circumstances.  
 
The reaction of the newly elected PP leader Mariano Rajoy was unequivocal too. Soon after 
his election in November 2011, and following in the footsteps of his predecessors (González, 
Aznar and Zapatero), Rajoy announced that his first official visit would be to Morocco in 
spite of the critical economic conditions of his country and the deepening Euro crisis that 
might have entailed the prioritization of a visit to Germany or France instead.170 His trip came 
a few weeks after his election during which he reiterated his friendship, support and 
congratulations for the reforms undertaken by Rabat, declaring that they “have placed 
Morocco in the vanguard of the Arab world” and that they were “an example to be followed 
by many other countries”.171 At the European level, and despite incidents like the voting 
down of the Morocco-EU Fisheries Agreements by the EP in December 2011, relations with 
                                                          
168 See Reuters article “Spain urges Europe to embrace Middle East democracy” (22 February 2011). 
169 See L’Express article « Tunisie: Alliot-Marie doit-elle démissionner? » (17 January 2011). 
170 See El País article “Rajoy prepara su primer viaje a Marruecos para la próxima semana” (11 January 2012). 
171 See full statement of Rajoy at the Moncloa (presidency) website upon concluding his visit to Morocco on 18 
January 2012 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/idiomas/9/presidente/intervenciones/otros/20120118_pdg_statement_morocco.ht
m  
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Rabat were maintained at a high level with Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Stefan Füle, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement 
and European Neighbourhood Policy, both supporting the country’s transition plans and 
welcoming its new constitution (European Union, 2011). Relations with Catalonia remained 
positive as well, with the consolidation of business relations and bilateral visits and 
initiatives. Although still puny, Catalan investments in Morocco saw a record increase in 
2011 from less than 30% of Spain’s total to over 50%.172 In 2012, Artur Mas also chose 
Morocco as his first destination outside of the European Union and came to the country on an 
official visit, heading a delegation of some 120 businessmen. 
The most salient observations 
Having broken down the 22 years of this triple set of bilateral relationships under scrutiny 
into seven approximate key phases, and having mapped and analysed these relying on a 
synthesis of arguments, data, major events and incidents surrounding the relationships, one 
can now evaluate these three relationships, look at their underpinning dynamics and provide 
some informed observations on the way these relations behaved together and impacted on 
each other. This evaluation will be divided under two major headings, one evaluating 
Moroccan-Spanish relations and the other gauging the impact of Catalonia and the EU on the 
bilateral relationship.  
Moroccan-Spanish relations: central, cyclical, fickle, yet improving 
Many observations can be extracted from this analysis as far as Moroccan-Spanish relations 
are concerned. This section will highlight four of the most important ones to emerge. First, it 
will discuss the centrality of the Moroccan-Spanish bilateral relationship in this complex web 
of relations as well as the significance of intergovernmental ties. Second, it will focus on the 
cyclicality of the relationship, its fickle nature as well as its surprising resilience in the face of 
adversity, which brings us to the debate over interdependencies and the central themes of 
migration, the economy and cooperation. The third observation relates to the main motives 
that seem to inform and guide the relationship since 1990, focussing on the pragmatic and 
opportunistic motivation that are also tightly linked to the three policy areas that this research 
has focussed on. This sub-section will also explore the varying pressure tools at the disposal 
of each player to achieve its objective. Finally, the section will highlight the significance of 
                                                          
172 Interview with the Director General of external affairs at the Catalan Generalitat (20 June 2012). 
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popular perceptions and discuss the apparent dissonance between official relations and public 
opinion, as well as the reasons behind this divergence and the enduring attitudes. 
 Intergovernmentalism 
The Rabat-Madrid relationship is by far the main axis in this triple relationship. Its centrality 
is expressed directly through official declarations and the protagonism of both countries’ 
executives, and indirectly through state-driven initiatives and policies. It reflects the degree of 
intergovernmentalism and the extent of state-centric decisions on both sides of the Strait. 
Indeed, the analysis so far has confirmed the extent to which Moroccan and Spanish relations 
in general, and towards each other in particular, is largely the preserve of both countries 
executive powers (the Palace and the office of the Prime Minister, respectively). In Morocco, 
the monarchy has often occupied centre stage, playing critical roles in times of crisis (such as 
the suspension of the fisheries agreement in 1994, the Perejil/Laila crisis in 2002, the 
resolution of the Haidar stalemate, etc.), and in times of rapprochement (such as the 1989 
to1992 entente between the two neighbours, the run-up to the Euro-Mediterranean conference 
in October-November 1995, King Mohammed VI’s honeymoon period with King Juan 
Carlos and Zapatero between 2004 and 2006, etc.). Other forces have also had an impact on 
bilateral ties, but they never significantly overshadowed the role of the Palace. Actors such as 
the political parties contributed, albeit marginally (especially the nationalist Istiqlal and the 
leftist USFP parties whose pressure often urged the Palace to step up claims to Ceuta and 
Melilla). Popular protests and foreign interventions (such as the United States intervention to 
resolve the Perejil/Laila and the Haidar problems, or France’s occasional pro-Moroccan 
stances at EU levels) also affected the relationship.  
 
In Spain, on the other hand, the predominant role in the bilateral relationship throughout this 
22-year period seems to have been mostly undertaken by the Prime Ministers both in the 
positive and negative turns of events. For example, Aznar’s uncompromising, at times 
confrontational, attitudes have certainly contributed to the worsening of bilateral relations 
between 2001 and 2002, and Zapatero’s resolve to preserve the relationship during difficult 
moments in the 2009 to 2010 period undoubtedly helped avoid the deterioration of the 
relationship. As in the Moroccan case, external influences of other countries and the EU (on 
which more later) have at times had an impact, while internal influence has mainly emanated 
from the main opposition parties, the parliament (as was the case during the Haidar and 
Agdim Izik parliamentary motions prompting Prime Ministerial actions against Morocco), or 
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civil society. Initiatives coming from this latter sometimes triggered small crises or placed the 
government in uncomfortable positions (such as 2001 tensions caused by the mock-
referendum on Western Sahara independence held by pro-Saharawi groups in Andalucía). 
However, the role of the executive proved to be primordial throughout the 22-year period, to 
the extent that bilateral relations, at times, seemed to reflect perspectives and world-views of 
different prime ministers (Aznar vs. Zapatero, for instance). 
 
Contrary to what some experts believe,173 Moroccan-Spanish relations have proved to be 
better under the Socialists compared to the right wing Popular Party in the last two decades, 
which largely reflects the political parties’ principles and the importance of leaders’ world-
views and attitudes. Granted that the parties tend to adopt their discourse depending on 
whether they sit in opposition or in power, that relations with Morocco is a subject of popular 
interest and partisan manipulation, and that increased interdependence seems to have reduced 
the number and impact of contentious issues; however, party principles and personal outlooks 
have proved to be equally important. PSOE’s policy change towards Morocco in 1980s, 
González’s consolidation of the bilateral relationship in the early 1990’s and Zapatero’s 
continued positive engagement with Rabat stand in sharp contradiction with the PP’s and 
Aznar’s adversarial approach. Indeed, with the coming to power of the socialists in 2004, for 
example, relations with Morocco improved significantly in comparison with the conflict-
ridden bilateral ties with the right-wing government, especially in the period between 2000 
and 2002. Although the honeymoon was marred in 2009 and 2010 as a result the usual 
divisive issues that came back to haunt the two counterparts, Zapatero successfully managed 
to weather the storm and downplay mounting tensions. 
Cyclicality, sensitivity and resilience of the relationship 
The analysis has also clearly shown the boom and bust phases in Moroccan-Spanish relations, 
a cyclical pattern that is particularly worth analysing further. This pattern reveals the 
multiplicity and complexity of issues, the degree of sensitivity of the issues involved and of 
both actors towards each other, and the volatility and prickliness of the relationship itself. 
Indeed, the analysis has revealed that bilateral relations can go sour for a number of reasons 
such as territorial issues involving Ceuta and Melilla, the Sahara or over a miniscule islet 
                                                          
173 Del Pino (2005: 79) believe that the role of the party in power may be important when it comes to the 
approach, but when it comes to problematic issues such as territorial disagreements, migration spats, and other 
perceptual, symbolic and historical issues, the response of both parties (PP and PSOE) tends to be similar. 
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such as Perejil/Laila. Tension can also be provoked by immigration issues such as the 2000 
El Ejido problem or discord caused by lack of cooperation in immigration control; economic 
issues such as the fisheries or agricultural disagreements; or even symbolic issues such as 
King Juan Carlos’ visit to Ceuta and Melilla in 2007 which provoked a diplomatic crisis 
between the two countries. Indeed, this last example highlights the precariousness and 
unpredictability of the relationship, as well as the misunderstandings that can occur. A high 
level visit or declaration, a news story or media coverage, a civil society initiative, or a 
parliamentary motion can be the source of official discord with the potential to lead to serious 
crises. Although both countries exhibit degrees of sensitivity, Morocco seems to be the 
pricklier partner when it comes to reactions to the various incidents. This may be partly 
explained by the country’s perceived unfairness (Since Morocco is the less endowed and the 
less developed partner) or victimhood (seeing its territories still usurped, waters still 
exploited, expectation of full European partnership still unfulfilled, access to EU market 
restricted, etc.).  
 
It is also worth exploring in more general terms the reasons why escalations occur, how they 
can convert into crises, and why they prove abortive. On occasions, escalations seem 
unpredictable. This is explained, to some extent, by the suspicions characterising the bilateral 
relationship as well as miscalculations, false anticipations or simple unawareness, which all 
seem to substantiate the disparities in political systems, cultures and outlooks. Here, Morocco 
seems to be the more sensitive partner. Examples of these are rife, they include the adoption 
of an autonomy status for Ceuta and Melilla, the security/military interventions in 
Laila/Perejil by Moroccan and Spanish forces, King Juan Carlos’ visit to Ceuta, Morocco’s 
reaction to the mock-referendum in Andalucía, etc. Other times, however, they seem 
premeditated and aiming at achieving specific goals. Suspension of agreements, refusal to 
cooperate, economic sanctions, or deliberate negative campaigns illustrate this. Here, both 
neighbours can be instigators as well as victims. 
 
The fact that crises have gradually lost intensity and durability is another important 
observation. Indeed, the bilateral relationship since 1990 is characterised by ever longer 
periods of cooperation, shorter periods of tension, and less intense conflicts. As explained 
earlier, the main reason why the 2001 to 2002 crisis peaked in July 2002 was because of the 
existence of multiple issues that reinforced each other. But the other reason why subsequent 
problems have been successfully stemmed before they morphed into serious crises, aside 
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from leaders’ political will, is the increased interdependencies that have equally keep crises at 
bay. Indeed, multiplication of economic relations, increased political and institutional 
cooperation, and the crucial need to cooperate in migration and security issues have 
constituted an effective buffer of mutually critical issues preventing the two neighbours from 
opting for escalation, preferring pragmatism and cooperation in order not to jeopardize 
interests and preserve stability. 
 Pragmatism and opportunism 
Indeed, realpolitik, cautiousness and keenness not to jeopardise achievements seem to inform 
a considerable portion of mutual behaviour. This gives credence to the principle of the 
colchón de intereses comunes (cushion of shared interests) that seems to underpin Spain’s 
strategy towards Morocco to boost relations, increase cooperation, and prevent serious crises 
(López García and De Larramendi, 2002: 171; Gillespie, 2006: 120; Fernandez, 2008: 352). 
In fact, this cushion of shared interests seems to be increasing and ramifying as the years go 
by. As discussed earlier, the common interests are being reinforced on the economic, political 
institutional, social and security fronts. For example, not only did Spain manage to strip 
France of its leading place as Morocco’s first economic partner in 2012, but its backing of 
Morocco’s regime and political interests, its support for its privileged status with the EU, the 
continuing cooperation and high-level encounters, and the increasing socialisation through 
development projects, migration and tourism deepen and reinforce the bilateral relationship 
even further. Rabat also seems involved in this process of cumulative interdepence; its ever 
closer collaboration in immigration control and repatriation, security and counter-terrorism 
efforts, and its increasing prioritization of Spain as a political and economic partner illustrate 
this tendency as well. Practicality and realism are also reflected in other aspects of official 
relations. When coming to power, governments tend to put to one side the more populist, at 
times denigrating, discourses that they held toward each other when in opposition (and that 
probably helped bringing them to power in the first place). This is clear, for example, in the 
shift of the PP and Rajoy’s pre- and post-November 2011 discourses towards Rabat, as well 
as the Moroccan government’s reactions to these. In November 2010 popular demonstration 
were led by the Moroccan Prime Minister against the PP and Rajoy’s hostile declarations, 
and one year after that the same Rajoy was received with honours by the newly elected 
Islamist Prime Minister. 
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However, when it comes to achieving or maximizing individual interests, pressure tools at 
every country’s disposal are different. To coerce or entice its southern neighbour, Spain tends 
to use its vast economic and financial firepower, its political support of the regime, its 
(constructive as well as destructive) lobbying within the EU, and a largely (albeit 
domestically unpopular) neutral stance with regard to the Sahara issue (Morocco’s top 
foreign policy priority). Morocco, in spite of its perceived “weaker” status in the relationship, 
proves to have a host of persuasion tools at its disposal as well. These can mainly be labelled 
“negative” or “disquieting”. The country does have some carrots to bring to bear such as the 
economic and strategic opportunities that come with improved relations with Madrid, but 
some of its main persuasion instruments seem to reside in what it can take away, levy or 
claim rather than what it can offer. As we have seen, Morocco has often cancelled or 
threatened to cancel fisheries agreements, renewed claims over Ceuta and Melilla, suspended 
collaboration over security issues, withdrawn support for immigration control, and even 
withdrawn ambassadors. Morocco also poses a threat for Spain, and Europe in general, if it 
becomes unstable or by “going rogue”. Indeed, Madrid (and Brussels) has not only been keen 
on maximizing economic, strategic and political gains with its southern neighbour but has 
also been concerned over its stability and regional security as a whole. The prospect of a 
troubled or radicalized Morocco invokes nightmare scenarios of mass immigration, security 
threats, extremism and the fear of an unknown political and economic future in the region. In 
transitional or critical moments such as the Arab protests and their aftermath, it was 
important for the departing and new Spanish prime ministers to leave differences and 
contentious issues aside and show support for the neighbouring regime. 
Perceptions and public opinion 
However, in stark opposition to official initiatives and declarations stands a largely hostile 
and deeply suspicious Spanish public opinion that has revealed through repeated opinion 
polls, media coverage and civil society actions the low esteem that Spaniards have of their 
Moroccan counterparts. Interestingly enough, these perceptions and attitudes do not seem to 
have changed much throughout these 22 years or been affected by Spain’s European 
membership. While it is hard to make assertions about such attitudes or the reasons behind 
their longevity (the debate being beyond the scope of this research), it seems plausible that 
history (both distant and recent), selective and negative media coverage, the Sahara issue, 
immigration, and the cyclical crises provide some answers. The few opinion polls covering 
Moroccans’ perception of their northern counterparts, on the other hand, reveal a relatively 
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more positive attitudes largely attributable to Spain’s political, economic, social and sporting 
feats as well as the perceived positive role that it plays in Morocco’s favour. The negativity 
shown by their northern counterparts, however, is regularly reported and covered by 
Moroccan media and might generate a trend of “reactive-negativity”. Finally, while the 
growth in Spanish tourism and investments in Morocco may be positively influencing 
perceptions in the north, the growing intolerance towards Moroccan immigrants living in 
Spain may be counterbalancing the process.  
The impact of the EU and Catalonia 
The impact of the EU 
Since this research wanted to analyse the bilateral relationship but also look beyond it to 
examine the extent to which it has been impacted by a sub-state actor and the supranational 
entity, this section will evaluate the input of these two players. As the analysis and the 
graphic chart (Figure 6.2) indicate, with the exception of the 1990 to 1992 phase where there 
was a clear divergence between Spain’s relationship and the EC’s relationship vis a vis 
Morocco, and where Catalonia’s prominence was not yet evident, one can perceive an overall 
faint convergence between the behaviour of the three actors towards Morocco. This 
convergence, however, is not perfect and happens to take place more at the higher end of 
Moroccan-Spanish relationship. In other words, both Catalonia’s and the EU’s relations with 
Rabat tend to improve when the Moroccan-Spanish relationship improves, but they do not 
decline as much when the latter deteriorates. Also, while Spanish and EU relations, at times, 
appear to be influenced by similar or comparable factors (fisheries negotiations, agricultural 
agreements, Euro-Mediterranean process, etc.), Barcelona’s relationship with Rabat, at times, 
seems to behave according to different reasons and agenda. All these aspects, therefore, 
deserve some in-depth scrutiny. 
 
The discord between the European and the national levels that seems to mark the first phase 
of this study is indeed interesting. Morocco was under considerable international pressure in 
the early 1990s because of the revelations surrounding human rights issues in the country. 
France and the EC’s reaction at the time reflected this pressure, but the improvement 
registered in relations with Madrid was probably a way for Rabat to compensate for its 
declining relations with key allies (France and the EC), and for Spain the occasion was an 
opportunity to secure the renewal of a fisheries agreement, to position itself strategically with 
regard to emerging economic opportunities in the southern neighbour, and a way to deepen 
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the concept of a “cushion of shared interests” that started to take shape within Felipe 
González’ administration. This early divergence between Spain and the EU is probably 
understandable as well in view of Spain’s recent EC accession and the fact that its relations 
with the supranational entity were still not fully Europeanized. 
 
Subsequent to this period, there is a clearer tendency of movements in tandem between 
Brussels and Madrid in their respective relationship with Rabat. This may reflect Madrid’s 
increasing Europeanization as of 1994 when it started to reap some of the rewards of its 
EC/EU membership by channelling some of its objectives and interests via the supranational 
entity, at relatively low cost. This strategy of “uploading” national issues to the European 
level, and “downloading” and conforming to EU norms and directives has consolidated this 
convergence tendency and proved to substitute some of the previous “national” policies with 
“European” policies. This has particularly been the case with EU common policies such as 
fisheries, agriculture and trade as well as immigration. While Spain has certainly lost a degree 
of control and autonomy in these areas with negotiation results at times not going its way, the 
shift in management of these issues from Madrid to Brussels has also brought beneficial 
outcomes for the country. Spain would use a higher negotiation platform echoing the voice of 
the EU community rather than a single country, avoid direct confrontation with Rabat, and 
deploy EU rather than its own resources and funds. At times these resources would directly 
support or compensate its own fishing or agricultural sectors during negotiation stalemates, 
agreement suspensions or the adoption of new agreements unfavourable to Spain.  
 
Through Europeanization, Spain also achieved the objective of playing an advocacy role for 
Morocco within the EU but without endangering its own interests that would have been 
jeopardized if Moroccan agricultural and fisheries products were granted more access to the 
EU market. Spain’s support for “more trade than aid” principle for Morocco placed it in a 
comfortable position with regard to Rabat, portraying itself as its European advocate and 
defender of interests, while rallying support of likeminded countries such as France and Italy 
to block further trade concessions in areas where Rabat has a clear comparative advantage. 
Consequently, Morocco could only “compete” for paltry aid moneys with other 
Mediterranean Partner Countries, without being able to develop its competitive sectors that 
are more likely to bring about more genuine development opportunities for the country. 
Europeanization of migration issues is another area where Spain made significant advances 
compared with late the 1990s and early 2000s when it struggled to push for linkage between 
195 
 
readmission of non-national illegal immigrants and EU cooperation and aid. Since then, 
countries like Morocco have increased their cooperation in migration control, partly thanks to 
the carrots and sticks involved, but also because illegal immigration to Europe started to 
affect Morocco as well. 
The impact of Catalonia 
Catalonia’s case tells a different story. While its overall impact on the relationship has proved 
less significant than the EU’s role in Spanish-Moroccan relations, its own drives and 
objectives remain interesting to analyse. Moroccan-Catalan relations on the chart suggest 
largely positive relations that tend to converge slightly with Moroccan-Spanish relations 
during times of crises between Rabat and Madrid. Rather than a reflection of “excellence” in 
Moroccan-Catalan relations, the positiveness of the overall trend should probably be read as 
an indication of scarcity of potentially conflictual issues (the problematic aspects of migration 
issues being largely the preserve of national governments), and the mainly business-oriented 
and cordial relations that have developed between Morocco and Catalonia. The interests of 
Catalonia, however, seem to be driven by five main objectives: 1) economic opportunism, 2) 
security concerns, 3) identity apprehensions, 4) regional outreach, international projection 
and the prestige of intermediation, and 5) influence upon Spain’s politics in a way that suits 
Catalonia’s interests. 
 
Since Jordi Pujol’s first visit to Morocco in 1994, the consolidation of economic relations has 
always been a priority in the bilateral relationship. Most official visits headed by Catalan 
premiers (1994, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012) have been accompanied by hordes 
of potential investors, business persons, and specialised agencies. This partly explains the 
growth registered in bilateral imports and exports (in 2010 and 2011 these started to represent 
almost 25% of total trade exchanges with Spain), and the considerable share of Catalan 
businesses active in Morocco (almost 40% of total Spanish businesses over the same period). 
More importantly, Catalonia’s share of Spanish investments in the country represents over 
50% of the total, a feat often trumpeted by Catalan officials (although the total value of 
investments is far from being significant).  
 
As was established in Chapter five, such initiatives combine a Catalan quest for business 
opportunities with the pursuit of a solution to rising Moroccan immigration, as a third of the 
Moroccan contingent is attracted to the autonomous region. Catalonia’s preferred strategy 
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towards Morocco includes institutional, security and legal instruments in coordination with 
Madrid to curb and control inflows of migrants, repatriate illegals and integrate existing ones, 
combined with economic development projects, without which the issue of immigration 
would be impossible to contain. In some ways, Catalonia perceives itself as a region that has 
a history of dealing with immigrants (the region having received internal and external 
migrants since the 1960s and 1970s), as opposed to Spain which had only converted from an 
emigration to immigration country in the 1980s. Massive Moroccan (and Muslim) 
immigration to the region seems to constitute a source of other security and identity concerns 
for Catalonia as well. The community is often associated with radicalism and security threats, 
and its difficult integration is, at times, construed as an added risk for the consolidation of a 
Catalan identity. 
 
Catalonia’s other motives include its quest for international recognition and the prestige that 
come partly with outreach and intermediation functions. International projection and 
recognition, as discussed in Chapter five, seem to be closely linked with the region’s sense of 
history, identity and quest for increased autonomy as well as nationalistic aspirations of an 
increasing number of Catalan people and political parties. Engaging in parallel diplomacy 
with countries like Morocco seems to provide it with a sense of independence and seems to 
bolster the popularity of the political parties that seek to increase Catalonia’s 
internationalization. Such initiatives are sometimes welcome, even encouraged, by Madrid. 
There is some evidence to suggest that a number of visits of Catalan Premiers had partly an 
intermediation objective (like Pujol’s 2001 visit and Mas’ visit in 2010) that was encouraged 
by the central government. Other times, however, Catalonia’s initiatives tended to antagonize 
Madrid. The row between Madrid and Barcelona following the 2003 establishment of Catalan 
delegations in Morocco (and other countries) on the grounds that these quasi-embassies are 
unconstitutional and create a sovereignty conflict is one such example. Madrid, therefore, 
seems happy for Catalonia to act as a region, coordinating with the centre, but not as an 
autonomous nation. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Madrid has started to view 
Catalan external actions with increasing suspicion since this latter started to call for an 
independence referendum by 2014.174 
 
                                                          
174 See Catalan News Agency article “The Spanish Government aims to ‘centralise’ the external action services 
of the Autonomous Communities” (1 March 2013). 
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Catalonia’s nationalism has often been described as peaceful, politically inclusive and 
accommodating, in opposition to Basque nationalism often referred to as exclusionary and 
violence-prone (Conversi, 1997: 224; Encarnación, 2008: 92). This non-confrontational trait 
seems to characterise Catalan politics as well. Catalan politicians seem to favour negotiated 
and incremental gains over clashes or hostilities. Catalonia’s policies towards Morocco (and 
interaction with Spain in this regard) seem to confirm a tendency to gradually negotiate and 
influence politics, in order to achieve its objectives. Its relations with Morocco, therefore, 
have not witnessed any major ripples and its efforts towards the country have largely 
reinforced Spain’s objectives. Indeed, aside from few exceptions like the 2003 disagreement 
with Madrid, Catalan premiers have mostly had similar objectives towards Morocco 
(immigration control issues, promotion of commercial activities, closer association of the 
country with the Euro-Mediterranean process, etc.), or acted to diffuse tensions between the 
two countries. Post-2012 Catalonia, however, seems to take more assertive external relations 
steps that correspond to its independentist aspirations.175 
 
For Morocco, on the other hand, the main relationship and focus has always been towards 
Madrid. While Rabat welcomed relations with Catalan executives, entrepreneurs and 
representatives (as it does with representatives from Andalucía or the Canary Islands, for 
example), coordination with Madrid seems to always have been sought. The fact that certain 
visits by Catalan premiers were treated with special honours (such as Pujol’s 1994 and 2001, 
and Maragall’s 2006 visits when they were both received by the King) may reflect the 
importance and esteem given to these official visits from economic and protocol perspectives 
but does not seem to carry further diplomatic implications beyond that. Rabat, in fact, seems 
to welcome these initiatives not only because of the economic and political opportunities that 
they represent, but also on account of the reconciliatory or intermediation aspects they may 
carry. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that Morocco has tried to use its relationship 
with Catalonia (or the EU for that matter) to counterbalance or “omnibalance” its relationship 
with Madrid, which reflects Morocco’s Realist perspective and further reinforces the state-
centric and intergovernmental character of Moroccan-Spanish relations. While 
omnibalancing and triangulation is a well-established government strategy, there is more 
evidence of its use between countries (Madrid, Paris, Washington, Moscow, etc.), but is does 
                                                          
175 See Catalan News Agency article “The Catalan Government announces it will increase its external relations 
action as it is ‘more needed than ever’” 29 January 2013. 
198 
 
not seem present in this country/sub-state/supra-state dynamic. The most obvious 
interpretations being the comparatively slim advantage that Rabat can reap in activating a 
triangulation strategy in this context, and the importance it gives to intergovernmental 
relations. 
Theoretical conceptualization of the triple bilateral relationship. 
The discussions in Chapters one and two have indicated that research on Spanish-Moroccan 
relations has rarely involved theoretical conceptualizations, although it involved 
epistemological assumptions built into the analysis. The studies that founded their analysis on 
theoretical grounds when addressing the bilateral relationship or its Euro-Mediterranean 
dimension have revealed that there are three main theoretical frameworks that have 
contended to frame the dynamics of these relationships. These are the Constructivist 
approach (Adler and Crawford, 2006; Bicchi, 2006; Bremberg, 2012, etc.), Europeanization 
theory (Manners and Whitman 2000; Torreblanca, 2001; Vaquer, 2004b, etc.), and Complex 
Interdependence Theory (López García and De Larramendi, 2002; Gillespie, 2006; 
Fernandez, 2008, etc.). The theory chapter also introduced Steven David’s (1991) concept of 
“Omnibalancing” to account for Morocco’s behaviour towards the three actors to test whether 
Rabat adopts a strategy of “shifting alliances” depending on which outside power is more 
likely to uphold its interests. 
 
The constructivist conceptual interpretations of Euro-Mediterranean partnerships such as 
Morocco and Spain have based their analysis on the premise of community and security 
(Adler and Crawford, 2006: 7-13; Acharya, 2001: 16, cited in Bremberg, 2012: 18-30). 
According to this interpretation, a Euro-Mediterranean community (or Regional Security 
Complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003; Bremberg, 2007)) imbibed with EU normative 
principles might potentially emerge through aspects of regional collaboration, culminating in 
the construction of a region (or sub-region). Spanish-Moroccan, EU-Moroccan (and to some 
extent Catalan-Moroccan) relations do involve economic, political and security components, 
but our analysis so far mainly suggests that the Moroccan and Spanish polities revolve in 
separate constellations, are informed by different political traditions and practices, are still 
characterised by deep misunderstanding, suspicions and sensitivities, but have increasing 
common interests. Rather than the emergence of a “we-feeling” or a process of region 
building, what seems to stand in the way of serious conflict are issues related to incremental 
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interdependencies and pragmatic considerations with regard to each party’s concerns, 
interests, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. 
 
Multi-level Governance theory (MLG) accounting for the hollowing out of state power within 
the EU context, and the shift of influence upwards and downwards still holds as a conceptual 
framework capturing dynamics at the EU level, but it offers little added value when it comes 
to the interpretation of the North-South dynamics at play. Also, Steven David’s 
Omnibalancing concept is an undeniably valuable framework as well that has a powerful 
potential to expound how a country like Morocco rationally seeks to diversify its options, 
shift alliances and build parallel channels and networks with a view to achieving objectives, 
preserving power and maximizing gains. One venue that seemed worth exploring was the 
extent to which Morocco resorts to such strategies in its dealings with the three European 
actors (Spain, the EU and Catalonia). The analysis, however, does not give credit to this 
assumption. There is no outstanding evidence suggesting that Rabat’s relations with Brussels 
or Barcelona carry competitive or duplicate elements likely to maximize the country’s odds 
in achieving its objectives. At these three levels, the relationships from Morocco’s end appear 
quite compartmentalized, with a strong degree of prioritization of the intergovernmental 
dimension. Rabat’s priority is clearly its relationship with Madrid. There is no evidence to 
suggest that it actively seeks to instrumentalize its relations with Catalonia or the EU to 
advance or maximize its interests with Spain as these do not seem to represent “alternative 
options” for Rabat. Omnibalancing, however, would have been an extremely useful 
theoretical paradigm if we were to look at multiple relationships involving other state actors. 
The resort to French support during the Laila/Perejil crisis to offset Spain’s quest for EU 
support is a case in point. 
 
Europeanization is yet another important theoretical framework that was explored since it had 
the potential to account for the role of the supranational entity in the bilateral relationship. 
The theory mainly refers to the impact of the EU on the politics and policies of member states 
as well as the sway that national governments may have over EU policies. It, therefore, 
includes a the top-down (reception) aspect whereby the EU influences policy areas in 
member countries such as Spain, and the bottom-up (projection) feature whereby policy 
competencies are transferred from the member-state to the supranational level (Börzel, 2002: 
6; Schneider and Häge, 2008: 16-17; Torreblanca, 2001: 12-13; Vaquer, 2004b: 41-42). 
Europeanization does, therefore, prove to be valuable for Euro-Mediterranean relations 
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analyses such as this one as it captures cases where competence has been transferred from 
national to EU levels and from EU to national levels (in such policy areas as fisheries, 
agriculture or trade, in our case), and where both facets of Europeanization (uploading and 
downloading) are verifiable. “Neighbourhood Europeanization” was also introduced in this 
research as it refers to all kinds of benefits and assistance that neighbourhood countries such 
as Morocco may reap as a result of their cooperation with the EU, as well as the norm-based 
socialization that follows from that (Gawrich et al, 2010; Franke, et al, 2010). Neighbourhood 
Europeanization, in fact, brings an interesting “constructivist” tinge to Europeanization 
theory, but without the insistence on the “community building” or institutional, cultural and 
identity components promoted by advocates of the Social Constructivist theory. 
Neighbourhood Europeanization also helps us account for European influence through such 
tools as the EMP or the ENP in areas such as democracy promotion, economic cooperation 
and institutional collaboration. 
  
Applied to our case, however, Europeanization reveals its limitations and pits us against a 
number of challenges. Besides its European focus and inadequacy to capture the 
intergovernmentalism and interdependencies discussed earlier, it presents other 
insufficiencies as well. First, it only sheds light on this complex relationship from a northern 
perspective, failing to capture the reverse process, i.e. the way we can account for Morocco’s 
relationship with Spain and the EU, especially having established the crucial state-centric 
aspect of our case study. Second, while Europeanization covers areas that have been 
effectively Europeanized (trade, agriculture, fisheries, etc.), it is more difficult to analyse 
Europeanization of foreign policy since it remains largely the preserve of national 
governments. Last but not least, and as was suggested in the conclusions of Chapter 4, the 
process conveyed by Europeanization itself can be regarded differently. Indeed, a possible 
interpretation of the role played by the supranational entity could further bolster arguments 
proposed by Complex Interdepence theory when it underlines the importance of 
multiplication of actors and channels as one of the three pre-conditions. This way, the 
assuaging roles assumed by Brussels (as well as Barcelona) would be interpreted according to 
CIT terms as a case of “the multiple intra-governmental and trans-governmental 
communication channels” necessary for complex interdependence to flourish. The added 
advantage of this interpretation is that it starts accounting for the whole relationship instead 
of the north-to-south limitation in Europeanization theory. One limitation to the adoption of 
this interpretation is a framing of the well rounded “actoredness” of the EU, reducing its 
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contribution to that of an “external actor”, thus alluding the complex functional and 
normative role it plays. However, given that the analysis looks at the EU role only in so far as 
its impact on Spanish-Moroccan relations is concerned, the interpretation holds water to a 
large extent. 
 
Indeed, the basic assumption of Complex Interdependence Theory is that as relationships 
among countries develop and interdependence grows, confrontation becomes a relatively 
costly way to pursue their interests (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 10). The main defining 
characteristics of the theory are the multiplicity of actors (including non-state actors), the 
multiplicity of channels through which these actors interact, the shifting (or absence of) 
hierarchy among issues, and the non-resort to force in mutual interactions (Keohane and Nye, 
1989: 24–5). With regard to the theory’s basic assumptions, our case study correspond fairly 
well to these premises. The increase in the “cushion of shared interests” in the form of 
cooperation, economic, political, institutional, social and cultural linkages between Morocco 
and Spain appears to gradually set the stage for more stable relations and mutual 
dependencies, thus discarding the potential of discord and conflict. Indeed, the environment 
in which the two countries’ decisions are made is increasingly broadened, the stakes 
(economic, political, institutional, security, social etc.) are increased, and the points of 
encounter and channels of contact between the two states have multiplied (the role played by 
the EU and Catalonia here further reinforces the interpretation as they substantiatiate the 
premises relative to the multiplicity of actors an channels). The main condition that our case 
seems to resist, however, is the issue of irrelevance or absence of hierarchy among issues. 
Moroccan-Spanish relations seem to be characterised by a high degree of rigidity of issues. 
For Morocco, it appears that the territorial issues (primarily legitimacy of its claims over 
Western Sahara and Ceuta and Melilla to a certain degree) constitute priority concerns 
overshadowing the rest. Spain’s relationship with Morocco, on the other hand, seems to be 
devoid of such pyramidal arrangement of issues, although immigration, at times, tends to 
constitute a concern that sometimes overrides the rest.  
 
Additionally, complex interdependence provides other convenient concepts and tools that 
prove useful in the analysis of Spanish-Moroccan relations such as the concepts of 
asymmetry, sensitivity and vulnerability. Our analysis has shown that bilateral relations are 
fairly asymmetrical and are characterised by sensitivities and vulnerabilities on both sides. 
Indeed, economically and politically at least, Morocco does wield relatively little political 
202 
 
and economic influence compared to its northern neighbours. But although it may appear to 
be the “weaker” partner in this relationship, Morocco has the ability to cause discomfort to its 
neighbour and does possess the means to make Spain sensitive and vulnerable to its policy 
changes.  Fisheries, immigration control and security cooperation represent some of the 
policy areas where Spain is likely to be sensitive (implying immediate impact when Morocco 
changes policy) or vulnerable (implying likely absence or costliness of alternatives) 
(Keohane and Nye, 1989:12–13). In fact, Morocco’s own stability may be considered as a 
potential vulnerability issue for Spain as well. A chaotic or unstable situation in the country 
would imply serious security threats to Spain and the EU as a whole. For Morocco 
vulnerabilities or sensitivities may be caused by Spain’s adoption of an adverse position on 
Western Sahara, denigration of Rabat’s regime, policies affecting Moroccan immigrants 
living in Spain, negative lobbying within the EU or other forms of economic and political 
sanctions. Indeed, negative changes in Spain’s political, economic or migration policies 
towards Morocco are likely to prove damaging for Morocco.  None of these, however, are in 
Spain’s interest since Morocco’s stability remains a priority for Madrid. What is interesting 
as previously discussed, however, is that Morocco can only activate the ‘negative sanctions’ 
(Hirschman, 1945: 16) when it seeks to influence its neighbour, while Spain tends to resort to 
more positive means involving incentives and support to achieve its purposes. This does not 
suggest, however, deliberate strategies but rather reflects the range of possible options at each 
country’s disposal as well as the least costly ones. For example, it is likely that the 2002 
conflict with Morocco proved to be a learning opportunity for Spain, having realised that 
such episodes can be draining and even traumatic and that inducement tactics are less costly 
and more readily available.  
 
This analysis of Moroccan-Spanish relations, indeed, seems to suggest a case of emerging 
complex interdependence, where we witness phases of extensive and increasing exchanges 
and interaction, punctuated by political tensions that are usually successfully dodged because 
of the potential hefty price if cooperation is jeopardized. There is ample evidence to suggest 
that the relationship binding Rabat and Madrid is increasingly dictated by the ever-growing 
web of interdependencies at the political, economic, social, institutional and security fronts. 
The two neighbours are gradually finding themselves enmeshed and conditioned by these 
interdependencies as they start to constitute sizable sources of reciprocal benefits as well as 
sensitivities and vulnerabilities. It is gradually becoming more and more mutually beneficial 
to amplify the scope of these interdependencies, and more and more costly to jeopardize 
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them. Indeed, notwithstanding the repeated frictions and spats, the two countries have never 
engaged in an open conflict during recent decades as the shared and increasing interests 
between the two have proved to be more resilient in the face of the recurring chapters of 
hostility. This general state of economic, social and institutional reinforcement, punctuated by 
political tensions has been characterizing this bilateral relationship up until today. After all, 
Nye reminds us that complex interdependence does not mean the end of the struggle for 
dominance as “power remains important even in domains characterized by complex 
interdependence” (Nye, 2004: 198). 
 
Although Complex Interdependence paradigm presents some limitations when adopted to our 
case as it does not satisfy the condition of “absence of hierarchy among issues” and offers a 
limited conceptualisation of the sub-state and supranational role; and although it is not clear 
whether Morocco and Spain have achieved the advanced degree of interdependence that the 
theory is likely to account for,176 Complex Interdependence proves to be the most 
comprehensive and parsimonious theory for this case analysis. In fact, with the inclusion of 
the sub-state and supra-state actors the theory still makes good sense. When Catalonia and the 
EU are perceived as additional actors and channels through which Moroccan-Spanish 
relations increase and gain amplitude, the theory proves even more potent and pertinent. Our 
analysis has, indeed, shown that in many instances the EU opens up the scope of bilateral 
connections and acts as a buffer that absorbs potential shocks in the Rabat-Madrid bilateral 
ties. Barcelona, as well, has proved to be acting as a facilitator and mediator in the bilateral 
relationship, in spite of its distinctive goals and priorities. Ultimately, both Catalonia and the 
EU play a reinforcing role in the growing Moroccan-Spanish interdependence. Used 
                                                          
176 The theory does not provide tools to measure interdependencies and decide the threshold beyond which the 
paradigm would apply, but in spite of the difficulty to benchmark Complex Interdependence based on 
measurable yardsticks, our case presents interesting indications and tendencies in this respect. Clearly the 
relationship presents us with a number of serious asymmetries, especially in the economic aspect where Spain’s 
exports to Morocco remain limited. However, economic relations reached for Spain (the least sensitive partner) 
important levels worth preserving. At almost €5.3 billion in 2012 (more than 2% of the country’s exports) and a 
positive trade balance of nearly €2.34 billion (See Figure 3.2) in a context of crisis, the relationship becomes 
increasingly important and, therefore, “sensitive”. See El País article “Doble récord comercial con Marruecos” 
(24 March 2013). What is equally important to notice is that both countries are becoming increasing “sensitive” 
and “vulnerable” towards each other in a number of other policy areas. For example, Spain may find itself 
exposed in case Morocco changes policy over such areas as migration control, security cooperation, and 
fisheries agreements or step up calls for Ceuta and Melilla. Morocco would find itself even more exposed if 
Madrid decided to alter policies on the Sahara, restrict access to its market, discourage Moroccan immigration, 
discredit the regime, or oppose EU assistance and trade. What is more important is that such policy choices for 
both countries are starting to become increasingly unthinkable as they would imply far higher costs for both, 
which bolsters even further the case for Complex Interdependence. 
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critically, Complex Interdependence is not only a valuable analysis framework for contiguous 
North-South relations such as Morocco and Spain, but its interpretative potential is likely to 
increase in significance given the increasingly ramified and multiplying interdependencies in 
Moroccan-Spanish relations in particular and in areas such as the Euro-Mediterranean region 
in general.  
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Conclusions 
These conclusions will first provide a general recapitulation of what the research set out to 
achieve, highlight the thesis main findings and arguments, and sum up the answers to the 
research questions posed in the introduction. They will, then, offer some informed 
speculative insights on where the relations under scrutiny might be heading based on recent 
developments in the region such as the Arab revolutions, the European and Spanish economic 
crises. This section will also highlight some of the original contributions of this research and, 
bearing in mind the limitations of this investigation, it will touch upon the research agenda to 
try to identify further investigation venues likely to enrich the debate on North-South Euro-
Mediterranean relations from empirical and theoretical viewpoints. 
 
This research has set out to explore the dynamics of a complex bilateral relationship, a 
fascinating North-South case that also marks the encounter of disparate historical narratives, 
cultural practices, political traditions and economic realities. It is the story of two countries 
“condemned to agree, since geography cannot be altered”, as King Hassan once put it.177 The 
relationship, however, is at the mercy of a myriad of interlaced and spikey issues spanning a 
wide range of areas: difficult historical legacies, inauspicious perceptions, cultural 
differences, severe economic disparities, territorial tensions, political discrepancies, 
immigration and security concerns, etc. The contemporary bilateral relationship has 
essentially been driven by intergovernmental policies but has also been conditioned by 
internal and external influences in the form of popular pressure, non-state actors, neighbours 
and superpowers. The main objective of this investigation has been to provide an updated 
examination of the workings the Moroccan-Spanish relationship since the 1990s, while 
exploring influences emanating from the supra-state (EU) and the sub-state (Catalan) entities. 
In so doing, the research opted for a substantive survey of the three bilateral relations 
(Morocco-Spain, Morocco-EU and Morocco-Catalan ties), including an analysis of the 
impact of the two non-state actors on the inter-state relationship. 
 
The investigation covered a period of 22 years (1990 to 2012). And while it touched upon the 
most significant areas in these three bilateral relationships, it dedicated slightly more focus to 
policy areas where the three actors have varying degrees of influence, namely migration, 
                                                          
177 See Le Matin editorial « Maroc-Espagne, un même défi » (28 February 2012). 
206 
 
economic and cooperation issues. The research also sought to produce a theoretically 
informed and grounded investigation by mainly resorting to conceptual frameworks that were 
already suggested for the conceptualization of the bilateral relationship and the EU input 
therein. It proceeded to exploring such theories as Multi-level governance, Europeanization, 
Complex Interdependence and Omnibalancing, while also engaging with other paradigms 
such as Constructivism, Game Theory and World Systems Theory. This work also relied on a 
method combining extensive literature research, field work and interviews to try to access the 
widest possible range of empirical and theoretical evidence. 
 
The research made several observations and reached a number of interesting conclusions with 
regard to the empirical and conceptual components of the analysis. With regard to the first 
research question and the central relationship (Spanish-Moroccan relations), the research 
highlighted its complex, multifaceted and cyclical nature, underlined some of the structural 
problems plaguing the relationship such as the dissimilar political systems, negative public 
opinion, the territorial squabbles, economic interests and disparities, migration and security 
challenges, etc. But the research also pointed to the flourishing web of interdependencies 
between the two neighbours reflected in the intensifying economic, political, human and 
cultural exchanges, and in the number of critical issues that force cooperation (such as illegal 
immigration and security concerns). The research concluded that the proliferation and 
consolidation of mutual interdependences generate a shield of common interests that mitigate 
degeneration of bilateral relations and prevent ominous escalations or potential conflicts. 
From a conceptual perspective, this provides ample substance to argue for Complex 
Interdependence as a theoretical base likely to frame this relationship given that the increase 
in all forms of interdependence and cooperation opportunities between the two states makes 
conflict all the more unlikely.  
 
The second research question had sought to examine the role and impact of the European 
Union and a Spanish autonomous region (Catalonia) on relations between Rabat and Madrid. 
EU-Moroccan relations was, therefore, the other dyad that was examined with a view to 
revealing the extent of Brussels’ impact on the inter-state relations. The research explored the 
history and the wide range of issues involved in this bilateral relationship spanning territorial 
issues, economic relations, migration, good governance and human rights, as well as 
development aid and cooperation issues. The main focus, however, was on the issues where 
Spain was mostly involved and had an interest or influence. It transpired that Madrid loomed 
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large in one form or another in most EU-Moroccan ties, especially in economy-related issues 
such as fisheries and agricultural negotiations, in migration matters and in regional 
cooperation issues, given the role that Spain and other southern European countries played in 
EU Mediterranean politics. On the one hand, Spain mostly found it convenient to export the 
difficult issues to the supranational entity, albeit with some undesirable consequences. 
Morocco, on the other hand, quickly adapted to the new situation, drew some concrete and 
symbolic advantages but continued to incur increasing economic costs caused by a gaping 
trade deficit that is only partly offset by immigrant remittances and tourism revenues. 
Brussels has played an on-going structural role allowing Madrid to de-problematize some of 
its dealings with Rabat, providing resources, support and funding when necessary. The EU 
has also provided an important contact channel allowing Rabat and Madrid to focus on the 
constructive issues. It successfully absorbed some of the tensions in the bilateral relationship 
by assuming responsibility for (and throwing resources at) such thorny bilateral issues as 
fisheries and agriculture negotiation, immigrant control and repatriation, and governance and 
human rights issues. Under this limelight, the research has suggested that the role played by 
the EU (and Catalonia) be also read within the framework of Complex Interdependence (as 
external actors and contact channels) rather than Europeanization due to the limitations of 
this latter, especially when it comes to accounting for the full mutual relationship. 
 
The Moroccan-Catalan relationship was held to be the best representative case for the role 
played by Spanish regions in the county’s external relations in general, and with Morocco in 
particular. Catalonia is indeed an important player with regard to the large proportion of 
Moroccan immigrants living there, the sustained level of official relations between Barcelona 
and Rabat since the early 1990s, and the important economic relations between the two. 
Barcelona is also an important case in view of the strengthening nationalistic aspirations 
brewing in the autonomous region as well as the distinctive identity characteristics 
distinguishing it. Catalonia’s and Spain’s priorities have not necessarily converged. In its 
dealings with Rabat, the autonomous region has mainly been concerned about maximization 
of its economic interests, preservation of its identity and security, international prestige, and 
an intermediation likely to result in political dividend and influence with Madrid. Barcelona’s 
impact on relations between Rabat and Madrid, however, has mainly been positive, if not 
complementary. As stated earlier, Catalonia’s role, from a theoretical point of view, 
reinforces Complex Interdependence interpretation since it can also be construed as an extra 
actor and channel in the complex web of interdepencies linking the two countries.  
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Indeed, the final research question relative to the ways in which our triple dyadic relationship 
can be captured from a theoretical point of view has found a substantive answer in Complex 
Interdependence theory. It is true that our case resists certain conceptual principles, as issues 
involved in the bilateral relationship are still rigid and the theory does not fully account for 
Morocco’s state-centric tendencies. However, Complex Interdependence theory offers a 
fairly satisfactory theoretical framework accounting for a good part of the dynamics at work 
in Spanish-Moroccan relations as well as the impact of Catalonia and the EU therein. As was 
discussed at length, relations between Rabat and Madrid involve a host of mutually 
interdependent issues ranging from political, economic, institutional, and security issues. 
These issues keep gaining importance and spinning webs of new relationships; some of them 
also constitute sources of increased sensitivities and vulnerabilities to both partners. Their 
preservation and consolidation, therefore, proves less costly than their disruption. The role 
played by the EU and Catalona within the framework of Moroccan-Spanish relations 
reinforces this interpretation since the sub-state and the supra-state actors act as additional 
communication conduits between the two states and largely facilitate their bilateral relations 
by deproblematizing, mediating and proliferating issues. In this regard, the role of the two 
non-state actors, therefore, befits and reinforces Complex Interdependence interpretation. 
 
This is not to suggest that Moroccan-Spanish relations are ideal. In fact, the two partners, still 
seem unable to transcend and make the spectacular leap forward long hoped for by many 
observers, despite the bourgeoning political, economic, institutional and social ties and the 
existence of considerable untapped opportunities for both parties; progress in the relationship 
is still thwarted by recurring crises and spats, albeit diminishing in size and intensity. Indeed, 
the last decade has seen an unprecedented surge in bilateral collaboration, migration flows, 
tourist visits and economic exchanges that seem to have curbed conflict threats in the long 
run. What seem to linger, however, are the more fundamental and structural issues that affect 
the relationship such as state structures, territorial problems, perception and identity issues, 
competing economies, etc. With the prospect of deepening democratization fading away and 
the Arab Revolutions looking increasingly like a missed opportunity, it is unlikely that 
attitudes will change in Morocco any time soon. The economic crisis plaguing Spain and the 
EU since 2008 has also constituted a considerable setback, affecting exchanges, aggravating 
problematic issues, limiting resources and incentives, and concentrating attention on EU 
problems and survival. The quandary shows no sign of abating. 
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Also, there is no current evidence of emerging change in the state structures, perceptions or 
perspectives towards territorial issues. The potential for periodic crises, therefore, may not be 
a thing of the past just yet. The increase in trade, socialization and institutional relations 
could be counterbalanced potentially by a new generation of bilateral problems such as the 
mounting xenophobia and racism towards Moroccan immigrants in Spain, the increasing 
competitiveness over exports of agricultural products (especially in the context of a 
deepening economic crisis), or the border delimitation issues and oil prospections in the 
Atlantic Ocean. Some of the old problems such as fisheries may be dwindling, but others are 
still alive and kicking (Western Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, drug trafficking, terrorism, etc.). 
Also, the hope that an ever-closer EU partnership or an Advanced Status for Morocco might 
bring a new momentum to the relationship seems to have dwindled with regard to the slim 
carrots and incentives on the table partly due to the lingering European crisis. Last but not 
least, the spectacular increase in bilateral economic relations should not veil the considerable 
and growing negative trade balance incurred by Morocco and the meagre investments and 
joint ventures. In fact, one cannot help but notice the contradictions between official 
discourses calling for the creation of a region of common prosperity and the stark reality 
where economic and political interests are fought for without mercy.  
 
Surprinsingly, however, Moroccan-Spanish (and Moroccan-EU) relations have shown 
considerable resilience and have, so far, managed to weather the storms of the European 
economic crisis and the Arab revolutions. Also, the support that Spain and the EU have 
shown Morocco at the height of the February 20th protests, that constituted a real threat to the 
regime, provides further substance to the robustness of their relationship and the ever-tighter 
web of interdepencies linking them. This is clearly explained by the mutual political, 
economic and symbolic benefits reaped by both sides, but also by interdependencies resulting 
from the potential threats and negative consequences that can be triggered by a regional 
breakdown in the case of a political vacuum or state failure. This enduring partnership, 
therefore, gives further credence to the complex interdependence dynamics at work in the 
region. 
 
This research has, hopefully, brought some novel empirical and theoretical contributions to 
the existing debate on Moroccan-Spanish relations. In view of the existing literature, this 
research does not only provide an update of the state of bilateral relations, but its originality 
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resides in the comprehensive scope of analysis it sought to adopt. Indeed, this may well be 
the first piece of work to have examined the key aspects of the bilateral relationship while 
bringing the sub-state and supra-state dimensions into full discussion. Having done that, the 
research highlights new important perspectives in the quadrilateral relationship. It sheds light 
on the complex relationship dynamics in Moroccan-EU and Moroccan-Catalan relations and 
also touches upon Spanish-Catalan and Spanish-EU relations. It also looks at the two non-
state entities as independent actors to fully appreciate their drives, priorities and strategies. 
The thesis also provides a theoretically informed and grounded analysis throughout. It 
explores a number of possible paradigms and tries to account for the whole relationship, 
rather than one single perspective of it. It also argues for a case of Complex Interdependence 
as a theoretical framework that captures the state, sub-state and supra-state dimensions of the 
relationship, while underlining the main limitations of this conceptualization. The research 
hopefully contributes to the wider debate on North-South Euro-Mediterranean relations 
joining an existing body of literature on the subject (Howorth, 1996; Testas, 2001; Amirah-
Fernandez, 2008; Darbouch, 2009, etc.). Future research may find it useful to study similar 
North-South relations in the region or analyse the role of other Spanish regions such as 
Andalucia and the Canary Islands to further explore the main empical and theoretical 
conclusions of the thesis. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1- List of interviewees178 
 
# Position Date 
1 Director of CIDOB  25/06/2012 
2 Member of Catalan Parliament of Moroccan Origins, and founder 
of Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta 
27/06/2012 
3 Expert in Moroccan-Spanish relations, journalist and Ex-minister 
of communication and ambassador 
09/04/2012 
4 Director general of external relations at the Catalan Generalitat 20/06/2012 
5 Manager, Asociación Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta  28/06/2012 
6 Migration coordinator at the Ayuntamiento de Sabadell 28/06/2012 
7 Secretary General for Foreign Affairs at the Catalan  Generalitat 
and President of the Executive Committee of the IEMed 
06/04/2012 
8 Former Secretary of Immigration Issues (CiU) 06/04/2012 
9 Director, Euro-Mediterranean Business Association 28/06/2012 
10 Coordinator of immigration issues, Unió Sindical Obrera de 
Catalunya (USOC) 
28/06/2012 
11 Moroccan-Catalan investor 29/06/2012 
12 Official at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the 
Direction de l'Union Européenne et des Processus Méditerranéens 
15/08/2012 
13 Official at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of 
Direction Générale des Relations Bilatérales et des Affaires 
Régionales 
15/08/2012 
14 Official at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chef de la 
Division de l’Europe Meditérranéenne,  
15/08/2012 
15 Consultant at Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 15/08/2012 
16 Research Fellow at CIDOB 07/04/2012 
17 Director, ACC1Ó Casablanca, Business Competitiveness Office, 
Generalitat de Catalunya 
16/08/2012 
18 Former President, Generalitat de Catalunya 05/09/2012 
19 Consultant at the Business Competitiveness Office, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, division: Mercats d'Àfrica i Orient Mitjà 
Centre d'Internacionalització, ACC1Ó,  
05/09/2012 
20 Coordinator at the Business Competitiveness Office, Generalitat 
de Catalunya: Entitats, Secretaria d'ACC1Ó,  
05/09/2012 
21 Representative of a Barcelona-based pharmaceutical company 
with sales in Morocco 
04/09/2012 
22 Chargée de l'Information et de la Communication à la Délégation 
de l'Union européenne à Rabat, Maroc 
28/08/2012 
23 Chargée de Culture et de Communication at European Union - 
Délégation de l'Union européenne au Maroc 
28/08/2012 
24 University lecturer (UAB) 06/09/2012 
                                                          
178 The names of interviewees have not been included in accordance with the University of Liverpool’s Ethics 
Committee recommendations. 
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25 Translator/interpreter at Barcelona courts for Moroccan 
immigrants 
04/09/2012 
26 Social assistant, translator/interpreter at Barcelona courts for 
Moroccan immigrants 
04/09/2012 
27 Social assistant, translator and former interpreter at Barcelona 
courts for Moroccan immigrants 
04/09/2012 
28 Account administrator of Moroccan bank (BMCE) in Barcelona 04/09/2012 
29 Head of Internationalization at Rivira i Virgili University and 
former expat in Morocco. 
06/09/2012 
30 Director general at the Catalan Development Cooperation 
Agency, (Cooperació al Desenvolupament, Generalitat de 
Catalunya) 
06/09/2012 
31 Assistant to the Director general of the Catalan Development 
Cooperation Agency (Cooperació al Desenvolupament, 
Generalitat de Catalunya) 
06/09/2012 
32 Former president of Moroccan migrants association ATIME 
(Asociaciones de inmigrantes marroquíes en España) 
20/12/2012 
33 Chargé des affaires commerciales, Délégation de l'Union 
européenne au Maroc 
06/01/2013 
34 European External Action Service, Deputy Head of Division, 
Maghreb 
25/02/2013 
35 European External Action Service, Maghreb Division, 06/03/2013 
36 European External Action Service, Maghreb Division, Desk 
Morocco 
28/02/2013 
37 DG Communication, Press Officer, European Commission 04/01/2013 
38 Coordinator at the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 13/03/2013 
39 DG (Trade), Bilateral Trade Coordinator, Trade Relations with 
non-EU countries. 
11/03/2013 
40 DG (MARE), Press officer, maritime affairs and fisheries 04/03/2013 
41 Media Officer for International Cooperation, 04/03/2013 
42 Official at the Moroccan Press Agency (La MAP) 12/05/2013 
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Appendix 2 – Interview questions179 
1- Can you briefly comment on the pattern of Spanish-Moroccan relations between 1990 and 
2012? 
2- What do you think are the main driving forces and strengths behind these relations? 
3- What in your opinions are the main weaknesses and threats to these relationships? 
4- What role do you think economic and trade relations play in these relationships? 
5- What role does immigration and immigrants play in these relationships? 
6- What is the role that the European Union plays in these relations? 
7- What role do businesses play in these relationships and what more can they do? 
8- What role do associations and other civil society actors play in these relationships? 
9- What role have governments been playing since 1990? 
10- Do you think the relationship is one that can be described as “Interdependent”? 
11- What kind of events or circumstances bring about crises or improvement in relations? Can 
you cite some examples? 
12- What lessons can be learned from the 2001-2002) crisis in Moroccan-Spanish relations? 
13- Can you briefly comment on the pattern of Moroccan-Catalan relations between 1990 and 
2012? 
14- What do you think are the main driving forces and strengths behind these relations? 
15- What in your opinions are the main weaknesses and threats to these relationships? 
16- What role do you think economic and trade relations play in these relationships? 
17- What role does immigration and immigrants play in these relationships? 
18- What role do associations and other civil society actors play in these relationships? 
19- What role has the Catalan and the Moroccan governments been playing since 1990? 
20- Is it positive for Spanish regions to be playing a role in Spanish-Moroccan relations? 
21- Can it be said that the Spanish and Catalan authorities mutually reinforce each other’s efforts 
in their relations with Morocco? 
22- What kind of coordination is there between Barcelona and Madrid in this regard? Is there 
information-sharing?, is cooperation structured or ad-hoc / improvised? 
23- Is it positive for the EU to be playing a role in Spanish-Moroccan relations? 
24- Does the Euro-med framework facilitate Spanish/Moroccan and Catalan/Moroccan relations? 
25- How do you see the future of relations between Morocco and Catalonia and Morocco and 
Spain? What opportunities or threats can you identify? 
26- What other aspects aside from migrations and the economy do you think play (or will play) a 
major role in these relations?  
27- What do you think qualified Morocco to be the first EU Mediterranean partner to benefit from 
an Advanced Status?  
28- Do you think the Advanced Status will soon translate into a more concrete action plan? 
29- The EU’s new “mantra” with its neighbourhood is “more for more”. How can the EU offer 
more in the context of the current economic crisis? 
30- How does the EU regard the recent political reforms in Morocco and its new constitution? 
31- How did the EU respond to these reforms and what else is the Union expecting from the 
country? 
32- What do you think are Morocco’s expectations with regard to the Advanced Status with the 
EU? 
33- Will Morocco’s Advanced Status imply further European concessions relative to Morocco’s 
agricultural and fisheries exports to the EU? 
34- What are the major differences among EU countries with regard to offering Morocco more 
market access? 
35- What impact did the southern European agricultural interest groups (Spain/France) have on 
the February 2012 EU-Morocco agreement on agriculture and fisheries before and after the deal? 
                                                          
179 The list shows all the core questions that were asked. However, the choice of which questions to ask 
depended on the interviewee’s profile. Other related questions were asked depending on the conversations. 
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